SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Jiazuo Hou

Publications and source records attributed to Jiazuo Hou.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Consensusability of Continuous-Time Multi-Agent Systems With Unbounded Heterogeneous Constant Delays: A Signed Laplacian Perspective

The consensus of continuous-time multi-agent systems with unbounded and heterogeneous constant delays is investigated by combining frequency-domain analysis and algebraic graph theory. Several types of signed Laplacians are constructed to characterize consensusability under delays. The core results are established based on the defined delay-embedded signed Laplacian, where a small-delay link creates a cooperative interaction and a possibly unbounded large-delay link creates an antagonistic interaction between the agents. The dividing line between small and large delays is given by $\tau_{ij}=\pi/2\lambda_{\max}(L_0)$, where $\lambda_{\max}(L_0)$ refers to the maximum eigenvalue of the conventional graph Laplacian. It is proved that the consensusability is preserved if the delay-embedded signed Laplacian is positive semi-definite with a simple zero eigenvalue. Moreover, we derived some consensus conditions in terms of the extended effective resistance which measures the overall coupling between two sets of agents. The obtained results provide new insights into the mechanism of delayed consensus from the interplay between the small-delay-induced cooperativeness and large-delay-induced antagonism in the underlying network topology.

math.OC

Preventive-Corrective Cyber-Defense: Attack-Induced Region Minimization and Cybersecurity Margin Maximization

False data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks on power systems can be prevented by strategically selecting and protecting a sufficiently large measurement subset, which, however, requires adequate cyber-defense resources for measurement protection. With any given cyber-defense resource, this paper proposes a preventive-corrective cyber-defense strategy, which minimizes the FDI attack-induced region in a preventive manner, followed by maximizing the cybersecurity margin in a corrective manner. First, this paper proposes a preventive cyber-defense strategy that minimizes the volume of the FDI attack-induced region via preventive allocation of any given measurement protection resource. Particularly, a sufficient condition for constructing the FDI unattackable lines is proposed, indicating that the FDI cyber-attack could be locally rather than globally prevented. Then, given a non-empty FDI attack-induced region, this paper proposes a corrective cyber-defense strategy that maximizes the cybersecurity margin, leading to a trade-off between the safest-but-expensive operation point (i.e., Euclidean Chebyshev center) and the cheapest-but-dangerous operation point. Simulation results on a modified IEEE 14 bus system verify the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the proposed preventive-corrective cyber-defense strategy.

eess.SY