arXiv subjects

Jeremiah Blocki

Publications and source records attributed to Jeremiah Blocki.

52 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2018

On the Computational Complexity of Minimal Cumulative Cost Graph Pebbling

We consider the computational complexity of finding a legal black pebbling of a DAG $G=(V,E)$ with minimum cumulative cost. A black pebbling is a sequence $P_0,\ldots, P_t \subseteq V$ of sets of nodes which must satisfy the following properties: $P_0 = \emptyset$ (we start off with no pebbles on $G$), $\mathsf{sinks}(G) \subseteq \bigcup_{j \leq t} P_j$ (every sink node was pebbled at some point) and $\mathsf{parents}\big(P_{i+1}\backslash P_i\big) \subseteq P_i$ (we can only place a new pebble on a node $v$ if all of $v$'s parents had a pebble during the last round). The cumulative cost of a pebbling $P_0,P_1,\ldots, P_t \subseteq V$ is $\mathsf{cc}(P) = | P_1| + \ldots + | P_t|$. The cumulative pebbling cost is an especially important security metric for data-independent memory hard functions, an important primitive for password hashing. Thus, an efficient (approximation) algorithm would be an invaluable tool for the cryptanalysis of password hash functions as it would provide an automated tool to establish tight bounds on the amortized space-time cost of computing the function. We show that such a tool is unlikely to exist. In particular, we prove the following results. (1) It is $\texttt{NP}\mbox{-}\texttt{Hard}$ to find a pebbling minimizing cumulative cost. (2) The natural linear program relaxation for the problem has integrality gap $\tilde{O}(n)$, where $n$ is the number of nodes in $G$. We conjecture that the problem is hard to approximate. (3) We show that a related problem, find the minimum size subset $S\subseteq V$ such that $\textsf{depth}(G-S) \leq d$, is also $\texttt{NP}\mbox{-}\texttt{Hard}$. In fact, under the unique games conjecture there is no $(2-ε)$-approximation algorithm.

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arXiv2017

Sustained Space Complexity

Memory-hard functions (MHF) are functions whose evaluation cost is dominated by memory cost. MHFs are egalitarian, in the sense that evaluating them on dedicated hardware (like FPGAs or ASICs) is not much cheaper than on off-the-shelf hardware (like x86 CPUs). MHFs have interesting cryptographic applications, most notably to password hashing and securing blockchains. Alwen and Serbinenko [STOC'15] define the cumulative memory complexity (cmc) of a function as the sum (over all time-steps) of the amount of memory required to compute the function. They advocate that a good MHF must have high cmc. Unlike previous notions, cmc takes into account that dedicated hardware might exploit amortization and parallelism. Still, cmc has been critizised as insufficient, as it fails to capture possible time-memory trade-offs, as memory cost doesn't scale linearly, functions with the same cmc could still have very different actual hardware cost. In this work we address this problem, and introduce the notion of sustained-memory complexity, which requires that any algorithm evaluating the function must use a large amount of memory for many steps. We construct functions (in the parallel random oracle model) whose sustained-memory complexity is almost optimal: our function can be evaluated using $n$ steps and $O(n/\log(n))$ memory, in each step making one query to the (fixed-input length) random oracle, while any algorithm that can make arbitrary many parallel queries to the random oracle, still needs $Ω(n/\log(n))$ memory for $Ω(n)$ steps. Our main technical contribution is the construction is a family of DAGs on $n$ nodes with constant indegree with high "sustained-space complexity", meaning that any parallel black-pebbling strategy requires $Ω(n/\log(n))$ pebbles for at least $Ω(n)$ steps.

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arXiv2017

Optimizing Locally Differentially Private Protocols

Protocols satisfying Local Differential Privacy (LDP) enable parties to collect aggregate information about a population while protecting each user's privacy, without relying on a trusted third party. LDP protocols (such as Google's RAPPOR) have been deployed in real-world scenarios. In these protocols, a user encodes his private information and perturbs the encoded value locally before sending it to an aggregator, who combines values that users contribute to infer statistics about the population. In this paper, we introduce a framework that generalizes several LDP protocols proposed in the literature. Our framework yields a simple and fast aggregation algorithm, whose accuracy can be precisely analyzed. Our in-depth analysis enables us to choose optimal parameters, resulting in two new protocols (i.e., Optimized Unary Encoding and Optimized Local Hashing) that provide better utility than protocols previously proposed. We present precise conditions for when each proposed protocol should be used, and perform experiments that demonstrate the advantage of our proposed protocols.

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arXiv2016

Towards Human Computable Passwords

An interesting challenge for the cryptography community is to design authentication protocols that are so simple that a human can execute them without relying on a fully trusted computer. We propose several candidate authentication protocols for a setting in which the human user can only receive assistance from a semi-trusted computer --- a computer that stores information and performs computations correctly but does not provide confidentiality. Our schemes use a semi-trusted computer to store and display public challenges $C_i\in[n]^k$. The human user memorizes a random secret mapping $σ:[n]\rightarrow\mathbb{Z}_d$ and authenticates by computing responses $f(σ(C_i))$ to a sequence of public challenges where $f:\mathbb{Z}_d^k\rightarrow\mathbb{Z}_d$ is a function that is easy for the human to evaluate. We prove that any statistical adversary needs to sample $m=\tildeΩ(n^{s(f)})$ challenge-response pairs to recover $σ$, for a security parameter $s(f)$ that depends on two key properties of $f$. To obtain our results, we apply the general hypercontractivity theorem to lower bound the statistical dimension of the distribution over challenge-response pairs induced by $f$ and $σ$. Our lower bounds apply to arbitrary functions $f $ (not just to functions that are easy for a human to evaluate), and generalize recent results of Feldman et al. As an application, we propose a family of human computable password functions $f_{k_1,k_2}$ in which the user needs to perform $2k_1+2k_2+1$ primitive operations (e.g., adding two digits or remembering $σ(i)$), and we show that $s(f) = \min\{k_1+1, (k_2+1)/2\}$. For these schemes, we prove that forging passwords is equivalent to recovering the secret mapping. Thus, our human computable password schemes can maintain strong security guarantees even after an adversary has observed the user login to many different accounts.

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arXiv2016

CASH: A Cost Asymmetric Secure Hash Algorithm for Optimal Password Protection

An adversary who has obtained the cryptographic hash of a user's password can mount an offline attack to crack the password by comparing this hash value with the cryptographic hashes of likely password guesses. This offline attacker is limited only by the resources he is willing to invest to crack the password. Key-stretching tools can help mitigate the threat of offline attacks by making each password guess more expensive for the adversary to verify. However, key-stretching increases authentication costs for a legitimate authentication server. We introduce a novel Stackelberg game model which captures the essential elements of this interaction between a defender and an offline attacker. We then introduce Cost Asymmetric Secure Hash (CASH), a randomized key-stretching mechanism that minimizes the fraction of passwords that would be cracked by a rational offline attacker without increasing amortized authentication costs for the legitimate authentication server. CASH is motivated by the observation that the legitimate authentication server will typically run the authentication procedure to verify a correct password, while an offline adversary will typically use incorrect password guesses. By using randomization we can ensure that the amortized cost of running CASH to verify a correct password guess is significantly smaller than the cost of rejecting an incorrect password. Using our Stackelberg game framework we can quantify the quality of the underlying CASH running time distribution in terms of the fraction of passwords that a rational offline adversary would crack. We provide an efficient algorithm to compute high quality CASH distributions for the defender. Finally, we analyze CASH using empirical data from two large scale password frequency datasets. Our analysis shows that CASH can significantly reduce (up to $50\%$) the fraction of password cracked by a rational offline adversary.

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arXiv2016

Client-CASH: Protecting Master Passwords against Offline Attacks

Offline attacks on passwords are increasingly commonplace and dangerous. An offline adversary is limited only by the amount of computational resources he or she is willing to invest to crack a user's password. The danger is compounded by the existence of authentication servers who fail to adopt proper password storage practices like key-stretching. Password managers can help mitigate these risks by adopting key stretching procedures like hash iteration or memory hard functions to derive site specific passwords from the user's master password on the client-side. While key stretching can reduce the offline adversary's success rate, these procedures also increase computational costs for a legitimate user. Motivated by the observation that most of the password guesses of the offline adversary will be incorrect, we propose a client side cost asymmetric secure hashing scheme (Client-CASH). Client-CASH randomizes the runtime of client-side key stretching procedure in a way that the expected computational cost of our key derivation function is greater when run with an incorrect master password. We make several contributions. First, we show how to introduce randomness into a client-side key stretching algorithms through the use of halting predicates which are selected randomly at the time of account creation. Second, we formalize the problem of finding the optimal running time distribution subject to certain cost constraints for the client and certain security constrains on the halting predicates. Finally, we demonstrate that Client-CASH can reduce the adversary's success rate by up to $21\%$. These results demonstrate the promise of the Client-CASH mechanism.

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arXiv2015

Audit Games with Multiple Defender Resources

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, social networks, government agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential information. Recent work on audit games models the strategic interaction between an auditor with a single audit resource and auditees as a Stackelberg game, augmenting associated well-studied security games with a configurable punishment parameter. We significantly generalize this audit game model to account for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to practical auditing scenarios. We provide an FPTAS that computes an approximately optimal solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem. The main technical novelty is in the design and correctness proof of an optimization transformation that enables the construction of this FPTAS. In addition, we experimentally demonstrate that this transformation significantly speeds up computation of solutions for a class of audit games and security games.

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arXiv2014

Set Families with Low Pairwise Intersection

A $\left(n,\ell,γ\right)$-sharing set family of size $m$ is a family of sets $S_1,\ldots,S_m\subseteq [n]$ s.t. each set has size $\ell$ and each pair of sets shares at most $γ$ elements. We let $m\left(n,\ell,γ\right)$ denote the maximum size of any such set family and we consider the following question: How large can $m\left(n,\ell,γ\right)$ be? $\left(n,\ell,γ\right)$-sharing set families have a rich set of applications including the construction of pseudorandom number generators and usable and secure password management schemes. We analyze the explicit construction of Blocki et al using recent bounds on the value of the $t$'th Ramanujan prime. We show that this explicit construction produces a $\left(4\ell^2\ln 4\ell,\ell,γ\right)$-sharing set family of size $\left(2 \ell \ln 2\ell\right)^{γ+1}$ for any $\ell\geq γ$. We also show that the construction of Blocki et al can be used to obtain a weak $\left(n,\ell,γ\right)$-sharing set family of size $m$ for any $m >0$. These results are competitive with the inexplicit construction of Raz et al for weak $\left(n,\ell,γ\right)$-sharing families. We show that our explicit construction of weak $\left(n,\ell,γ\right)$-sharing set families can be used to obtain a parallelizable pseudorandom number generator with a low memory footprint by using the pseudorandom number generator of Nisan and Wigderson. We also prove that $m\left(n,n/c_1,c_2n\right)$ must be a constant whenever $c_2 \leq \frac{2}{c_1^3+c_1^2}$. We show that this bound is nearly tight as $m\left(n,n/c_1,c_2n\right)$ grows exponentially fast whenever $c_2 > c_1^{-2}$.

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arXiv2013

GOTCHA Password Hackers!

We introduce GOTCHAs (Generating panOptic Turing Tests to Tell Computers and Humans Apart) as a way of preventing automated offline dictionary attacks against user selected passwords. A GOTCHA is a randomized puzzle generation protocol, which involves interaction between a computer and a human. Informally, a GOTCHA should satisfy two key properties: (1) The puzzles are easy for the human to solve. (2) The puzzles are hard for a computer to solve even if it has the random bits used by the computer to generate the final puzzle --- unlike a CAPTCHA. Our main theorem demonstrates that GOTCHAs can be used to mitigate the threat of offline dictionary attacks against passwords by ensuring that a password cracker must receive constant feedback from a human being while mounting an attack. Finally, we provide a candidate construction of GOTCHAs based on Inkblot images. Our construction relies on the usability assumption that users can recognize the phrases that they originally used to describe each Inkblot image --- a much weaker usability assumption than previous password systems based on Inkblots which required users to recall their phrase exactly. We conduct a user study to evaluate the usability of our GOTCHA construction. We also generate a GOTCHA challenge where we encourage artificial intelligence and security researchers to try to crack several passwords protected with our scheme.

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arXiv2013

Naturally Rehearsing Passwords

We introduce quantitative usability and security models to guide the design of password management schemes --- systematic strategies to help users create and remember multiple passwords. In the same way that security proofs in cryptography are based on complexity-theoretic assumptions (e.g., hardness of factoring and discrete logarithm), we quantify usability by introducing usability assumptions. In particular, password management relies on assumptions about human memory, e.g., that a user who follows a particular rehearsal schedule will successfully maintain the corresponding memory. These assumptions are informed by research in cognitive science and validated through empirical studies. Given rehearsal requirements and a user's visitation schedule for each account, we use the total number of extra rehearsals that the user would have to do to remember all of his passwords as a measure of the usability of the password scheme. Our usability model leads us to a key observation: password reuse benefits users not only by reducing the number of passwords that the user has to memorize, but more importantly by increasing the natural rehearsal rate for each password. We also present a security model which accounts for the complexity of password management with multiple accounts and associated threats, including online, offline, and plaintext password leak attacks. Observing that current password management schemes are either insecure or unusable, we present Shared Cues--- a new scheme in which the underlying secret is strategically shared across accounts to ensure that most rehearsal requirements are satisfied naturally while simultaneously providing strong security. The construction uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to achieve these competing goals.

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arXiv2013

Adaptive Regret Minimization in Bounded-Memory Games

Online learning algorithms that minimize regret provide strong guarantees in situations that involve repeatedly making decisions in an uncertain environment, e.g. a driver deciding what route to drive to work every day. While regret minimization has been extensively studied in repeated games, we study regret minimization for a richer class of games called bounded memory games. In each round of a two-player bounded memory-m game, both players simultaneously play an action, observe an outcome and receive a reward. The reward may depend on the last m outcomes as well as the actions of the players in the current round. The standard notion of regret for repeated games is no longer suitable because actions and rewards can depend on the history of play. To account for this generality, we introduce the notion of k-adaptive regret, which compares the reward obtained by playing actions prescribed by the algorithm against a hypothetical k-adaptive adversary with the reward obtained by the best expert in hindsight against the same adversary. Roughly, a hypothetical k-adaptive adversary adapts her strategy to the defender's actions exactly as the real adversary would within each window of k rounds. Our definition is parametrized by a set of experts, which can include both fixed and adaptive defender strategies. We investigate the inherent complexity of and design algorithms for adaptive regret minimization in bounded memory games of perfect and imperfect information. We prove a hardness result showing that, with imperfect information, any k-adaptive regret minimizing algorithm (with fixed strategies as experts) must be inefficient unless NP=RP even when playing against an oblivious adversary. In contrast, for bounded memory games of perfect and imperfect information we present approximate 0-adaptive regret minimization algorithms against an oblivious adversary running in time n^{O(1)}.

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arXiv2013

Audit Games

Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern organizations that hold large volumes of personal information (e.g., hospitals, banks, and Web services providers) relies heavily on internal audit mechanisms. We study economic considerations in the design of these mechanisms, focusing in particular on effective resource allocation and appropriate punishment schemes. We present an audit game model that is a natural generalization of a standard security game model for resource allocation with an additional punishment parameter. Computing the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game is challenging because it involves solving an optimization problem with non-convex quadratic constraints. We present an additive FPTAS that efficiently computes a solution that is arbitrarily close to the optimal solution.

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arXiv2013

Optimizing Password Composition Policies

A password composition policy restricts the space of allowable passwords to eliminate weak passwords that are vulnerable to statistical guessing attacks. Usability studies have demonstrated that existing password composition policies can sometimes result in weaker password distributions; hence a more principled approach is needed. We introduce the first theoretical model for optimizing password composition policies. We study the computational and sample complexity of this problem under different assumptions on the structure of policies and on users' preferences over passwords. Our main positive result is an algorithm that -- with high probability --- constructs almost optimal policies (which are specified as a union of subsets of allowed passwords), and requires only a small number of samples of users' preferred passwords. We complement our theoretical results with simulations using a real-world dataset of 32 million passwords.

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arXiv2013

Differentially Private Data Analysis of Social Networks via Restricted Sensitivity

We introduce the notion of restricted sensitivity as an alternative to global and smooth sensitivity to improve accuracy in differentially private data analysis. The definition of restricted sensitivity is similar to that of global sensitivity except that instead of quantifying over all possible datasets, we take advantage of any beliefs about the dataset that a querier may have, to quantify over a restricted class of datasets. Specifically, given a query f and a hypothesis H about the structure of a dataset D, we show generically how to transform f into a new query f_H whose global sensitivity (over all datasets including those that do not satisfy H) matches the restricted sensitivity of the query f. Moreover, if the belief of the querier is correct (i.e., D is in H) then f_H(D) = f(D). If the belief is incorrect, then f_H(D) may be inaccurate. We demonstrate the usefulness of this notion by considering the task of answering queries regarding social-networks, which we model as a combination of a graph and a labeling of its vertices. In particular, while our generic procedure is computationally inefficient, for the specific definition of H as graphs of bounded degree, we exhibit efficient ways of constructing f_H using different projection-based techniques. We then analyze two important query classes: subgraph counting queries (e.g., number of triangles) and local profile queries (e.g., number of people who know a spy and a computer-scientist who know each other). We demonstrate that the restricted sensitivity of such queries can be significantly lower than their smooth sensitivity. Thus, using restricted sensitivity we can maintain privacy whether or not D is in H, while providing more accurate results in the event that H holds true.

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arXiv2012

The Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transform Itself Preserves Differential Privacy

This paper proves that an "old dog", namely -- the classical Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform, "performs new tricks" -- it gives a novel way of preserving differential privacy. We show that if we take two databases, $D$ and $D'$, such that (i) $D'-D$ is a rank-1 matrix of bounded norm and (ii) all singular values of $D$ and $D'$ are sufficiently large, then multiplying either $D$ or $D'$ with a vector of iid normal Gaussians yields two statistically close distributions in the sense of differential privacy. Furthermore, a small, deterministic and \emph{public} alteration of the input is enough to assert that all singular values of $D$ are large. We apply the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform to the task of approximating cut-queries: the number of edges crossing a $(S,\bar S)$-cut in a graph. We show that the JL transform allows us to \emph{publish a sanitized graph} that preserves edge differential privacy (where two graphs are neighbors if they differ on a single edge) while adding only $O(|S|/ε)$ random noise to any given query (w.h.p). Comparing the additive noise of our algorithm to existing algorithms for answering cut-queries in a differentially private manner, we outperform all others on small cuts ($|S| = o(n)$). We also apply our technique to the task of estimating the variance of a given matrix in any given direction. The JL transform allows us to \emph{publish a sanitized covariance matrix} that preserves differential privacy w.r.t bounded changes (each row in the matrix can change by at most a norm-1 vector) while adding random noise of magnitude independent of the size of the matrix (w.h.p). In contrast, existing algorithms introduce an error which depends on the matrix dimensions.

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arXiv2010

Resolving the Complexity of Some Data Privacy Problems

We formally study two methods for data sanitation that have been used extensively in the database community: k-anonymity and l-diversity. We settle several open problems concerning the difficulty of applying these methods optimally, proving both positive and negative results: 1. 2-anonymity is in P. 2. The problem of partitioning the edges of a triangle-free graph into 4-stars (degree-three vertices) is NP-hard. This yields an alternative proof that 3-anonymity is NP-hard even when the database attributes are all binary. 3. 3-anonymity with only 27 attributes per record is MAX SNP-hard. 4. For databases with n rows, k-anonymity is in O(4^n poly(n)) time for all k > 1. 5. For databases with n rows and l <= log_{2c+2} log n attributes over an alphabet of cardinality c = O(1), k-anonymity is in P. Assuming c, l = O(1), k-anonymity is in O(n). 6. 3-diversity with binary attributes is NP-hard, with one sensitive attribute. 7. 2-diversity with binary attributes is NP-hard, with three sensitive attributes.

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