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Jeremy McEntire

Publications and source records attributed to Jeremy McEntire.

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Leap+Verify: Regime-Adaptive Speculative Weight Prediction for Accelerating Neural Network Training

We introduce Leap+Verify, a framework that applies speculative execution -- predicting future model weights and validating predictions before acceptance -- to accelerate neural network training. Inspired by speculative decoding in language model inference and by the Automatically Scalable Computation (ASC) architecture for program execution, Leap+Verify decomposes training into three dynamically detected regimes (chaotic, transition, stable) using activation-space cosine similarity as a real-time Lyapunov proxy signal. Within each regime, analytic weight predictors (momentum, linear, quadratic extrapolation) attempt to forecast model parameters K training steps ahead; predictions are accepted only when validated against a held-out loss criterion. We evaluate Leap+Verify on GPT-2 124M and Qwen 2.5-1.5B trained on WikiText-103 across five random seeds, sweeping prediction depth K in {5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 100}. Momentum-based prediction (Adam moment extrapolation) fails catastrophically at both scales, with predicted losses exceeding actuals by 100-10,000x -- a universal norm explosion in optimizer-state extrapolation. Finite-difference predictors (linear, quadratic) succeed where momentum fails: at 124M, they achieve 24% strict acceptance at K=5 in stable regimes; at 1.5B, they achieve 37% strict acceptance in transition regimes. The scale-dependent finding is in regime distribution: GPT-2 124M spends 34% of training in stable regime, while Qwen 1.5B spends 64% in chaotic regime and reaches stable in only 0-2 of 40 checkpoints. Larger models are more predictable when predictable, but less often predictable -- the practical bottleneck shifts from predictor accuracy to regime availability. Cross-seed results are highly consistent (less than 1% validation loss variance), and the three-regime framework produces identical phase boundaries (plus or minus 50 steps) across seeds.

cs.LG

Dysmemic Pressure: Selection Dynamics in Organizational Information Environments

Why do organizations comprised of intelligent individuals converge on collective delusion? This paper introduces dysmemic pressure as a formal mechanism explaining organizational epistemic failure. Synthesizing strategic communication theory (Crawford & Sobel, 1982), agency theory (Prendergast, 1993), and cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), I demonstrate how preference divergence between organizational agents generates stable equilibria where communication becomes statistically independent of reality, while transmission biases lock dysfunction into self-reinforcing states. The mechanism operates through identifiable dynamics: as the bias between sender and receiver preferences increases, communication precision degrades through progressively coarser partitions until reaching "babbling equilibrium" where messages carry no information; simultaneously, transmission biases (content, prestige, conformity) ensure that dysfunctional signals outcompete accurate ones in the organizational meme pool. Three detailed case studies--Nokia's smartphone collapse, NASA's Challenger disaster, and Wells Fargo's account fraud scandal--illustrate the mechanism's operation across industries and failure modes. I derive five testable propositions and evaluate potential countermeasures through a mechanism design lens. The analysis reframes organizational dysfunction from moral failure to physics problem, explaining why standard interventions (culture change, leadership development, values alignment) so often fail: they treat equilibrium outcomes as behavioral problems rather than altering the selection environment that produces them.

physics.soc-ph

Tournament-Based Performance Evaluation and Systematic Misallocation: Why Forced Ranking Systems Produce Random Outcomes

Tournament-based compensation schemes with forced distributions represent a widely adopted class of relative performance evaluation mechanisms in technology and corporate environments. These systems mandate within-team ranking and fixed distributional requirements (e.g., bottom 15% terminated, top 15% promoted), ostensibly to resolve principal-agent problems through mandatory differentiation. We demonstrate through agent-based simulation that this mechanism produces systematic classification errors independent of implementation quality. With 994 engineers across 142 teams of 7, random team assignment yields 32% error in termination and promotion decisions, misclassifying employees purely through composition variance. Under realistic conditions reflecting differential managerial capability, error rates reach 53%, with false positives and false negatives each exceeding correct classifications. Cross-team calibration (often proposed as remedy) transforms evaluation into influence contests where persuasive managers secure promotions independent of merit. Multi-period dynamics produce adverse selection as employees observe random outcomes, driving risk-averse behavior and high-performer exit. The efficient solution (delegating judgment to managers with hierarchical accountability) cannot be formalized within the legal and coordination constraints that necessitated forced ranking. We conclude that this evaluation mechanism persists not through incentive alignment but through satisfying demands for demonstrable process despite producing outcomes indistinguishable from random allocation. This demonstrates how formalization intended to reduce agency costs structurally increases allocation error.

econ.GN