arXiv subjects

Jibang Wu

Publications and source records attributed to Jibang Wu.

14 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

When do prophets profit in prediction markets?

Prediction markets aggregate dispersed beliefs into prices that act as probabilistic forecasts of uncertain events. Classical theory establishes a clean equivalence between forecasting accuracy and trading profit, but only for the specific automated market maker (AMM) design. However, the largest exchanges today are based on central limit order books in which informed forecasters routinely lose money while uninformed strategies can profit on simple heuristics. We resolve this discrepancy by establishing a formal equivalence between predictive accuracy and profitability. For any strictly proper scoring rule $S$, we exhibit a "proper" betting strategy that depends only on the forecaster's prediction $\mathbf{p}$ and the market price $\mathbf{q}$, and earns positive expected profit whenever $\mathbf{p}$ outperforms $\mathbf{q}$ under $S$ and the market has sufficient liquidity. Moreover, this proper betting is essentially the only strategy with such robust profitability guarantee. The proof rests on a decomposition of expected profit that strictly generalizes the classical AMM guarantee and also explains how strategies can profit without an accuracy edge. Empirically, across thousands of forecasts by AI models, proper betting is the only strategy that reliably converts accuracy into profit, and we further identify systematic forecasting personas and show how the optimal proper strategy varies across them. A month-long live deployment on Kalshi achieves $+80.33\%$ return on investment with a Sharpe ratio of $3.35$.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

LLM-as-a-Prophet: Understanding Predictive Intelligence with Prophet Arena

Forecasting is not only a fundamental intellectual pursuit but also is of significant importance to societal systems such as finance and economics. With the rapid advances of large language models (LLMs) trained on Internet-scale data, it raises the promise of employing LLMs to forecast real-world future events, an emerging paradigm we call "LLM-as-a-Prophet". This paper systematically investigates such predictive intelligence of LLMs. To this end, we build Prophet Arena, a general evaluation benchmark that continuously collects live forecasting tasks and decomposes each task into distinct pipeline stages, in order to support our controlled and large-scale experimentation. Our comprehensive evaluation reveals that many LLMs already exhibit impressive forecasting capabilities, reflected in, e.g., their small calibration errors, consistent prediction confidence and promising market returns. However, we also uncover key bottlenecks towards achieving superior predictive intelligence via LLM-as-a-Prophet, such as LLMs' inaccurate event recalls, misunderstanding of data sources and slower information aggregation compared to markets when resolution nears.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Robust Stackelberg Equilibria

This paper provides a systematic study of the robust Stackelberg equilibrium (RSE), which naturally generalizes the widely adopted solution concept of the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE). The RSE accounts for any possible up-to-$δ$ suboptimal follower responses in Stackelberg games and is adopted to improve the robustness of the leader's strategy. While a few variants of robust Stackelberg equilibrium have been considered in previous literature, the RSE solution concept we consider is importantly different -- in some sense, it relaxes previously studied robust Stackelberg strategies and is applicable to much broader sources of uncertainties. We provide a thorough investigation of several fundamental properties of RSE, including its utility guarantees, algorithmics, and learnability. We first show that the RSE we defined always exists and thus is well-defined. Then we characterize how the leader's utility in RSE changes with the robustness level considered. On the algorithmic side, we show that, in sharp contrast to the tractability of computing an SSE, it is NP-hard to obtain a fully polynomial approximation scheme (FPTAS) for any constant robustness level. Nevertheless, we develop a quasi-polynomial approximation scheme (QPTAS) for RSE. Finally, we examine the learnability of the RSE in a natural learning scenario, where both players' utilities are not known in advance, and provide almost tight sample complexity results on learning the RSE. As a corollary of this result, we also obtain an algorithm for learning SSE, which strictly improves a key result of Bai et al. [2021] in terms of both utility guarantee and computational efficiency.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

AI Realtor: Towards Grounded Persuasive Language Generation for Automated Copywriting

This paper develops an agentic framework that employs large language models (LLMs) for grounded persuasive language generation in automated copywriting, with real estate marketing as a focal application. Our method is designed to align the generated content with user preferences while highlighting useful factual attributes. This agent consists of three key modules: (1) Grounding Module, mimicking expert human behavior to predict marketable features; (2) Personalization Module, aligning content with user preferences; (3) Marketing Module, ensuring factual accuracy and the inclusion of localized features. We conduct systematic human-subject experiments in the domain of real estate marketing, with a focus group of potential house buyers. The results demonstrate that marketing descriptions generated by our approach are preferred over those written by human experts by a clear margin while maintaining the same level of factual accuracy. Our findings suggest a promising agentic approach to automate large-scale targeted copywriting while ensuring factuality of content generation.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands

The agency problem emerges in today's large scale machine learning tasks, where the learners are unable to direct content creation or enforce data collection. In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for aligning economic interests of different stakeholders in the online learning problems through contract design. The problem, termed \emph{contractual reinforcement learning}, naturally arises from the classic model of Markov decision processes, where a learning principal seeks to optimally influence the agent's action policy for their common interests through a set of payment rules contingent on the realization of next state. For the planning problem, we design an efficient dynamic programming algorithm to determine the optimal contracts against the far-sighted agent. For the learning problem, we introduce a generic design of no-regret learning algorithms to untangle the challenges from robust design of contracts to the balance of exploration and exploitation, reducing the complexity analysis to the construction of efficient search algorithms. For several natural classes of problems, we design tailored search algorithms that provably achieve $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret. We also present an algorithm with $\tilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ for the general problem that improves the existing analysis in online contract design with mild technical assumptions.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Generalized Principal-Agency: Contracts, Information, Games and Beyond

In the principal-agent problem formulated by Myerson'82, agents have private information (type) and make private decisions (action), both of which are unobservable to the principal. Myerson pointed out an elegant linear programming solution that relies on the revelation principle. This paper extends Myerson's results to a more general setting where the principal's action space can be infinite and subject to additional design constraints. Our generalized principal-agent model unifies several important design problems including contract design, information design, and Bayesian Stackelberg games, and encompasses them as special cases. We first extend the revelation principle to this general model, based on which a polynomial-time algorithm is then derived for computing the optimal mechanism for the principal. This algorithm not only implies new efficient solutions simultaneously for all the aforementioned special cases but also significantly simplifies previously known algorithms designed for special cases. Inspired by the recent interest in the algorithmic design of a single contract and menu of contracts, we study such constrained design problems to our general principal-agent model. In contrast to the above unification, our results here illustrate the other facet of diversity among different principal-agent design problems and demonstrate how their different structures can lead to different complexities: some are tractable whereas others are APX-hard. Finally, we reveal an interesting connection of our model to the problem of information acquisition for decision making and study its algorithmic properties in general.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Uncoupled Bandit Learning towards Rationalizability: Benchmarks, Barriers, and Algorithms

Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability, a key solution concept in epistemic game theory that relaxes the stringent belief assumptions in both Nash and correlated equilibrium. This learning task naturally generalizes best arm identification problems, due to the intrinsic connections between rationalizable action profiles and the elimination of iteratively dominated actions. Despite a seemingly simple task, our first main result is a surprisingly negative one; that is, a large and natural class of no regret algorithms, including the entire family of Dual Averaging algorithms, provably take exponentially many rounds to reach rationalizability. Moreover, algorithms with the stronger no swap regret also suffer similar exponential inefficiency. To overcome these barriers, we develop a new algorithm that adjusts Exp3 with Diminishing Historical rewards (termed Exp3-DH); Exp3-DH gradually forgets history at carefully tailored rates. We prove that when all agents run Exp3-DH (a.k.a., self-play in multi-agent learning), all iteratively dominated actions can be eliminated within polynomially many rounds. Our experimental results further demonstrate the efficiency of Exp3-DH, and that state-of-the-art bandit algorithms, even those developed specifically for learning in games, fail to reach rationalizability efficiently.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Learning to Incentivize Information Acquisition: Proper Scoring Rules Meet Principal-Agent Model

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear $T^{2/3}$-regret after $T$ iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

An Isotonic Mechanism for Overlapping Ownership

Motivated by the problem of improving peer review at large scientific conferences, this paper studies how to elicit self-evaluations to improve review scores in a natural many-to-many owner-item (e.g., author-paper) situation with overlapping ownership. We design a simple, efficient and truthful mechanism to elicit self-evaluations from item owners that can be used to calibrate their noisy review scores in the existing evaluation process (e.g., papers' review scores from peers). Our approach starts by partitioning the owner-item relation structure into disjoint blocks, each sharing a common set of co-owners. We then elicit the ranking of items from each owner and employ isotonic regression to produce adjusted item scores, aligning with both the reported rankings and raw item review scores. We prove that truth-telling by all owners is a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium for any valid partition of the overlapping ownership sets under natural conditions. Moreover, the truthfulness depends on eliciting rankings independently within each block, making block partition optimization crucial for improving statistical efficiency. Despite being computationally intractable in general, we develop a nearly linear-time greedy algorithm that provably finds a performant block partition with appealing robust approximation guarantees. Extensive experiments on both synthetic data and real-world conference review data demonstrate the effectiveness of our mechanism in a pressing real-world problem.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Auctioning with Strategically Reticent Bidders

We propose and study a novel mechanism design setup where each bidder holds two kinds of private information: (1) type variable, which can be misreported; (2) information variable, which the bidder may want to conceal or partially reveal, but importantly, not to misreport. We refer to bidders with such behaviors as strategically reticent bidders. Among others, one direct motivation of our model is the ad auction in which many ad platforms today elicit from each bidder not only their private value per conversion but also their private information about Internet users (e.g., user activities on the advertiser's websites) in order to improve the platform's estimation of conversion rates. We show that in this new setup, it is still possible to design mechanisms that are both Incentive and Information Compatible (IIC). We develop two different black-box transformations, which convert any mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ for classic bidders to a mechanism $\bar{\mathcal{M}}$ for strategically reticent bidders, based on either outcome of expectation or expectation of outcome, respectively. We identify properties of the original mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ under which the transformation leads to IIC mechanisms $\bar{\mathcal{M}}$. Interestingly, as corollaries of these results, we show that running VCG with bidders' expected values maximizes welfare, whereas the mechanism using expected outcome of Myerson's auction maximizes revenue. Finally, we study how regulation on the auctioneer's usage of information can lead to more robust mechanisms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Inverse Game Theory for Stackelberg Games: the Blessing of Bounded Rationality

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem -- instead of prescribing equilibrium of a given game, we may directly observe the agents' equilibrium behaviors but want to infer the underlying parameters of an unknown game. This research question, also known as inverse game theory, has been studied in multiple recent works in the context of Stackelberg games. Unfortunately, existing works exhibit quite negative results, showing statistical hardness and computational hardness, assuming follower's perfectly rational behaviors. Our work relaxes the perfect rationality agent assumption to the classic quantal response model, a more realistic behavior model of bounded rationality. Interestingly, we show that the smooth property brought by such bounded rationality model actually leads to provably more efficient learning of the follower utility parameters in general Stackelberg games. Systematic empirical experiments on synthesized games confirm our theoretical results and further suggest its robustness beyond the strict quantal response model.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning

In today's economy, it becomes important for Internet platforms to consider the sequential information design problem to align its long term interest with incentives of the gig service providers. This paper proposes a novel model of sequential information design, namely the Markov persuasion processes (MPPs), where a sender, with informational advantage, seeks to persuade a stream of myopic receivers to take actions that maximizes the sender's cumulative utilities in a finite horizon Markovian environment with varying prior and utility functions. Planning in MPPs thus faces the unique challenge in finding a signaling policy that is simultaneously persuasive to the myopic receivers and inducing the optimal long-term cumulative utilities of the sender. Nevertheless, in the population level where the model is known, it turns out that we can efficiently determine the optimal (resp. $ε$-optimal) policy with finite (resp. infinite) states and outcomes, through a modified formulation of the Bellman equation. Our main technical contribution is to study the MPP under the online reinforcement learning (RL) setting, where the goal is to learn the optimal signaling policy by interacting with with the underlying MPP, without the knowledge of the sender's utility functions, prior distributions, and the Markov transition kernels. We design a provably efficient no-regret learning algorithm, the Optimism-Pessimism Principle for Persuasion Process (OP4), which features a novel combination of both optimism and pessimism principles. Our algorithm enjoys sample efficiency by achieving a sublinear $\sqrt{T}$-regret upper bound. Furthermore, both our algorithm and theory can be applied to MPPs with large space of outcomes and states via function approximation, and we showcase such a success under the linear setting.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

Least Square Calibration for Peer Review

Peer review systems such as conference paper review often suffer from the issue of miscalibration. Previous works on peer review calibration usually only use the ordinal information or assume simplistic reviewer scoring functions such as linear functions. In practice, applications like academic conferences often rely on manual methods, such as open discussions, to mitigate miscalibration. It remains an important question to develop algorithms that can handle different types of miscalibrations based on available prior knowledge. In this paper, we propose a flexible framework, namely least square calibration (LSC), for selecting top candidates from peer ratings. Our framework provably performs perfect calibration from noiseless linear scoring functions under mild assumptions, yet also provides competitive calibration results when the scoring function is from broader classes beyond linear functions and with arbitrary noise. On our synthetic dataset, we empirically demonstrate that our algorithm consistently outperforms the baseline which select top papers based on the highest average ratings.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Déjà vu: A Contextualized Temporal Attention Mechanism for Sequential Recommendation

Predicting users' preferences based on their sequential behaviors in history is challenging and crucial for modern recommender systems. Most existing sequential recommendation algorithms focus on transitional structure among the sequential actions, but largely ignore the temporal and context information, when modeling the influence of a historical event to current prediction. In this paper, we argue that the influence from the past events on a user's current action should vary over the course of time and under different context. Thus, we propose a Contextualized Temporal Attention Mechanism that learns to weigh historical actions' influence on not only what action it is, but also when and how the action took place. More specifically, to dynamically calibrate the relative input dependence from the self-attention mechanism, we deploy multiple parameterized kernel functions to learn various temporal dynamics, and then use the context information to determine which of these reweighing kernels to follow for each input. In empirical evaluations on two large public recommendation datasets, our model consistently outperformed an extensive set of state-of-the-art sequential recommendation methods.

cs.IR↗