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Jepson Taylor

Publications and source records attributed to Jepson Taylor.

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No Accidental Software Agent First Canonical Code for Human Code Entropy Reduction and 30 to 500 times Lower Frontier Model Requirements

Frontier coding models may spend substantial capacity learning not only program behavior, but also accidental entropy in human repositories. Such repositories contain valuable signals: tests, incidents, migrations, edge cases, product judgment, and operational history. These signals are entangled with framework churn, naming drift, generated-source ambiguity, dependency rituals, CI dialects, weak proof routes, and human-oriented review customs. We propose agent-first canonical code, a proof-carrying substrate that rewrites routine product software into canonical behavior profiles, typed change algebra, proof lanes, constrained edit grammars, semantic patch cells, runtime negative memory, and proof-carrying change objects. The core hypothesis is that quotienting software by behavior equivalence under a declared oracle can collapse equivalent encodings into governed representatives with explicit evidence and proof obligations. The endpoint is amortized cost per verified correct change, including source, context, reasoning, tools, verification, security, provenance, review, failed loops, defects, and foundry cost under a common oracle. Reported reduction bands are hypotheses, not measured frontier results. The proposed limit is a No-Accident Horizon: removable accident decreases until residual novelty, evidence, governance, risk, and future optionality dominate. For supported routine-product distributions, this gives a defensible planning target near 100-fold all-in cost reduction, not a guarantee for all software. Preliminary QLoRA experiments on Qwen2.5-Coder-14B show that 64,088 canonical trajectories are learnable and suppress tested forbidden-language markers, but do not establish behavior preservation, scaling economics, or verified-change cost. The contribution is a falsifiable program centered on minimum functional description length and verified-change cost.

cs.SE

ZitPit: Consumer-Side Admission Control for Agentic Software Intake

AI IDEs and coding agents compress discovery, fetch, workspace open, installation, and execution into one low-observability loop. Existing defenses such as provenance frameworks, package and repository firewalls, runtime protection, and tool-approval prompts each cover part of that path, but they often leave the final consumer-side execution decision implicit. ZitPit is a 100% open-source Rust system that argues for a stricter boundary: first-seen external artifacts should become durable policy events before they gain execution rights on protected developer or CI hosts. The current public evidence is intentionally narrow and explicit. It includes repeated Git smart-HTTP intake measurements showing that approved artifacts can remain faster than unmanaged public fetch, plus implemented protected-session and governed-egress proof families. The broader contribution is architectural rather than universal-coverage-by-assertion: ZitPit unifies artifact admission, repo-open state, capability-scoped execution, and durable policy records at the consumer execution boundary for agentic workflows.

cs.CR