arXiv subjects

Jiashui Wang

Publications and source records attributed to Jiashui Wang.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Is My RPC Response Reliable? Detecting RPC Bugs in Ethereum Blockchain Client under Context

Blockchain clients are fundamental software for running blockchain nodes. They provide users with various RPC (Remote Procedure Call) interfaces to interact with the blockchain. These RPC methods are expected to follow the same specification across different blockchain nodes, providing users with seamless interaction. However, there have been continuous reports on various RPC bugs that can cause unexpected responses or even Denial of Service weakness. Existing studies on blockchain RPC bug detection mainly focus on generating the RPC method calls for testing blockchain clients. However, a wide range of the reported RPC bugs are triggered in various blockchain contexts. To the best of our knowledge, little attention is paid to generating proper contexts that can trigger these context-dependent RPC bugs. In this work, we propose EthCRAFT, a Context-aware RPC Analysis and Fuzzing Tool for client RPC bug detection. EthCRAFT first proposes to explore the state transition program space of blockchain clients and generate various transactions to construct the context. EthCRAFT then designs a context-aware RPC method call generation method to send RPC calls to the blockchain clients. The responses of 5 different client implementations are used as cross-referring oracles to detect the RPC bugs. We evaluate EthCRAFT on real-world RPC bugs collected from the GitHub issues of Ethereum client implementations. Experiment results show that EthCRAFT outperforms existing client RPC detectors by detecting more RPC bugs. Moreover, EthCRAFT has found six new bugs in major Ethereum clients and reported them to the developers. One of the bug fixes has been written into breaking changes in the client's updates. Three of our bug reports have been offered a vulnerability bounty by the Ethereum Foundation.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

AEAS: Actionable Exploit Assessment System

Security practitioners face growing challenges in exploit assessment, as public vulnerability repositories are increasingly populated with inconsistent and low-quality exploit artifacts. Existing scoring systems, such as CVSS and EPSS, offer limited support for this task. They either rely on theoretical metrics or produce opaque probability estimates without assessing whether usable exploit code exists. In practice, security teams often resort to manual triage of exploit repositories, which is time-consuming, error-prone, and difficult to scale. We present AEAS, an automated system designed to assess and prioritize actionable exploits through static analysis. AEAS analyzes both exploit code and associated documentation to extract a structured set of features reflecting exploit availability, functionality, and setup complexity. It then computes an actionability score for each exploit and produces ranked exploit recommendations. We evaluate AEAS on a dataset of over 5,000 vulnerabilities derived from 600+ real-world applications frequently encountered by red teams. Manual validation and expert review on representative subsets show that AEAS achieves a 100% top-3 success rate in recommending functional exploits and shows strong alignment with expert-validated rankings. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of AEAS in supporting exploit-driven vulnerability prioritization.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

ORFuzz: Fuzzing the "Other Side" of LLM Safety -- Testing Over-Refusal

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit over-refusal - erroneously rejecting benign queries due to overly conservative safety measures - a critical functional flaw that undermines their reliability and usability. Current methods for testing this behavior are demonstrably inadequate, suffering from flawed benchmarks and limited test generation capabilities, as highlighted by our empirical user study. To the best of our knowledge, this paper introduces the first evolutionary testing framework, ORFuzz, for the systematic detection and analysis of LLM over-refusals. ORFuzz uniquely integrates three core components: (1) safety category-aware seed selection for comprehensive test coverage, (2) adaptive mutator optimization using reasoning LLMs to generate effective test cases, and (3) OR-Judge, a human-aligned judge model validated to accurately reflect user perception of toxicity and refusal. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate that ORFuzz generates diverse, validated over-refusal instances at a rate (6.98% average) more than double that of leading baselines, effectively uncovering vulnerabilities. Furthermore, ORFuzz's outputs form the basis of ORFuzzSet, a new benchmark of 1,855 highly transferable test cases that achieves a superior 63.56% average over-refusal rate across 10 diverse LLMs, significantly outperforming existing datasets. ORFuzz and ORFuzzSet provide a robust automated testing framework and a valuable community resource, paving the way for developing more reliable and trustworthy LLM-based software systems.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

FORGE: An LLM-driven Framework for Large-Scale Smart Contract Vulnerability Dataset Construction

High-quality smart contract vulnerability datasets are critical for evaluating security tools and advancing smart contract security research. Two major limitations of current manual dataset construction are (1) labor-intensive and error-prone annotation processes limiting the scale, quality, and evolution of the dataset, and (2) absence of standardized classification rules results in inconsistent vulnerability categories and labeling results across different datasets. To address these limitations, we present FORGE, the first automated approach for constructing smart contract vulnerability datasets. FORGE leverages an LLM-driven pipeline to extract high-quality vulnerabilities from real-world audit reports and classify them according to the CWE, the most widely recognized classification in software security. FORGE employs a divide-and-conquer strategy to extract structured and self-contained vulnerability information from these reports. Additionally, it uses a tree-of-thoughts technique to classify the vulnerability information into the hierarchical CWE classification. To evaluate FORGE's effectiveness, we run FORGE on 6,454 real-world audit reports and generate a dataset comprising 81,390 solidity files and 27,497 vulnerability findings across 296 CWE categories. Manual assessment of the dataset demonstrates high extraction precision and classification consistency with human experts (precision of 95.6% and inter-rater agreement k-$\alpha$ of 0.87). We further validate the practicality of our dataset by benchmarking 13 existing security tools on our dataset. The results reveal the significant limitations in current detection capabilities. Furthermore, by analyzing the severity-frequency distribution patterns through a unified CWE perspective in our dataset, we highlight inconsistency between current smart contract research focus and priorities identified from real-world vulnerabilities...

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Beyond the Protocol: Unveiling Attack Vectors in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) Ecosystem

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an emerging standard designed to enable seamless interaction between Large Language Model (LLM) applications and external tools or resources. Within a short period, thousands of MCP services have been developed and deployed. However, the client-server integration architecture inherent in MCP may expand the attack surface against LLM Agent systems, introducing new vulnerabilities that allow attackers to exploit by designing malicious MCP servers. In this paper, we present the first end-to-end empirical evaluation of attack vectors targeting the MCP ecosystem. We identify four categories of attacks, i.e., Tool Poisoning Attacks, Puppet Attacks, Rug Pull Attacks, and Exploitation via Malicious External Resources. To evaluate their feasibility, we conduct experiments following the typical steps of launching an attack through malicious MCP servers: upload -> download -> attack. Specifically, we first construct malicious MCP servers and successfully upload them to three widely used MCP aggregation platforms. The results indicate that current audit mechanisms are insufficient to identify and prevent these threats. Next, through a user study and interview with 20 participants, we demonstrate that users struggle to identify malicious MCP servers and often unknowingly install them from aggregator platforms. Finally, we empirically demonstrate that these attacks can trigger harmful actions within the user's local environment, such as accessing private files or controlling devices to transfer digital assets. Additionally, based on interview results, we discuss four key challenges faced by the current MCP security ecosystem. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to defend against malicious MCP servers and ensure the safe deployment of increasingly autonomous LLM agents.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

ASMA-Tune: Unlocking LLMs' Assembly Code Comprehension via Structural-Semantic Instruction Tuning

Assembly code analysis and comprehension play critical roles in applications like reverse engineering, yet they face substantial challenges due to low information density and a lack of explicit syntactic structures. While traditional masked language modeling (MLM) approaches do not explicitly focus on natural language interaction, emerging decoder-focused large language models (LLMs) demonstrate partial success in binary analysis yet remain underexplored for holistic comprehension. We present Assembly Augmented Tuning, an end-to-end structural-semantic instruction tuning framework that synergizes encoder architecture with decoder-based LLMs through a projector module, where the assembly encoder extracts hardware-level structural features, the projector bridges representations with the semantic space, and the instruction-tuned LLM preserves natural language capabilities. Experimental results demonstrate three key advantages: (1) State-of-the-art performance in assembly comprehension with +39.7% Recall@1 and +17.8% MRR improvements over GPT-4-Turbo, (2) Consistent enhancements across base models (24.6-107.4% Recall@1 and 15.2-106.3% MRR on Qwen2.5-Coder, Deepseek-Coder and CodeLlama variants), and (3) Superior instruction-following capabilities (41.5%-118% improvements) with controlled code generation degradation (-8.9% to -35% across architectures).

cs.SE↗

arXiv2024

PentestAgent: Incorporating LLM Agents to Automated Penetration Testing

Penetration testing is a critical technique for identifying security vulnerabilities, traditionally performed manually by skilled security specialists. This complex process involves gathering information about the target system, identifying entry points, exploiting the system, and reporting findings. Despite its effectiveness, manual penetration testing is time-consuming and expensive, often requiring significant expertise and resources that many organizations cannot afford. While automated penetration testing methods have been proposed, they often fall short in real-world applications due to limitations in flexibility, adaptability, and implementation. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) offer new opportunities for enhancing penetration testing through increased intelligence and automation. However, current LLM-based approaches still face significant challenges, including limited penetration testing knowledge and a lack of comprehensive automation capabilities. To address these gaps, we propose PentestAgent, a novel LLM-based automated penetration testing framework that leverages the power of LLMs and various LLM-based techniques like Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) to enhance penetration testing knowledge and automate various tasks. Our framework leverages multi-agent collaboration to automate intelligence gathering, vulnerability analysis, and exploitation stages, reducing manual intervention. We evaluate PentestAgent using a comprehensive benchmark, demonstrating superior performance in task completion and overall efficiency. This work significantly advances the practical applicability of automated penetration testing systems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Detecting DBMS Bugs with Context-Sensitive Instantiation and Multi-Plan Execution

DBMS bugs can cause serious consequences, posing severe security and privacy concerns. This paper works towards the detection of memory bugs and logic bugs in DBMSs, and aims to solve the two innate challenges, including how to generate semantically correct SQL queries in a test case, and how to propose effective oracles to capture logic bugs. To this end, our system proposes two key techniques. The first key technique is called context-sensitive instantiation, which considers all static semantic requirements (including but not limited to the identifier type used by existing systems) to generate semantically valid SQL queries. The second key technique is called multi-plan execution, which can effectively capture logic bugs. Given a test case, multi-plan execution makes the DBMS execute all query plans instead of the default optimal one, and compares the results. A logic bug is detected if a difference is found among the execution results of the executed query plans. We have implemented a prototype system called Kangaroo and applied it to three widely used and well-tested DBMSs, including SQLite, PostgreSQL, and MySQL. Our system successfully detected 50 new bugs. The comparison between our system with the state-of-the-art systems shows that our system outperforms them in terms of the number of generated semantically valid SQL queries, the explored code paths during testing, and the detected bugs.

cs.DB↗

arXiv2023

HODOR: Shrinking Attack Surface on Node.js via System Call Limitation

Node.js provides Node.js applications with system interaction capabilities using system calls. However, such convenience comes with a price, i.e., the attack surface of JavaScript arbitrary code execution (ACE) vulnerabilities is expanded to the system call level. There lies a noticeable gap between existing protection techniques in the JavaScript code level (either by code debloating or read-write-execute permission restriction) and a targeted defense for emerging critical system call level exploitation. To fill the gap, we design and implement HODOR, a lightweight runtime protection system based on enforcing precise system call restrictions when running a Node.js application. HODOR achieved this by addressing several nontrivialial technical challenges. First, HODOR requires to construct high-quality call graphs for both the Node.js application (in JavaScript) and its underlying Node.js framework (in JavaScript and C/C++). Specifically, HODOR incorporates several important optimizations in both the JavaScript and C/C++ level to improve the state-of-the-art tools for building more precise call graphs. Then, HODOR creates the main-thread whitelist and the thread-pool whitelist respectively containing the identified necessary system calls based on the call graphs mappings. Finally, with the whitelists, HODOR implements lightweight system call restriction using the Linux kernel feature Secure Computing Mode (seccomp) to shrink the attack surface. We utilize HODOR to protect 83 real-world Node.js applications compromised by arbitrary code/command execution attacks. HODOR could reduce the attack surface to 16.75% on average with negligible runtime overhead (i.e., <3%).

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Towards Understanding and Mitigating Audio Adversarial Examples for Speaker Recognition

Speaker recognition systems (SRSs) have recently been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, raising significant security concerns. In this work, we systematically investigate transformation and adversarial training based defenses for securing SRSs. According to the characteristic of SRSs, we present 22 diverse transformations and thoroughly evaluate them using 7 recent promising adversarial attacks (4 white-box and 3 black-box) on speaker recognition. With careful regard for best practices in defense evaluations, we analyze the strength of transformations to withstand adaptive attacks. We also evaluate and understand their effectiveness against adaptive attacks when combined with adversarial training. Our study provides lots of useful insights and findings, many of them are new or inconsistent with the conclusions in the image and speech recognition domains, e.g., variable and constant bit rate speech compressions have different performance, and some non-differentiable transformations remain effective against current promising evasion techniques which often work well in the image domain. We demonstrate that the proposed novel feature-level transformation combined with adversarial training is rather effective compared to the sole adversarial training in a complete white-box setting, e.g., increasing the accuracy by 13.62% and attack cost by two orders of magnitude, while other transformations do not necessarily improve the overall defense capability. This work sheds further light on the research directions in this field. We also release our evaluation platform SPEAKERGUARD to foster further research.

cs.SD↗