arXiv subjects

Jian Xiang

Publications and source records attributed to Jian Xiang.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

What the Detector Can See: Evaluating CPS Anomaly Detectors Independently of the Decision Rule

Anomaly detectors are often the last line of defense for cyber-physical systems (CPS). But detectors built in very different ways, from deep neural networks to invariant templates, are usually compared using precision, recall, or F1 at a single operating point. These scores mix two separate things: how well the detector represents the physical process, and how well its alarm threshold is set. We therefore treat a CPS anomaly detector as a two-stage pipeline: Stage 1 maps observations to residuals, and Stage 2 maps residuals to alarms. Instead of scoring only the final alarms, we evaluate Stage 1 directly using normalized residual energy, which has an exact connection to the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the trained-normal reference distribution. Because it does not depend on a specific alarm rule, it can separately measure attack separation, stability across the train-test gap, and the compactness with which a detector encodes the plant. Without any per-detector tuning, we apply this evaluation to five detectors -- GDN, FuSAGNet, TranAD, NSIBF, and GeCo -- across three CPS benchmarks: SWaT, WADI, and HAI. Although the detectors have similar ROC-AUC values on SWaT, their performance differs by more than an order of magnitude at a common false-alarm rate. Rankings also change across testbeds: TranAD ranks first on HAI but last on SWaT, while NSIBF ranks first on WADI but last on HAI. On WADI, localized attacks can evade detectors that pool evidence across all channels, helping explain why NSIBF outperforms methods that do well on other benchmarks. These results show that detection failure can come from different sources: a weak representation, poor threshold calibration, or an attack with little physical effect. A decision-rule-free analysis helps separate these causes.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Dual-stream Spatio-Temporal GCN-Transformer Network for 3D Human Pose Estimation

3D human pose estimation is a classic and important research direction in the field of computer vision. In recent years, Transformer-based methods have made significant progress in lifting 2D to 3D human pose estimation. However, these methods primarily focus on modeling global temporal and spatial relationships, neglecting local skeletal relationships and the information interaction between different channels. Therefore, we have proposed a novel method,the Dual-stream Spatio-temporal GCN-Transformer Network (MixTGFormer). This method models the spatial and temporal relationships of human skeletons simultaneously through two parallel channels, achieving effective fusion of global and local features. The core of MixTGFormer is composed of stacked Mixformers. Specifically, the Mixformer includes the Mixformer Block and the Squeeze-and-Excitation Layer ( SE Layer). It first extracts and fuses various information of human skeletons through two parallel Mixformer Blocks with different modes. Then, it further supplements the fused information through the SE Layer. The Mixformer Block integrates Graph Convolutional Networks (GCN) into the Transformer, enhancing both local and global information utilization. Additionally, we further implement its temporal and spatial forms to extract both spatial and temporal relationships. We extensively evaluated our model on two benchmark datasets (Human3.6M and MPI-INF-3DHP). The experimental results showed that, compared to other methods, our MixTGFormer achieved state-of-the-art results, with P1 errors of 37.6mm and 15.7mm on these datasets, respectively.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2024

Measuring Robustness in Cyber-Physical Systems under Sensor Attacks

This paper contributes a formal framework for quantitative analysis of bounded sensor attacks on cyber-physical systems, using the formalism of differential dynamic logic. Given a precondition and postcondition of a system, we formalize two quantitative safety notions, quantitative forward and backward safety, which respectively express (1) how strong the strongest postcondition of the system is with respect to the specified postcondition, and (2) how strong the specified precondition is with respect to the weakest precondition of the system needed to ensure the specified postcondition holds. We introduce two notions, forward and backward robustness, to characterize the robustness of a system against sensor attacks as the loss of safety. To reason about robustness, we introduce two simulation distances, forward and backward simulation distances, which are defined based on the behavioral distances between the original system and the system with compromised sensors. Forward and backward distances, respectively, characterize upper bounds of the degree of forward and backward safety loss caused by the sensor attacks. We verify the two simulation distances by expressing them as modalities, i.e., formulas of differential dynamic logic, and develop an ad-hoc proof system to reason with such formulas. We showcase our formal notions and reasoning techniques on two non-trivial case studies: an autonomous vehicle that needs to avoid collision and a water tank system.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2021

Relational Analysis of Sensor Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems, such as self-driving cars or autonomous aircraft, must defend against attacks that target sensor hardware. Analyzing system design can help engineers understand how a compromised sensor could impact the system's behavior; however, designing security analyses for cyber-physical systems is difficult due to their combination of discrete dynamics, continuous dynamics, and nondeterminism. This paper contributes a framework for modeling and analyzing sensor attacks on cyber-physical systems, using the formalism of hybrid programs. We formalize and analyze two relational properties of a system's robustness. These relational properties respectively express (1) whether a system's safety property can be influenced by sensor attacks, and (2) whether a system's high-integrity state can be affected by sensor attacks. We characterize these relational properties by defining an equivalence relation between a system under attack and the original unattacked system. That is, the system satisfies the robustness properties if executions of the attacked system are appropriately related to executions of the unattacked system. We present two techniques for reasoning about the equivalence relation and thus proving the relational properties for a system. One proof technique decomposes large proof obligations to smaller proof obligations. The other proof technique adapts the self-composition technique from the literature on secure information-flow, allowing us to reduce reasoning about the equivalence of two systems to reasoning about properties of a single system. This technique allows us to reuse existing tools for reasoning about properties of hybrid programs, but is challenging due to the combination of discrete dynamics, continuous dynamics, and nondeterminism. To evaluate, we present three case studies motivated by real design flaws in existing cyber-physical systems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Time-dependent generator coordinate method study of mass-asymmetric fission of actinides

Low-energy positive and negative parity collective states in the equilibrium minimum, and the dynamics of induced fission of actinide nuclei are investigated in a unified theoretical framework based on the generator coordinate method (GCM) with the Gaussian overlap approximation (GOA). The collective potential and inertia tensor, both at zero and finite temperature, are computed using the self-consistent multidimensionally constrained relativistic mean field (MDC-RMF) model, based on the energy density functional DD-PC1. Pairing correlations are treated in the BCS approximation with a separable pairing force of finite range. A collective quadrupole-octupole Hamiltonian characterized by zero-temperature axially-symmetric deformation energy surface and perturbative cranking inertia tensor, is used to model the low-lying excitation spectrum. The fission fragment charge distributions are obtained by propagating the initial collective states in time with the time-dependent GCM+GOA that uses the same quadrupole-octupole Hamiltonian, but with the collective potential and inertia tensor computed at finite temperature. The illustrative charge yields of $^{228}$Th, $^{234}$U, $^{240}$Pu, $^{244}$Cm, and $^{250}$Cf are in very good agreement with experiment, and the predicted mass asymmetry is consistent with the result of a recent microscopic study that has attributed the distribution (peak) of the heavier-fragment nuclei to shell-stabilized octupole deformations.

nucl-th↗

arXiv2017

Interpreted Formalisms for Configurations

Imprecise and incomplete specification of system \textit{configurations} threatens safety, security, functionality, and other critical system properties and uselessly enlarges the configuration spaces to be searched by configuration engineers and auto-tuners. To address these problems, this paper introduces \textit{interpreted formalisms based on real-world types for configurations}. Configuration values are lifted to values of real-world types, which we formalize as \textit{subset types} in Coq. Values of these types are dependent pairs whose components are values of underlying Coq types and proofs of additional properties about them. Real-world types both extend and further constrain \textit{machine-level} configurations, enabling richer, proof-based checking of their consistency with real-world constraints. Tactic-based proof scripts are written once to automate the construction of proofs, if proofs exist, for configuration fields and whole configurations. \textit{Failures to prove} reveal real-world type errors. Evaluation is based on a case study of combinatorial optimization of Hadoop performance by meta-heuristic search over Hadoop configurations spaces.

cs.LO↗