arXiv subjects

Jiehua Chen

Publications and source records attributed to Jiehua Chen.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2022

Game Implementation: What Are the Obstructions?

In many applications, we want to influence the decisions of independent agents by designing incentives for their actions. We revisit a fundamental problem in this area, called GAME IMPLEMENTATION: Given a game in standard form and a set of desired strategies, can we design a set of payment promises such that if the players take the payment promises into account, then all undominated strategies are desired? Furthermore, we aim to minimize the cost, that is, the worst-case amount of payments. We study the tractability of computing such payment promises and determine more closely what obstructions we may have to overcome in doing so. We show that GAME IMPLEMENTATION is NP-hard even for two players, solving in particular a long open question (Eidenbenz et al. 2011) and suggesting more restrictions are necessary to obtain tractability results. We thus study the regime in which players have only a small constant number of strategies and obtain the following. First, this case remains NP-hard even if each player's utility depends only on three others. Second, we repair a flawed efficient algorithm for the case of both small number of strategies and small number of players. Among further results, we characterize sets of desired strategies that can be implemented at zero cost as a kind of stable core of the game.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Multi-Dimensional Stable Roommates in 2-Dimensional Euclidean Space

We investigate the Euclidean $d$-Dimensional Stable Roommates problem, which asks whether a given set~$V$ of $d \cdot n$ points from the 2-dimensional Euclidean space can be partitioned into $n$ disjoint (unordered) subsets $Π=\{V_1,\ldots,V_{n}\}$ with $|V_i|=d$ for each $V_i\in Π$ such that $Π$ is stable. Here, stability means that no point subset $W\subseteq V$ is blocking $Π$ and $W$ is said to be blocking $Π$ if $|W|= d$ such that $\sum_{w'\in W}δ(w,w') < \sum_{v\in Π(w)}δ(w,v)$ holds for each point $w\in W$, where $Π(w)$ denotes the subset $V_i\in Π$ which contains $w$ and $δ(a,b)$ denotes the Euclidean distance between points $a$ and $b$. Complementing the existing known polynomial-time result for $d=2$, we show that such polynomial-time algorithms cannot exist for any fixed number $d \ge 3$ unless P=NP. Our result for $d=3$ answers a decade-long open question in the theory of Stable Matching and Hedonic Games [17, 1, 9, 25, 20].

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

2-Dimensional Euclidean Preferences

A preference profile with m alternatives and n voters is 2-dimensional Euclidean if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into a 2-dimensional space such that for each pair of alternatives, every voter prefers the one which has a shorter Euclidean distance to the voter. We study how 2-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles depend on the values m and n. We find that any profile with at most two voters or at most three alternatives is 2-dimensional Euclidean while for three voters, we can show this property for up to seven alternatives. The results are tight in terms of Bogomolnaia and Laslier [2, Proposition 15(1)].

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Parameterized Intractability for Multi-Winner Election under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the Monroe Rule

Answering an open question by Betzler et al. [Betzler et al., JAIR'13], we resolve the parameterized complexity of the multi-winner determination problem under two famous representation voting rules: the Chamberlin-Courant (in short CC) rule [Chamberlin and Courant, APSR'83] and the Monroe rule [Monroe, APSR'95]. We show that under both rules, the problem is W[1]-hard with respect to the sum $β$ of misrepresentations, thereby precluding the existence of any $f(β) \cdot |I|^{O(1)}$ -time algorithm, where $|I|$ denotes the size of the input instance.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2021

On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matching

We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a given Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates instance is called coalitional exchange-stable if it does not admit any exchange-blocking coalition, that is, a subset S of agents in which everyone prefers the partner of some other agent in S. The matching is exchange-stable if it does not admit any exchange-blocking pair, that is, an exchange-blocking coalition of size two. We investigate the computational and parameterized complexity of the Coalitional Exchange-Stable Marriage (resp. Coalitional Exchange Roommates) problem, which is to decide whether a Stable Marriage (resp. Stable Roommates) instance admits a coalitional exchange-stable matching. Our findings resolve an open question and confirm the conjecture of Cechlárová and Manlove [Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2005] that Coalitional Exchange-Stable Marriage is NP-hard even for complete preferences without ties. We also study bounded-length preference lists and a local-search variant of deciding whether a given matching can reach an exchange-stable one after at most k swaps, where a swap is defined as exchanging the partners of the two agents in an exchange-blocking pair.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process where citizens jointly decide on how to allocate public funds to indivisible projects. This paper focuses on PB processes where citizens may give additional money to projects they want to see funded. We introduce a formal framework for this kind of PB with donations. Our framework also allows for diversity constraints, meaning that each project belongs to one or more types, and there are lower and upper bounds on the number of projects of the same type that can be funded. We propose three general classes of methods for aggregating the citizens' preferences in the presence of donations and analyze their axiomatic properties. Furthermore, we investigate the computational complexity of determining the outcome of a PB process with donations and of finding a citizen's optimal donation strategy.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2021

Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces is Hard

We study the Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces (DivorceSM) problem of deciding, given a Stable Marriage instance and an initial matching $M$ , whether there exists a stable matching which is reachable from $M$ by divorce operations as introduced by Knuth [12]. Towards answering an open question of Manlove [13] and Cechlárová et al. [3], we show that for incomplete preferences without ties, DivorceSM is NP-hard. Our hardness reduction also implies that the problem remains parameterized intractable for the number $κ$ of allowed divorce operations. It remains NP-hard even if the maximum length $d$ of the preferences is a constant. For the combined parameter ($κ$, $d$), the problem is fixed-parameter tractable.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Fractional Matchings under Preferences: Stability and Optimality

We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of Combinatorial Theory, 2003] and cardinal stability [Caragiannis et al., ACM EC 2019] and two optimality criteria: maximizing social welfare (i.e., the overall satisfaction of the agents) and maximizing the number of fully matched agents (i.e., agents whose shares sum up to one). After having observed that ordinal stability always exists and implies cardinal stability, and that the set of ordinally stable matchings in a restricted case admits a lattice structure, we obtain a complete picture regarding the computational complexity of finding an optimal ordinally stable or cardinally stable matching. In the process we answer an open question raised by Caragiannis et al. [AIJ 2020].

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Efficient fully dynamic elimination forests with applications to detecting long paths and cycles

We present a data structure that in a dynamic graph of treedepth at most $d$, which is modified over time by edge insertions and deletions, maintains an optimum-height elimination forest. The data structure achieves worst-case update time $2^{{\cal O}(d^2)}$, which matches the best known parameter dependency in the running time of a static fpt algorithm for computing the treedepth of a graph. This improves a result of Dvořák et al. [ESA 2014], who for the same problem achieved update time $f(d)$ for some non-elementary (i.e. tower-exponential) function $f$. As a by-product, we improve known upper bounds on the sizes of minimal obstructions for having treedepth $d$ from doubly-exponential in $d$ to $d^{{\cal O}(d)}$. As applications, we design new fully dynamic parameterized data structures for detecting long paths and cycles in general graphs. More precisely, for a fixed parameter $k$ and a dynamic graph $G$, modified over time by edge insertions and deletions, our data structures maintain answers to the following queries: - Does $G$ contain a simple path on $k$ vertices? - Does $G$ contain a simple cycle on at least $k$ vertices? In the first case, the data structure achieves amortized update time $2^{{\cal O}(k^2)}$. In the second case, the amortized update time is $2^{{\cal O}(k^4)} + {\cal O}(k \log n)$. In both cases we assume access to a dictionary on the edges of $G$.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2020

Stable Roommates with Narcissistic, Single-Peaked, and Single-Crossing Preferences

The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their respectively assigned partners. We investigate Stable Roommates with complete (i.e., every agent can be matched with any other agent) or incomplete preferences, with ties (i.e., two agents are considered of equal value to some agent) or without ties. It is known that in general allowing ties makes the problem NP-complete. We provide algorithms for Stable Roommates that are, compared to those in the literature, more efficient when the input preferences are complete and have some structural property, such as being narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing. However, when the preferences are incomplete and have ties, we show that being single-peaked and single-crossing does not reduce the computational complexity--Stable Roommates remains NP-complete.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Stable Matchings with Diversity Constraints: Affirmative Action is beyond NP

We investigate the following many-to-one stable matching problem with diversity constraints (SMTI-Diverse): Given a set of students and a set of colleges which have preferences over each other, where the students have overlapping types, and the colleges each have a total capacity as well as quotas for individual types (the diversity constraints), is there a matching satisfying all diversity constraints such that no unmatched student-college pair has an incentive to deviate? SMTI-Diverse is known to be NP-hard. However, as opposed to the NP-membership claims in the literature [Aziz et al., AAMAS 2019; Huang, SODA 2010], we prove that it is beyond NP: it is complete for the complexity class $Σ^{\text{P}}_2$. In addition, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the problem's complexity from the viewpoint of natural restrictions to inputs and obtain new algorithms for the problem.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Adapting Stable Matchings to Evolving Preferences

Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing "incrementalized versions" of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for both problems, what is the computational cost of adapting an existing stable matching after some of the preferences of the agents have changed. While doing so, we also model the constraint that the new stable matching shall be not too different from the old one. After formalizing these incremental versions, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of Incremental Stable Marriage and Incremental Stable Roommates. To this end, we exploit the parameters "degree of change" both in the input (difference between old and new preference profile) and in the output (difference between old and new stable matching). We obtain both hardness and tractability results, in particular showing a fixed-parameter tractability result with respect to the parameter "distance between old and new stable matching".

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

On Computing Centroids According to the $p$-Norms of Hamming Distance Vectors

In this paper we consider the $p$-Norm Hamming Centroid problem which asks to determine whether some given binary strings have a centroid with a bound on the $p$-norm of its Hamming distances to the strings. Specifically, given a set of strings $S$ and a real $k$, we consider the problem of determining whether there exists a string $s^*$ with $\big(\sum_{s \in S}d^p(s^*,s)\big)^{1/p} \leq k$, where $d(,)$ denotes the Hamming distance metric. This problem has important applications in data clustering, and is a generalization of the well-known polynomial-time solvable \textsc{Consensus String} $(p=1)$ problem, as well as the NP-hard \textsc{Closest String} $(p=\infty)$ problem. Our main result shows that the problem is NP-hard for all fixed rational $p > 1$, closing the gap for all rational values of $p$ between $1$ and $\infty$. Under standard complexity assumptions the reduction also implies that the problem has no $2^{o(n+m)}$-time or $2^{o(k^{\frac{p}{(p+1)}})}$-time algorithm, where $m$ denotes the number of input strings and $n$ denotes the length of each string, for any fixed $p > 1$. Both running time lower bounds are tight. In particular, we provide a $2^{k^{\frac{p}{(p+1)}+\varepsilon}}$-time algorithm for each fixed $\varepsilon > 0$. In the last part of the paper, we complement our hardness result by presenting a fixed-parameter algorithm and a factor-$2$ approximation algorithm for the problem.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2019

Matchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Trade-offs

We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness requires that a matching must be stable in the classic sense, even if the agents slightly change their preferences. Near stability, on the other hand, imposes that a matching must become stable (again, in the classic sense) provided the agents are willing to adjust their preferences a bit. Both of our concepts are quantitative; together they provide means for a fine-grained analysis of stability for matchings. Moreover, our concepts allow to explore the trade-offs between stability and other criteria of societal optimality, such as the egalitarian cost and the number of unmatched agents. We investigate the computational complexity of finding matchings that implement certain predefined trade-offs. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that given agents' preferences returns a socially optimal robust matching, and we prove that finding a socially optimal and nearly stable matching is computationally hard.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Good Things Come to Those Who Swap Objects on Paths

We study a simple exchange market, introduced by Gourvés, Lesca and Wilczynski (IJCAI-17), where every agent initially holds a single object. The agents have preferences over the objects, and two agents may swap their objects if they both prefer the object of the other agent. The agents live in an underlying social network that governs the structure of the swaps: Two agents can only swap their objects if they are adjacent. We investigate the REACHABLE OBJECT problem, which asks whether a given starting situation can ever lead, by means of a sequence of swaps, to a situation where a given agent obtains a given object. Our results answer several central open questions on the complexity of REACHABLE OBJECT. First, the problem is polynomial-time solvable if the social network is a path. Second, the problem is NP-hard on cliques and generalized caterpillars. Finally, we establish a three-versus-four dichotomy result for preference lists of bounded length: The problem is easy if all preference lists have length at most three, and the problem becomes NP-hard even if all agents have preference lists of length at most four.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

Computational Complexity of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates and Their Variants

This paper gives an overview on and summarizes existing complexity and algorithmic results of some variants of the Stable Marriage and the Stable Roommates problems. The last section defines a list of stable matching problems mentioned in the paper. If you find any corrections, suggestions, new or missing results, please send them to jiehua.chen2@gmail.com.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Cluster Editing for Multi-Layer and Temporal Graphs

Motivated by the recent rapid growth of research for algorithms to cluster multi-layer and temporal graphs, we study extensions of the classical Cluster Editing problem. In Multi-Layer Cluster Editing we receive a set of graphs on the same vertex set, called layers and aim to transform all layers into cluster graphs (disjoint unions of cliques) that differ only slightly. More specifically, we want to mark at most $d$ vertices and to transform each layer into a cluster graph using at most $k$ edge additions or deletions per layer so that, if we remove the marked vertices, we obtain the same cluster graph in all layers. In Temporal Cluster Editing we receive a sequence of layers and we want to transform each layer into a cluster graph so that consecutive layers differ only slightly. That is, we want to transform each layer into a cluster graph with at most $k$ edge additions or deletions and to mark a distinct set of $d$ vertices in each layer so that each two consecutive layers are the same after removing the vertices marked in the first of the two layers. We study the combinatorial structure of the two problems via their parameterized complexity with respect to the parameters $d$ and $k$, among others. Despite the similar definition, the two problems behave quite differently: In particular, Multi-Layer Cluster Editing is fixed-parameter tractable with running time $k^{O(k+d)}\cdot s^{O(1)}$ for inputs of size $s$, whereas Temporal Cluster Editing is W[1]-hard with respect to $k$ even if $d = 3$.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2018

Small One-Dimensional Euclidean Preference Profiles

We characterize one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles with a small number of alternatives and voters. In particular, we show the following. 1. Every preference profile with up to two voters is one-dimensional Euclidean if and only if it is single-peaked. 2. Every preference profile with up to five alternatives is one-dimensional Euclidean if and only if it is single-peaked and single-crossing. By [12], we thus obtain that the smallest single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles that are not one-dimensional Euclidean consist of three voters and six alternatives.

cs.GT↗