arXiv subjects

Jeremie S. Kim

Publications and source records attributed to Jeremie S. Kim.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2023

BLEND: A Fast, Memory-Efficient, and Accurate Mechanism to Find Fuzzy Seed Matches in Genome Analysis

Generating the hash values of short subsequences, called seeds, enables quickly identifying similarities between genomic sequences by matching seeds with a single lookup of their hash values. However, these hash values can be used only for finding exact-matching seeds as the conventional hashing methods assign distinct hash values for different seeds, including highly similar seeds. Finding only exact-matching seeds causes either 1) increasing the use of the costly sequence alignment or 2) limited sensitivity. We introduce BLEND, the first efficient and accurate mechanism that can identify both exact-matching and highly similar seeds with a single lookup of their hash values, called fuzzy seed matches. BLEND 1) utilizes a technique called SimHash, that can generate the same hash value for similar sets, and 2) provides the proper mechanisms for using seeds as sets with the SimHash technique to find fuzzy seed matches efficiently. We show the benefits of BLEND when used in read overlapping and read mapping. For read overlapping, BLEND is faster by 2.4x - 83.9x (on average 19.3x), has a lower memory footprint by 0.9x - 14.1x (on average 3.8x), and finds higher quality overlaps leading to accurate de novo assemblies than the state-of-the-art tool, minimap2. For read mapping, BLEND is faster by 0.8x - 4.1x (on average 1.7x) than minimap2. Source code is available at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/BLEND.

q-bio.GN↗

arXiv2022

Uncovering In-DRAM RowHammer Protection Mechanisms: A New Methodology, Custom RowHammer Patterns, and Implications

The RowHammer vulnerability in DRAM is a critical threat to system security. To protect against RowHammer, vendors commit to security-through-obscurity: modern DRAM chips rely on undocumented, proprietary, on-die mitigations, commonly known as Target Row Refresh (TRR). At a high level, TRR detects and refreshes potential RowHammer-victim rows, but its exact implementations are not openly disclosed. Security guarantees of TRR mechanisms cannot be easily studied due to their proprietary nature. To assess the security guarantees of recent DRAM chips, we present Uncovering TRR (U-TRR), an experimental methodology to analyze in-DRAM TRR implementations. U-TRR is based on the new observation that data retention failures in DRAM enable a side channel that leaks information on how TRR refreshes potential victim rows. U-TRR allows us to (i) understand how logical DRAM rows are laid out physically in silicon; (ii) study undocumented on-die TRR mechanisms; and (iii) combine (i) and (ii) to evaluate the RowHammer security guarantees of modern DRAM chips. We show how U-TRR allows us to craft RowHammer access patterns that successfully circumvent the TRR mechanisms employed in 45 DRAM modules of the three major DRAM vendors. We find that the DRAM modules we analyze are vulnerable to RowHammer, having bit flips in up to 99.9% of all DRAM rows. We make U-TRR source code openly and freely available at [106].

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

RevaMp3D: Architecting the Processor Core and Cache Hierarchy for Systems with Monolithically-Integrated Logic and Memory

Recent nano-technological advances enable the Monolithic 3D (M3D) integration of multiple memory and logic layers in a single chip, allowing for fine-grained connections between layers and significantly alleviating main memory bottlenecks. We show for a variety of workloads, on a state-of-the-art M3D-based system, that the performance and energy bottlenecks shift from main memory to the processor core and cache hierarchy. Therefore, there is a need to revisit current designs that have been conventionally tailored to tackle the memory bottleneck. Based on the insights from our design space exploration, we propose RevaMp3D, introducing five key changes. First, we propose removing the shared last-level cache, as this delivers speedups comparable to or exceeding those from increasing its size or reducing its latency across all workloads. Second, since improving L1 cache latency has a large impact on performance, we reduce L1 latency by leveraging an M3D layout to shorten its wires. Third, we repurpose the area from the removed cache to widen and scale up pipeline structures, accommodating more in-flight requests that are efficiently served by M3D memory. To avoid latency penalties from these larger structures, we leverage M3D layouts. Fourth, to facilitate high thread-level parallelism, we propose a new fine-grained synchronization technique, using M3D's dense inter-layer connectivity. Fifth, we leverage the M3D main memory to mitigate the core bottlenecks. We propose a processor frontend design that memoizes the repetitive fetched, decoded, and reordered instructions, stores them in main memory, and turns off the relevant parts of the core when possible. RevaMp3D provides 1.2x-2.9x speedup and 1.2x-1.4x energy reduction compared to a state-of-the-art M3D system. We also analyze RevaMp3D's design decisions across various memory latencies to facilitate latency-aware design decisions.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2022

FastRemap: A Tool for Quickly Remapping Reads between Genome Assemblies

A genome read data set can be quickly and efficiently remapped from one reference to another similar reference (e.g., between two reference versions or two similar species) using a variety of tools, e.g., the commonly-used CrossMap tool. With the explosion of available genomic data sets and references, high-performance remapping tools will be even more important for keeping up with the computational demands of genome assembly and analysis. We provide FastRemap, a fast and efficient tool for remapping reads between genome assemblies. FastRemap provides up to a 7.82$\times$ speedup (6.47$\times$, on average) and uses as low as 61.7% (80.7%, on average) of the peak memory consumption compared to the state-of-the-art remapping tool, CrossMap. FastRemap is written in C++. The source code and user manual are freely available at: github.com/CMU-SAFARI/FastRemap. Docker image available at: https://hub.docker.com/r/alkanlab/fast. Also available in Bioconda at: https://anaconda.org/bioconda/fastremap-bio.

q-bio.GN↗

arXiv2022

BlockHammer: Preventing RowHammer at Low Cost by Blacklisting Rapidly-Accessed DRAM Rows

Aggressive memory density scaling causes modern DRAM devices to suffer from RowHammer, a phenomenon where rapidly activating a DRAM row can cause bit-flips in physically-nearby rows. Recent studies demonstrate that modern DRAM chips, including chips previously marketed as RowHammer-safe, are even more vulnerable to RowHammer than older chips. Many works show that attackers can exploit RowHammer bit-flips to reliably mount system-level attacks to escalate privilege and leak private data. Therefore, it is critical to ensure RowHammer-safe operation on all DRAM-based systems. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms face two major challenges. First, they incur increasingly higher performance and/or area overheads when applied to more vulnerable DRAM chips. Second, they require either proprietary information about or modifications to the DRAM chip design. In this paper, we show that it is possible to efficiently and scalably prevent RowHammer bit-flips without knowledge of or modification to DRAM internals. We introduce BlockHammer, a low-cost, effective, and easy-to-adopt RowHammer mitigation mechanism that overcomes the two key challenges by selectively throttling memory accesses that could otherwise cause RowHammer bit-flips. The key idea of BlockHammer is to (1) track row activation rates using area-efficient Bloom filters and (2) use the tracking data to ensure that no row is ever activated rapidly enough to induce RowHammer bit-flips. By doing so, BlockHammer (1) makes it impossible for a RowHammer bit-flip to occur and (2) greatly reduces a RowHammer attack's impact on the performance of co-running benign applications. Compared to state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms, BlockHammer provides competitive performance and energy when the system is not under a RowHammer attack and significantly better performance and energy when the system is under attack.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Understanding RowHammer Under Reduced Wordline Voltage: An Experimental Study Using Real DRAM Devices

RowHammer is a circuit-level DRAM vulnerability, where repeatedly activating and precharging a DRAM row, and thus alternating the voltage of a row's wordline between low and high voltage levels, can cause bit flips in physically nearby rows. Recent DRAM chips are more vulnerable to RowHammer: with technology node scaling, the minimum number of activate-precharge cycles to induce a RowHammer bit flip reduces and the RowHammer bit error rate increases. Therefore, it is critical to develop effective and scalable approaches to protect modern DRAM systems against RowHammer. To enable such solutions, it is essential to develop a deeper understanding of the RowHammer vulnerability of modern DRAM chips. However, even though the voltage toggling on a wordline is a key determinant of RowHammer vulnerability, no prior work experimentally demonstrates the effect of wordline voltage (VPP) on the RowHammer vulnerability. Our work closes this gap in understanding. This is the first work to experimentally demonstrate on 272 real DRAM chips that lowering VPP reduces a DRAM chip's RowHammer vulnerability. We show that lowering VPP 1) increases the number of activate-precharge cycles needed to induce a RowHammer bit flip by up to 85.8% with an average of 7.4% across all tested chips and 2) decreases the RowHammer bit error rate by up to 66.9% with an average of 15.2% across all tested chips. At the same time, reducing VPP marginally worsens a DRAM cell's access latency, charge restoration, and data retention time within the guardbands of system-level nominal timing parameters for 208 out of 272 tested chips. We conclude that reducing VPP is a promising strategy for reducing a DRAM chip's RowHammer vulnerability without requiring modifications to DRAM chips.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2022

COVIDHunter: COVID-19 pandemic wave prediction and mitigation via seasonality-aware modeling

Early detection and isolation of COVID-19 patients are essential for successful implementation of mitigation strategies and eventually curbing the disease spread. With a limited number of daily COVID-19 tests performed in every country, simulating the COVID-19 spread along with the potential effect of each mitigation strategy currently remains one of the most effective ways in managing the healthcare system and guiding policy-makers. We introduce COVIDHunter, a flexible and accurate COVID-19 outbreak simulation model that evaluates the current mitigation measures that are applied to a region, predicts COVID-19 statistics (the daily number of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths), and provides suggestions on what strength the upcoming mitigation measure should be. The key idea of COVIDHunter is to quantify the spread of COVID-19 in a geographical region by simulating the average number of new infections caused by an infected person considering the effect of external factors, such as environmental conditions (e.g., climate, temperature, humidity), different variants of concern, vaccination rate, and mitigation measures. Using Switzerland as a case study, COVIDHunter estimates that we are experiencing a deadly new wave that will peak on 26 January 2022, which is very similar in numbers to the wave we had in February 2020. The policy-makers have only one choice that is to increase the strength of the currently applied mitigation measures for 30 days. Unlike existing models, the COVIDHunter model accurately monitors and predicts the daily number of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths due to COVID-19. Our model is flexible to configure and simple to modify for modeling different scenarios under different environmental conditions and mitigation measures. We release the source code of the COVIDHunter implementation at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/COVIDHunter.

q-bio.QM↗

arXiv2022

COVIDHunter: An Accurate, Flexible, and Environment-Aware Open-Source COVID-19 Outbreak Simulation Model

Background: Early detection and isolation of COVID-19 patients are essential for successful implementation of mitigation strategies and eventually curbing the disease spread. With a limited number of daily COVID-19 tests performed in every country, simulating the COVID-19 spread along with the potential effect of each mitigation strategy currently remains one of the most effective ways in managing the healthcare system and guiding policy-makers. Methods: We introduce COVIDHunter, a flexible and accurate COVID-19 outbreak simulation model that evaluates the current mitigation measures that are applied to a region and provides suggestions on what strength the upcoming mitigation measure should be. The key idea of COVIDHunter is to quantify the spread of COVID-19 in a geographical region by simulating the average number of new infections caused by an infected person considering the effect of external factors, such as environmental conditions (e.g., climate, temperature, humidity) and mitigation measures. Results: Using Switzerland as a case study, COVIDHunter estimates that if the policy-makers relax the mitigation measures by 50% for 30 days then both the daily capacity need for hospital beds and daily number of deaths increase exponentially by an average of 5.1x, who may occupy ICU beds and ventilators for a period of time. Unlike existing models, the COVIDHunter model accurately monitors and predicts the daily number of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths due to COVID-19. Our model is flexible to configure and simple to modify for modeling different scenarios under different environmental conditions and mitigation measures. Availability: We release the source code of the COVIDHunter implementation at https://github.com/CMU- SAFARI/COVIDHunter and show how to flexibly configure our model for any scenario and easily extend it for different measures and conditions than we account for.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2022

DR-STRaNGe: End-to-End System Design for DRAM-based True Random Number Generators

Random number generation is an important task in a wide variety of critical applications including cryptographic algorithms, scientific simulations, and industrial testing tools. True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) produce truly random data by sampling a physical entropy source that typically requires custom hardware and suffers from long latency. To enable high-bandwidth and low-latency TRNGs on commodity devices, recent works propose TRNGs that use DRAM as an entropy source. Although prior works demonstrate promising DRAM-based TRNGs, integration of such mechanisms into real systems poses challenges. We identify three challenges for using DRAM-based TRNGs in current systems: (1) generating random numbers can degrade system performance by slowing down concurrently-running applications due to the interference between RNG and regular memory operations in the memory controller (i.e., RNG interference), (2) this RNG interference can degrade system fairness by unfairly prioritizing applications that intensively use random numbers (i.e., RNG applications), and (3) RNG applications can experience significant slowdowns due to the high RNG latency. We propose DR-STRaNGe, an end-to-end system design for DRAM-based TRNGs that (1) reduces the RNG interference by separating RNG requests from regular requests in the memory controller, (2) improves the system fairness with an RNG-aware memory request scheduler, and (3) hides the large TRNG latencies using a random number buffering mechanism with a new DRAM idleness predictor that accurately identifies idle DRAM periods. We evaluate DR-STRaNGe using a set of 186 multiprogrammed workloads. Compared to an RNG-oblivious baseline system, DR-STRaNGe improves the average performance of non-RNG and RNG applications by 17.9% and 25.1%, respectively. DR-STRaNGe improves average system fairness by 32.1% and reduces average energy consumption by 21%.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2022

AgileWatts: An Energy-Efficient CPU Core Idle-State Architecture for Latency-Sensitive Server Applications

User-facing applications running in modern datacenters exhibit irregular request patterns and are implemented using a multitude of services with tight latency requirements. These characteristics render ineffective existing energy conserving techniques when processors are idle due to the long transition time from a deep idle power state (C-state). While prior works propose management techniques to mitigate this inefficiency, we tackle it at its root with AgileWatts (AW): a new deep C-state architecture optimized for datacenter server processors targeting latency-sensitive applications. AW is based on three key ideas. First, AW eliminates the latency overhead of saving/restoring the core context (i.e., micro-architectural state) when powering-off/-on the core in a deep idle power state by i) implementing medium-grained power-gates, carefully distributed across the CPU core, and ii) retaining context in the power-ungated domain. Second, AW eliminates the flush latency overhead (several tens of microseconds) of the L1/L2 caches when entering a deep idle power state by keeping L1/L2 cache content power-ungated. A minimal control logic also remains power-ungated to serve cache coherence traffic (i.e., snoops) seamlessly. AW implements sleep-mode in caches to reduce caches leakage power consumption and lowers a core voltage to the minimum operational voltage level to minimize the leakage power of the power-ungated domain. Third, using a state-of-the-art power efficient all-digital phase-locked loop (ADPLL) clock generator, AW keeps the PLL active and locked during the idle state, further cutting precious microseconds of wake-up latency at a negligible power cost. Our evaluation with an accurate simulator calibrated against an Intel Skylake server shows that AW reduces the energy consumption of Memcached by up to 71% (35% on average) with up to 1% performance degradation.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2021

DarkGates: A Hybrid Power-Gating Architecture to Mitigate the Performance Impact of Dark-Silicon in High Performance Processors

To reduce the leakage power of inactive (dark) silicon components, modern processor systems shut-off these components' power supply using low-leakage transistors, called power-gates. Unfortunately, power-gates increase the system's power-delivery impedance and voltage guardband, limiting the system's maximum attainable voltage (i.e., Vmax) and, thus, the CPU core's maximum attainable frequency (i.e., Fmax). As a result, systems that are performance constrained by the CPU frequency (i.e., Fmax-constrained), such as high-end desktops, suffer significant performance loss due to power-gates. To mitigate this performance loss, we propose DarkGates, a hybrid system architecture that increases the performance of Fmax-constrained systems while fulfilling their power efficiency requirements. DarkGates is based on three key techniques: i) bypassing on-chip power-gates using package-level resources (called bypass mode), ii) extending power management firmware to support operation either in bypass mode or normal mode, and iii) introducing deeper idle power states. We implement DarkGates on an Intel Skylake microprocessor for client devices and evaluate it using a wide variety of workloads. On a real 4-core Skylake system with integrated graphics, DarkGates improves the average performance of SPEC CPU2006 workloads across all thermal design power (TDP) levels (35W-91W) between 4.2% and 5.3%. DarkGates maintains the performance of 3DMark workloads for desktop systems with TDP greater than 45W while for a 35W-TDP (the lowest TDP) desktop it experiences only a 2% degradation. In addition, DarkGates fulfills the requirements of the ENERGY STAR and the Intel Ready Mode energy efficiency benchmarks of desktop systems.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2021

A Deeper Look into RowHammer`s Sensitivities: Experimental Analysis of Real DRAM Chips and Implications on Future Attacks and Defenses

RowHammer is a circuit-level DRAM vulnerability where repeatedly accessing (i.e., hammering) a DRAM row can cause bit flips in physically nearby rows. The RowHammer vulnerability worsens as DRAM cell size and cell-to-cell spacing shrink. Recent studies demonstrate that modern DRAM chips, including chips previously marketed as RowHammer-safe, are even more vulnerable to RowHammer than older chips such that the required hammer count to cause a bit flip has reduced by more than 10X in the last decade. Therefore, it is essential to develop a better understanding and in-depth insights into the RowHammer vulnerability of modern DRAM chips to more effectively secure current and future systems. Our goal in this paper is to provide insights into fundamental properties of the RowHammer vulnerability that are not yet rigorously studied by prior works, but can potentially be $i$) exploited to develop more effective RowHammer attacks or $ii$) leveraged to design more effective and efficient defense mechanisms. To this end, we present an experimental characterization using 248~DDR4 and 24~DDR3 modern DRAM chips from four major DRAM manufacturers demonstrating how the RowHammer effects vary with three fundamental properties: 1)~DRAM chip temperature, 2)~aggressor row active time, and 3)~victim DRAM cell's physical location. Among our 16 new observations, we highlight that a RowHammer bit flip 1)~is very likely to occur in a bounded range, specific to each DRAM cell (e.g., 5.4% of the vulnerable DRAM cells exhibit errors in the range 70C to 90C), 2)~is more likely to occur if the aggressor row is active for longer time (e.g., RowHammer vulnerability increases by 36% if we keep a DRAM row active for 15 column accesses), and 3)~is more likely to occur in certain physical regions of the DRAM module under attack (e.g., 5% of the rows are 2x more vulnerable than the remaining 95% of the rows).

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Improving DRAM Performance, Security, and Reliability by Understanding and Exploiting DRAM Timing Parameter Margins

This dissertation rigorously characterizes many modern commodity DRAM devices and shows that by exploiting DRAM access timing margins within manufacturer-recommended DRAM timing specifications, we can significantly improve system performance, reduce power consumption, and improve device reliability and security. First, we characterize DRAM timing parameter margins and find that certain regions of DRAM can be accessed faster than other regions due to DRAM cell process manufacturing variation. We exploit this by enabling variable access times depending on the DRAM cells being accessed, which not only improves overall system performance, but also decreases power consumption. Second, we find that we can uniquely identify DRAM devices by the locations of failures that result when we access DRAM with timing parameters reduced below specification values. Because we induce these failures with DRAM accesses, we can generate these unique identifiers significantly more quickly than prior work. Third, we propose a random number generator that is based on our observation that timing failures in certain DRAM cells are randomly induced and can thus be repeatedly polled to very quickly generate true random values. Finally, we characterize the RowHammer security vulnerability on a wide range of modern DRAM chips while violating the DRAM refresh requirement in order to directly characterize the underlying DRAM technology without the interference of refresh commands. We demonstrate with our characterization of real chips, that existing RowHammer mitigation mechanisms either are not scalable or suffer from prohibitively large performance overheads in projected future devices and it is critical to research more effective solutions to RowHammer. Overall, our studies build a new understanding of modern DRAM devices to improve computing system performance, reliability and security all at the same time.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2021

Security Analysis of the Silver Bullet Technique for RowHammer Prevention

The purpose of this document is to study the security properties of the Silver Bullet algorithm against worst-case RowHammer attacks. We mathematically demonstrate that Silver Bullet, when properly configured and implemented in a DRAM chip, can securely prevent RowHammer attacks. The demonstration focuses on the most representative implementation of Silver Bullet, the patent claiming many implementation possibilities not covered in this demonstration. Our study concludes that Silver Bullet is a promising RowHammer prevention mechanism that can be configured to operate securely against RowHammer attacks at various efficiency-area tradeoff points, supporting relatively small hammer count values (e.g., 1000) and Silver Bullet table sizes (e.g., 1.06KB).

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

IChannels: Exploiting Current Management Mechanisms to Create Covert Channels in Modern Processors

To operate efficiently across a wide range of workloads with varying power requirements, a modern processor applies different current management mechanisms, which briefly throttle instruction execution while they adjust voltage and frequency to accommodate for power-hungry instructions (PHIs) in the instruction stream. Doing so 1) reduces the power consumption of non-PHI instructions in typical workloads and 2) optimizes system voltage regulators' cost and area for the common use case while limiting current consumption when executing PHIs. However, these mechanisms may compromise a system's confidentiality guarantees. In particular, we observe that multilevel side-effects of throttling mechanisms, due to PHI-related current management mechanisms, can be detected by two different software contexts (i.e., sender and receiver) running on 1) the same hardware thread, 2) co-located Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT) threads, and 3) different physical cores. Based on these new observations on current management mechanisms, we develop a new set of covert channels, IChannels, and demonstrate them in real modern Intel processors (which span more than 70% of the entire client and server processor market). Our analysis shows that IChannels provides more than 24x the channel capacity of state-of-the-art power management covert channels. We propose practical and effective mitigations to each covert channel in IChannels by leveraging the insights we gain through a rigorous characterization of real systems.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2021

CODIC: A Low-Cost Substrate for Enabling Custom In-DRAM Functionalities and Optimizations

DRAM is the dominant main memory technology used in modern computing systems. Computing systems implement a memory controller that interfaces with DRAM via DRAM commands. DRAM executes the given commands using internal components (e.g., access transistors, sense amplifiers) that are orchestrated by DRAM internal timings, which are fixed foreach DRAM command. Unfortunately, the use of fixed internal timings limits the types of operations that DRAM can perform and hinders the implementation of new functionalities and custom mechanisms that improve DRAM reliability, performance and energy. To overcome these limitations, we propose enabling programmable DRAM internal timings for controlling in-DRAM components. To this end, we design CODIC, a new low-cost DRAM substrate that enables fine-grained control over four previously fixed internal DRAM timings that are key to many DRAM operations. We implement CODIC with only minimal changes to the DRAM chip and the DDRx interface. To demonstrate the potential of CODIC, we propose two new CODIC-based security mechanisms that outperform state-of-the-art mechanisms in several ways: (1) a new DRAM Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) that is more robust and has significantly higher throughput than state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs, and (2) the first cold boot attack prevention mechanism that does not introduce any performance or energy overheads at runtime.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2021

QUAC-TRNG: High-Throughput True Random Number Generation Using Quadruple Row Activation in Commodity DRAM Chips

True random number generators (TRNG) sample random physical processes to create large amounts of random numbers for various use cases, including security-critical cryptographic primitives, scientific simulations, machine learning applications, and even recreational entertainment. Unfortunately, not every computing system is equipped with dedicated TRNG hardware, limiting the application space and security guarantees for such systems. To open the application space and enable security guarantees for the overwhelming majority of computing systems that do not necessarily have dedicated TRNG hardware, we develop QUAC-TRNG. QUAC-TRNG exploits the new observation that a carefully-engineered sequence of DRAM commands activates four consecutive DRAM rows in rapid succession. This QUadruple ACtivation (QUAC) causes the bitline sense amplifiers to non-deterministically converge to random values when we activate four rows that store conflicting data because the net deviation in bitline voltage fails to meet reliable sensing margins. We experimentally demonstrate that QUAC reliably generates random values across 136 commodity DDR4 DRAM chips from one major DRAM manufacturer. We describe how to develop an effective TRNG (QUAC-TRNG) based on QUAC. We evaluate the quality of our TRNG using NIST STS and find that QUAC-TRNG successfully passes each test. Our experimental evaluations show that QUAC-TRNG generates true random numbers with a throughput of 3.44 Gb/s (per DRAM channel), outperforming the state-of-the-art DRAM-based TRNG by 15.08x and 1.41x for basic and throughput-optimized versions, respectively. We show that QUAC-TRNG utilizes DRAM bandwidth better than the state-of-the-art, achieving up to 2.03x the throughput of a throughput-optimized baseline when scaling bus frequencies to 12 GT/s.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2021

pLUTo: Enabling Massively Parallel Computation in DRAM via Lookup Tables

Data movement between the main memory and the processor is a key contributor to execution time and energy consumption in memory-intensive applications. This data movement bottleneck can be alleviated using Processing-in-Memory (PiM). One category of PiM is Processing-using-Memory (PuM), in which computation takes place inside the memory array by exploiting intrinsic analog properties of the memory device. PuM yields high performance and energy efficiency, but existing PuM techniques support a limited range of operations. As a result, current PuM architectures cannot efficiently perform some complex operations (e.g., multiplication, division, exponentiation) without large increases in chip area and design complexity. To overcome these limitations of existing PuM architectures, we introduce pLUTo (processing-using-memory with lookup table (LUT) operations), a DRAM-based PuM architecture that leverages the high storage density of DRAM to enable the massively parallel storing and querying of lookup tables (LUTs). The key idea of pLUTo is to replace complex operations with low-cost, bulk memory reads (i.e., LUT queries) instead of relying on complex extra logic. We evaluate pLUTo across 11 real-world workloads that showcase the limitations of prior PuM approaches and show that our solution outperforms optimized CPU and GPU baselines by an average of 713$\times$ and 1.2$\times$, respectively, while simultaneously reducing energy consumption by an average of 1855$\times$ and 39.5$\times$. Across these workloads, pLUTo outperforms state-of-the-art PiM architectures by an average of 18.3$\times$. We also show that different versions of pLUTo provide different levels of flexibility and performance at different additional DRAM area overheads (between 10.2% and 23.1%). pLUTo's source code is openly and fully available at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/pLUTo.

cs.AR↗