arXiv subjects

Jian Sheng Wang

Publications and source records attributed to Jian Sheng Wang.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

HFIPay: Privacy-Preserving, Cross-Chain Cryptocurrency Payments to Human-Friendly Identifiers

Human-friendly identifiers such as email addresses and phone numbers are convenient payment targets, but direct mappings from identifiers to blockchain addresses make balances and transaction histories enumerable by anyone who knows the identifier. We present HFI-Pay, a relay-assisted protocol for privacy-preserving identifier-routed cryptocurrency payments. The relay resolves the identifier off-chain and registers only a random intent identifier, a per-intent blinded binding rho_i, and the quoted payment tuple on-chain; no identifier or reusable recipient tag is published before claim. In a verified-quote deployment, the sender verifies an attested quote proving that rho_i was derived from the same hidden binding handle as the recipient's attested binding-key commitment, preventing relay-side recipient substitution before funding. Claims are authorized by a zero-knowledge proof, instantiated through ZK-ACE, that the claimant controls the deterministic identity whose epoch-scoped handle opens the blinded binding and authorizes release of the quoted asset and amount to a chosen destination. We define observer-model games for enumeration resistance and pre-claim unlinkability, state the composition needed for post-quote claim correctness, and characterize relay compromise and post-claim linkability. Keywords: identifier-based payment, privacy-preserving, verifiable quote, blinded claim binding, zero-knowledge authorization

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

ZK-ACE: Identity-Centric Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Post-Quantum Blockchain Systems

Post-quantum signature schemes impose kilobyte-scale on-chain artifacts. Verifying them inside ZK circuits merely relocates the cost via expensive lattice arithmetic in prover circuits. We present ZK-ACE (Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Cryptographic Entities), which replaces transaction-carried signature objects with identity-bound ZK statements. Given a deterministic identity derivation primitive (DIDP) as a black box, the prover demonstrates in zero knowledge that an identity consistent with an on-chain commitment authorized the transaction; no signature object is produced or verified on-chain. We provide game-based definitions and reduction-based proofs for authorization soundness, replay resistance, substitution resistance, and cross-domain separation, under knowledge soundness, collision resistance, and DIDP recovery hardness. Structural data accounting shows an order-of-magnitude reduction in per-transaction authorization data versus direct PQC deployment. A reference implementation offers two backends: Circle STARK (341 active rows / 361 AIR constraint expressions, 14.5 ms prove, 1.1 ms verify, approx. 107 KB proofs, transparent setup, post-quantum-oriented) and Groth16/BN254 (2,155 R1CS constraints, 37.3 ms prove, 128-byte proofs). Both are roughly 500--2,300x smaller than in-circuit PQC signature verification. Under mandatory per-block STARK aggregation, per-transaction consensus-visible data is approx. 160 bytes.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

MEV-ACE: Identity-Authenticated Fair Ordering for Proposer-Controlled MEV Mitigation

Maximal Extractable Value, or MEV, remains a structural threat to blockchain fairness because a block producer can often observe pending transactions and unilaterally decide their ordering or inclusion. Existing mitigations hide transaction contents or outsource ordering, but they often leave two gaps unresolved. First, commitments are not authenticated by slashable identities. Second, inclusion obligations are not backed by transferable evidence that other validators can verify. This paper presents MEV ACE, a fair ordering protocol for proposer controlled ordering MEV. MEV ACE combines three mechanisms. First, it uses registered economic identities whose authentication keys are deterministically derived from the ACE GF framework and bonded on chain. Second, it uses authenticated commit and open messages with validator receipt thresholds, which make admissibility and inclusion obligations independently auditable. Third, it uses verifiable delay based randomness to determine transaction order only after the admissible commitment set is fixed. We formalize the protocol in a Byzantine fault tolerant validator model with threshold receipts and show three properties under standard assumptions: order unpredictability after the admissible set is locked, commitment authenticity under signature unforgeability, and accountable inclusion for transactions that obtain threshold commit and open receipts. Under these conditions, and when producer and user bonds exceed the one slot gain from invalid execution or selective non opening, MEV ACE removes unilateral proposer discretion over front running, sandwich attacks, and censorship against admitted transactions. The protocol remains single slot in structure, requires no threshold decryption committee, and is compatible with post quantum signature schemes such as ML DSA 44.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

n-VM: A Multi-VM Layer-1 Architecture with Shared Identity and Token State

Multi-chain ecosystems suffer from fragmented identity, siloed liquidity, and bridge-dependent token transfers. We present n-VM, a Layer-1 architecture that hosts n heterogeneous virtual machines as co-equal execution environments over shared consensus and shared state. The design combines three components: a dispatcher that routes transactions by opcode prefix, a unified identity layer in which one 32-byte commitment anchors VM-specifific addresses, and a unified token ledger that exposes VM-native interfaces such as ERC-20 and SPL over a common balance store. We formalize routing, identity derivation, and token transfer semantics, and prove cross-VM transfer atomicity and identity isolation under standard cryptographic assumptions. We describe a concrete instantiation with five VMs: a native runtime, EVM, SVM, Bitcoin Script, and TVM. We also present context-based sharding and a write-set scheduler for parallel execution. Under an analytical throughput model, the architecture admits a projected range of about 16,000 to 66,000 transactions per second on commodity hardware.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

ACE Runtime - A ZKP-Native Blockchain Runtime with Sub-Second Cryptographic Finality

Existing high performance blockchains verify one signature per transaction on the critical path, which creates O(N) verification cost, high hardware pressure, and difficult post quantum migration. This paper presents ACE Runtime, a ZKP native execution layer built on identity authorization separation. We replace per transaction signature checks with lightweight HMAC attestations in the hot path, then generate one aggregated zero knowledge finality certificate per block in an asynchronous prove stage. The system is organized as an Attest Execute Prove pipeline with two tier finality: soft finality from BFT voting and hard finality from proof verification. Under standard cryptographic assumptions, we provide formal arguments for attestation unforgeability and hard finality irreversibility. We also define a two phase timeout and backup proving path with witness availability gossip for liveness under builder failure. Quantitative results combine analytical modeling with reference implementation measurements. The prototype shows low CPU orchestration overhead, while model driven analysis projects constant per block verification cost, lower validator hardware requirements for non builders, and better bandwidth efficiency than per transaction signature designs. These results indicate that identity authorization separation is a practical architecture for sub second cryptographic finality with a clear path toward stronger post quantum components.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Condition-Triggered Cryptographic Asset Control via Dormant Authorization Paths

Control of encrypted digital assets is traditionally equated with permanent possession of private keys, a model that precludes regulatory supervision, conditional delegation, and legally compliant transfer at the cryptographic layer. Existing remedies (multi-signature schemes, threshold signatures, smart contracts, custodial delegation) require persistent key exposure, on-chain state mutation, or trusted intermediaries. We introduce Condition-Triggered Dormant Authorization Paths (CT-DAP), a cryptographic asset control method built on destructible authorization factors and parameterized by a root-derivable framework satisfying deterministic key derivation, context-isolated capability generation, and authorization-bound revocation. Under CT-DAP, control rights are dormant authorization paths composed of user-held credentials and administrative factors held by independent custodians; a path remains cryptographically inactive until all factors are simultaneously available. Upon verification of predefined conditions (e.g., user consent, inheritance events, time-based triggers), the corresponding factor is released, activating the path. Revocation is achieved by destroying factors, rendering the path permanently unusable without altering the cryptographic root. We formalize the threat model, define security games for unauthorized control resistance, path isolation, and stateless revocation, and prove security under standard assumptions (AEAD security of AES-GCM-SIV, PRF security of HKDF, memory-hardness of Argon2id, collision resistance of SHA-256). We instantiate CT-DAP using the Atomic Cryptographic Entity Generative Framework (ACE-GF) and evaluate performance, demonstrating sub-second activation latency with configurable security-performance trade-offs.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

ACE-GF-based Attestation Relay for PQC - Lightweight Mempool Propagation Without On-Path Proofs

In post-quantum blockchain settings, objects that require validity proofs (e.g., blob roots, execution-layer or consensus-layer signature aggregates) must be broadcast through mempool and relay networks. Recursive STARKs have been proposed to aggregate such proofs so that each node forwards one proof per tick plus objects without proofs, capping per-node proof bandwidth at roughly 128 KB degree per tick. We observe that propagation does not inherently require validity proofs on the path-only a lightweight assurance that an object is eligible for relay. We present AR-ACE (ACE-GF-based Attestation Relay for PQC), in which relay nodes forward objects plus compact attestations (e.g., identity-bound signatures or commitments) and do not generate, hold, or forward any full validity proof. Only the builder (or final verifier) performs a single aggregated validity proof over the set of objects it includes. This proof-off-path design removes proof overhead from the propagation path entirely, yielding an order-of-magnitude reduction in proof-related relay bandwidth relative to proof-carrying propagation. When instantiated with ACE-GF-derived attestation keys, AR-ACE preserves a unified identity story with on-chain authorization and is PQC-ready. We specify a protocol model, state design goals and security considerations, define security games, and provide a structural bandwidth comparison with recursive-STARK-based propagation.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

VA-DAR: A PQC-Ready, Vendor-Agnostic Deterministic Artifact Resolution for Serverless, Enumeration-Resistant Wallet Recovery

Serverless wallet recovery must balance portability, usability, and privacy. Public registries enable decentralized lookup but naive identifier hashing leaks membership through enumeration. We present VA-DAR, a keyed-discovery protocol for ACE-GF-based wallets that use device-bound passkeys for day-to-day local unlock while supporting cross-device recovery using only a user-provided identifier (e.g., email) and a single recovery passphrase. As a discovery-and-recovery layer over ACE-GF, VA-DAR inherits ACE-GF's context-isolated, algorithm-agile derivation substrate, enabling non-disruptive migration to post-quantum algorithms at the identity layer. The design introduces a decentralized discovery-and-recovery layer that maps a privacy-preserving discovery identifier to an immutable content identifier of a backup sealed artifact stored on a decentralized storage network. Concretely, a user derives passphrase-rooted key material with a memory-hard KDF, domain-separates keys for artifact sealing and discovery indexing, and publishes a registry record keyed by a passphrase-derived discovery identifier. VA-DAR provides: (i) practical cross-device recovery using only identifier and passphrase, (ii) computational resistance to public-directory enumeration, (iii) integrity of discovery mappings via owner authorization, and (iv) rollback/tamper detection via monotonic versioning and artifact commitments. We define three sealed artifact roles, two update-authorization options, and three protocol flows (registration, recovery, update). We formalize security goals via cryptographic games and prove, under standard assumptions, that VA-DAR meets these goals while remaining vendor-agnostic and chain-agnostic. End-to-end post-quantum deployment additionally requires a PQ-secure instantiation of registry authorization.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

AESP: A Human-Sovereign Economic Protocol for AI Agents with Privacy-Preserving Settlement

As AI agents increasingly perform economic tasks on behalf of humans, a fundamental tension arises between agent autonomy and human control over financial assets. We present the Agent Economic Sovereignty Protocol (AESP), a layered protocol in which agents transact autonomously at machine speed on crypto-native infrastructure while remaining cryptographically bound to human-defined governance boundaries. AESP enforces the invariant that agents are economically capable but never economically sovereign through five mechanisms: (1) a deterministic eight-check policy engine with tiered escalation; (2) human-in-the-loop review with automatic, explicit, and biometric tiers; (3) EIP-712 dual-signed commitments with escrow; (4) HKDF-based context-isolated privacy with batched consolidation; and (5) an ACE-GF-based cryptographic substrate. We formalize two testable hypotheses on security coverage and latency overhead, and specify a complete evaluation methodology with baselines and ablation design. The protocol is implemented as an open-source TypeScript SDK (208 tests, ten modules) with interoperability via MCP and A2A.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

ACE-GF: A Generative Framework for Atomic Cryptographic Entities

Autonomous digital entities require deterministic identity mechanisms that avoid persistent storage of high-value master secrets, while supporting credential rotation and cryptographic agility across heterogeneous systems. Existing deterministic key hierarchies and centralized key management systems typically rely on long-lived root secrets, introducing structural single points of failure and complicating lifecycle management. We present ACE-GF (Atomic Cryptographic Entity Generative Framework), a seed-storage-free identity construction that enables deterministic and context-isolated key derivation without storing any master secret at rest. The construction reconstructs an identity root ephemerally in memory from a sealed artifact and authorization credentials, using misuse-resistant authenticated encryption together with standard key derivation primitives. Derived keys are generated via HKDF with explicit context encoding, ensuring cryptographic isolation across curves and application domains. This design naturally supports stateless credential rotation, authorization-bound revocation, and non-disruptive migration toward post-quantum cryptographic domains. Furthermore, the framework's parametric agility allows for optimization in resource-constrained environments, ensuring that deterministic identity reconstruction remains viable across a spectrum of hardware from high-performance servers to low-power IoT nodes without compromising the underlying security model. This work builds upon the conceptual framework introduced in MSCIKDF, which identified the core design goals for multi-curve, context-isolated, PQC-pluggable identity but did not provide a concrete construction. A formal protocol specification of ACE-GF has been submitted as an IETF Internet-Draft.

cs.CR↗