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Jeremy Canale

Publications and source records attributed to Jeremy Canale.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Detecting Shadow AI: Unsanctioned LLM Agents on Enterprise Endpoints: A Taxonomy, an Open Detector and a Controlled Evaluation

Shadow IT, the use of technology that the IT organisation has not approved, is a long-standing governance problem. We argue that autonomous AI agents can make it grow much faster: agents make building tools nearly free, act with their user's privileges, and leave behind scripts, automations and MCP servers that are themselves unsanctioned. A simple compounding model shows that, under its assumptions, shadow IT grows exponentially once agentic artifacts reproduce faster than the organisation retires them; retiring them starts with detecting them. We then ask whether unsanctioned agents can be detected on Windows endpoints. We propose a taxonomy of nine classes of agents and six layers of endpoint footprint, and argue that rules based only on the structure of processes and connections cannot separate an agent from its behavioural twin, the same program talking to a non-AI service. We present Agent Detector, an open-source Windows detector that anchors behaviour to the identity of the remote service and correlates it with configuration, installation and execution history, using a catalog of 39 tools and 184 LLM endpoint entries; it informs users through a notice they must acknowledge instead of blocking. On a controlled bench of 12 synthetic agents, 3 AI components and 9 benign workloads, repeated 5 times on one workstation, two behavioural rules flagged every behavioural twin, while Agent Detector flagged none and detected every agent in the majority of runs. Its limits are temporal: a connection to a provider behind a shared content-delivery network is attributable only while the DNS cache holds the provider's name, one to five minutes, and an intermittent agent was seen by about one scan in three. A scan costs about 154 ms. The bench is too small to rank detectors; it maps what each kind of evidence can see: unsanctioned agents can be partly detected, and not by behaviour alone.

cs.AI↗

ReplayRCA: Measuring Post-hoc Diagnosis and Live Oversight of Agent Failures by Counterfactual Replay

When a language-model agent fails a multi-step task, can another model find the decisive mistake and fix it with a single action? We introduce ReplayRCA, a benchmark that scores such diagnoses by intervention rather than by agreement with annotations: the environment is restored to the state preceding the chosen step, the proposed action replaces the agent's own, and the same agent continues. The score, causal repair, is the continuation success rate minus that of a paired placebo that replays the agent's original action through the same mechanism. Two tracks share this protocol: a post-hoc autopsy, where the diagnoser sees the whole failed run and is told that it failed, and live oversight, where a supervisor watches the run unfold and may intervene once, before an irreversible action, without knowing whether the run will fail. Tasks come from OpsWorld, a deterministic, procedurally generated back-office environment with six difficulty levels, the last of which is multimodal (QR codes, handwriting). On 62 calibrated systematic failures, the best of 13 frontier models (Grok 4.7) reaches a causal repair of +51.3 points; the top eight models are statistically indistinguishable, the flagship models of the two largest vendors rank 8th and 12th, and 5 items are repaired by no model. Forcing a strong model to intervene at the last step costs it 17.1 points, so the last-step shortcut of annotation-based attribution benchmarks does not transfer. On 87 runs, the two best live supervisors are statistically tied and one of them is a small open-weight model (DeepSeek V4.1 Flash); the supervisor that is among the best post-hoc diagnosers (GPT-6.1 Sol) is the weakest live one (-14.5 points on the same runs, p = 0.002), so post-hoc diagnostic performance can be a poor proxy for live oversight. The environment and the evaluation code are released at https://github.com/jeremy1392/RCAreplay.

cs.AI↗

Toward Alignment Scaling Laws: A Framework and First Preregistered Measurements

Whether alignment gets easier or harder as models grow is often argued from isolated findings, as if alignment were one property. We treat it as a family of measurable scaling relations: for each risk category r, the alignment burden needed to hold a fixed safety target is modeled as B_r(N)=a_rN^alpha_r, with N a capability proxy; against a budget proportional to N, scaling helps if alpha_r<1, keeps pace if alpha_r~1, and accumulates alignment debt if alpha_r>1. We give three operationalizations of burden and distinguish observed, audited and true alignment. A toy model, in which corrections consume capability headroom, makes the consequences explicit. We prove that the largest exponent among corrected risks, not an average, sets the long-run regime; that above 1 any policy holding headroom above a floor must grow super-exponentially; that, for burdens that are positive mixtures of power laws, fits on small models underestimate large-scale exponents; and that an audit that uncovers hidden failures without false positives never underestimates true alignment. We propose a pre-registrable protocol and apply reduced versions of it twice. A preregistered reanalysis of public adversarial-training data for Pythia classifiers finds that the compute needed to bring attack success under 10% grows as N^0.60. A preregistered pilot on Qwen2.5 0.5B-72B finds exponents of -0.05 for truthfulness and 0.48 for stated dispositions (both scaling helps under its reduced rule, though local slopes approach 1 at the top; replicated on Qwen3 0.6B-14B), while sycophancy (0.89, or 0.83 with two seeds added at 72B) and a planted backdoor are undetermined: the backdoor is removed quickly when its trigger is known but survives blind safety training at four of five sizes. We release four browser games that play these laws (www.aisafety.fun). We make no claim about which regime holds for current frontier models.

cs.AI↗

DGF-Bench: A Benchmark for Simulating and Auditing Deception Against Multi-Agent Governance Boards

Tool-using language-model agents can review enterprise projects as governance boards do: they read the evidence, apply written rules and decide whether the project may proceed. Part of that evidence comes from suppliers and project members with a stake in the decision. DGF-Bench is a benchmark in which a board of agents (specialist gates and a General gate that consolidates their decisions) reviews synthetic dossiers while an attacker plants deceptive content in evidence the organization does not vouch for. Dossiers are generated from canonical facts under 61 executable rules, with 42 authoritative records and 32 narrative documents; every gate is certified decidable from those records. Attacks never change an authoritative value, so an attacked dossier keeps the reference decisions of its clean copy. A success is attributable only when the agent receives the injection and takes the exact injected action, which it does not take on the paired clean dossier; the DGF score is the share of applicable fixed attacks a model blocks. Reading documents and records themselves, five of six models were outcome-strict (disposition, findings, actions and authorization all correct) on 82 to 85 of 85 gates. Over 2,622 attacked gate runs, seven direct-order, false-data and false-authority attacks obtained one attributable success against these five, whereas task-aligned attacks imitating the organization's own process passed against four of them: a record note citing a fake review procedure lowered GPT-6 Luna Pro from 34 to 6 outcome-strict gates and DeepSeek V4 Pro from 33 to 7. DGF scores ranged from 96.2 to 26.9, and a policy-aware adaptive attacker writing in records succeeded against five of six models. The approval tool executed no forged approval, yet deceived agents submitted approvals that the rules forbid. The open-source package dgf-bench computes the DGF score with one command.

cs.AI↗

The Last Human Gate: Forward Deployed Engineering for Governance Automation

Enterprise governance requires decisions, evidence, and accountable authority; it does not require every review task to retain its current human implementation. We develop a task-substitution framework for Digital Governance Frameworks (DGF), treating each gate as an executable contract. Substitution requires sufficient accessible information, valid decision and authority checks, and a reduction in total human work after exceptions, verification, correction, and maintenance are counted. We derive a residual-work threshold and show why automating most cases can still increase labor. Forward deployed engineering connects these conditions to an architecture for agents, rule engines, evidence services, and escalation. DGF-Bench supplies controlled evidence from 300 synthetic projects and 899 evaluable model-project runs. Gemini 3.8 Flash, GPT-5.6 Luna, and DeepSeek v4.1 Flash achieve strict gate success of 94.98%, 83.29%, and 74.18%; complete-route success is 76.92%, 42.33%, and 24.67%. A deterministic control passes all 1,700 gates given the supplied rules and structured facts, locating the comparison in execution of a supplied decision kernel. Evidence audits and 135 repeated runs distinguish correct decisions from reliable execution. A document counterexample establishes an information-sufficiency obstruction. These results support the technical feasibility of replacing human execution of specified governance-review tasks with agents and software. The framework specifies a workforce test based on the complete human effort required at fixed output and quality; the present measurements concern review performance. Sources, dossiers, traces, and analyses are public.

cs.AI↗