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Jiangtao Meng

Publications and source records attributed to Jiangtao Meng.

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Failure-Based Testing for Deep Reinforcement Learning Agents

Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) agents have been widely adopted across diverse domains to address challenging decision-making problems, such as autonomous driving and robotic control. Given that many of these applications are safety- and security-critical, rigorous testing of DRL agents is indispensable. Existing testing methods are typically guided by reward signals to detect failures. However, for well-trained agents, whose performance approaches optimal levels in standard operating conditions, reward signals remain generally high, making current methods ineffective at uncovering critical failures. To address these challenges, we propose a novel failure-based method that leverages task-induced failure insights to enhance failure detection capability while reducing the number of tests required. Since DRL agents are inherently designed with human-defined tasks, they provide valuable cues about task difficulty. Intuitively, a DRL agent is more likely to fail when confronted with a more difficult task; therefore, PRT prioritizes these tasks. Building on this foundation, we propose Prior Random Testing, a black-box failure-based testing method that enables targeted prioritization while preserving the diversity of generated test cases. Guided by task-induced failure insights, PRT prioritizes failure-prone regions of the input domain, thereby facilitating efficient failure detection. PRT is evaluated on four widely used benchmarks and compared with different state-of-the-art methods including fuzzing, search-based and generative-based methods. PRT ranks among the top performers in terms of both the cost of finding the first failure and the diversity of test cases. Notably, compared to random testing, PRT achieves better diversity and reduces the testing cost by over 50%.

cs.SE

New directions in mechanism design

Mechanism design uses the tools of economics and game theory to design rules of interaction for economic transactions that will,in principle, yield some de- sired outcome. In the last few years this field has received much interest of researchers in computer science, especially with the Internet developing as a platform for communications and connections among enormous numbers of computers and humans. Arguably the most positive result in mechanism de- sign is truthful and there are only one general truthful mechanisms so far : the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. But VCG mecha- nism has one shortage: The implementation of truthfulness is on the cost of decreasing the revenue of the mechanism. (e.g., Ning Chen and Hong Zhu. [1999]). We introduce three new characters of mechanism:partly truthful, criti- cal, consistent, and introduce a new mechanism: X mechanism that satisfy the above three characters. Like VCG mechanism, X mechanism also generalizes from Vickery Auction and is consistent with Vickery auction in many ways, but the extended methods used in X mechanism is different from that in VCG mechanism . This paper will demonstrate that X mechanism better than VCG mechanism in optimizing utility of mechanism, which is the original intention of mechanism design. So partly truthful,critical and consistent are at least as important as truthful in mechanism design, and they beyond truthful in many situations.As a result, we conclude that partly truthful,critical and consistent are three new directions in mechanism design.

cs.GT