arXiv subjects

Jerzy Konorski

Publications and source records attributed to Jerzy Konorski.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2021

Mitigating Traffic Remapping Attacks in Autonomous Multi-hop Wireless Networks

Multi-hop wireless networks with autonomous nodes are susceptible to selfish traffic remapping attacks (TRAs). Nodes launching TRAs leverage the underlying channel access function to receive unduly high quality of service (QoS) for packet flows traversing source-to-destination routes. TRAs are easy to execute, impossible to prevent, difficult to detect, and harmful to the QoS of honest nodes. Recognizing the need for providing QoS security, we use a novel network-oriented QoS metric to propose a self-enforcing game-theoretic mitigation approach. By switching between TRA and honest behavior, selfish nodes engage in a noncooperative multistage game in pursuit of high QoS. We analyze feasible node strategies and design a distributed signaling mechanism called DISTRESS, under which, given certain conditions, the game produces a desirable outcome: after an upper-bounded play time, honesty tends to become a selfish node's best-reply behavior, while yielding acceptable QoS to most or all nodes. We verify these findings by Monte Carlo and ns-3 simulations of static and mobile nodes.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2020

A reactive algorithm for deducing nodal forwarding behavior in a multihop ad-hoc wireless network in the presence of errors

novel algorithm is presented to deduce individual nodal forwarding behavior from standard end-to-end acknowledgments. The algorithm is based on a well-established mathematical method and is robust to network related errors and nodal behavior changes. The proposed solution was verified in a network simulation, during which it achieved sound results in a challenging multihop ad-hoc network environment.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2020

Nodal cooperation equilibrium analysis in multihop wireless ad hoc networks with a reputation system

Motivated by the concerns of cooperation security, this work examines selected principles of state-of-the-art reputation systems for multihop adhoc networks and their impact upon optimal strategies for rational nodes. An analytic framework is proposed and used for identification of effective cooperation-enforcement schemes. It is pointed out that an optimum rather than high reputation can be expected to be sought by rational nodes.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2018

A Reputation Scheme to Discourage Selfish QoS Manipulation in Two-Hop Wireless Relay Networks

In wireless networks, stations can improve their received quality of service (QoS) by handling packets of source flows with higher priority. Additionally, in cooperative relay networks, the relays can handle transit flows with lower priority. We use game theory to model a two-hop relay network where each of the two involved stations can commit such selfish QoS manipulation. We design and evaluate a reputation-based incentive scheme called RISC2WIN, whereby a trusted third party (e.g., an access point) can limit selfish behavior and preserve appropriate QoS for both stations.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2018

Selfish Attacks in Two-hop IEEE 802.11 Relay Networks: Impact and Countermeasures

In IEEE 802.11 networks, selfish stations can pursue a better quality of service (QoS) through selfish MAC-layer attacks. Such attacks are easy to perform, secure routing protocols do not prevent them, and their detection may be complex. Two-hop relay topologies allow a new angle of attack: a selfish relay can tamper with either source traffic, transit traffic, or both. We consider the applicability of selfish attacks and their variants in the two-hop relay topology, quantify their impact, and study defense measures.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2017

Modeling a Traffic Remapping Attack Game in a Multi-hop Ad Hoc Network

In multi-hop ad hoc networks, selfish nodes may unduly acquire high quality of service (QoS) by assigning higher priority to source packets and lower priority to transit packets. Such traffic remapping attacks (TRAs) are cheap to launch, impossible to prevent, hard to detect, and harmful to non-selfish nodes. While studied mostly in single-hop wireless network settings, TRAs have resisted analysis in multi-hop settings. In this paper we offer a game-theoretic approach: we derive a formal model of opportunistic TRAs, define a TRA game with a heuristic rank-based payoff function, and propose a boundedly rational multistage attack strategy that both selfish and non-selfish nodes are free to use. Thus non-selfish nodes are allowed to respond in kind to selfish ones. We characterize the form of equilibrium that the multistage play reaches and verify via simulation that it often coincides with a Nash equilibrium in which harmful TRAs are curbed in the first place, whereas harmless ones need not be.

cs.NI↗