Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a social choice correspondence to be the one that selects the Pareto optimal alternatives.
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arXiv subjects
Jerry S. Kelly
Publications and source records attributed to Jerry S. Kelly.
Balancedness of Social Choice Correspondences
A social choice correspondence satisfies balancedness if, for every pair of alternatives, x and y, and every pair of individuals, i and j, whenever a profile has x adjacent to but just above y for individual i while individual j has y adjacent to but just above x, then only switching x and y in the orderings for both of those two individuals leaves the choice set unchanged. We show how the balancedness condition interacts with other social choice properties, especially tops-only. We also use balancedness to characterize the Borda rule (for a fixed number of voters) within the class of scoring rules.
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Range results for some social choice correspondences
Determination of the range of a variety of social choice correspondences: Plurality voting, the Borda rule, the Pareto rule, the Copeland correspondence, approval voting, and the top cycle correspondence
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A Class of Orderings in the Range of Borda's Rule
We present a class of orderings L for which there exists a profile u of preferences for a fixed odd number of individuals such that Borda's rule maps u to L.
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Strategy-proofness on the Non-Paretian Subdomain
Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other. Then we establish a result with a Gibbard-Satterthwaite flavor: g is dictatorial if its range contains at least three alternatives.
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Two Theorems on the Range of Strategy-proof Rules on a Restricted Domain
Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other and let g have range S on NP. We complete the proof of a Gibbard-Satterthwaite result - if S contains more than two elements, then g is dictatorial - by establishing a full range result on two subdomains of NP.
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