arXiv subjects

Jieming Mao

Publications and source records attributed to Jieming Mao.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2022

Regret Minimization with Noisy Observations

In a typical optimization problem, the task is to pick one of a number of options with the lowest cost or the highest value. In practice, these cost/value quantities often come through processes such as measurement or machine learning, which are noisy, with quantifiable noise distributions. To take these noise distributions into account, one approach is to assume a prior for the values, use it to build a posterior, and then apply standard stochastic optimization to pick a solution. However, in many practical applications, such prior distributions may not be available. In this paper, we study such scenarios using a regret minimization model. In our model, the task is to pick the highest one out of $n$ values. The values are unknown and chosen by an adversary, but can be observed through noisy channels, where additive noises are stochastically drawn from known distributions. The goal is to minimize the regret of our selection, defined as the expected difference between the highest and the selected value on the worst-case choices of values. We show that the naïve algorithm of picking the highest observed value has regret arbitrarily worse than the optimum, even when $n = 2$ and the noises are unbiased in expectation. On the other hand, we propose an algorithm which gives a constant-approximation to the optimal regret for any $n$. Our algorithm is conceptually simple, computationally efficient, and requires only minimal knowledge of the noise distributions.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2022

Shuffle Private Stochastic Convex Optimization

In shuffle privacy, each user sends a collection of randomized messages to a trusted shuffler, the shuffler randomly permutes these messages, and the resulting shuffled collection of messages must satisfy differential privacy. Prior work in this model has largely focused on protocols that use a single round of communication to compute algorithmic primitives like means, histograms, and counts. We present interactive shuffle protocols for stochastic convex optimization. Our protocols rely on a new noninteractive protocol for summing vectors of bounded $\ell_2$ norm. By combining this sum subroutine with mini-batch stochastic gradient descent, accelerated gradient descent, and Nesterov's smoothing method, we obtain loss guarantees for a variety of convex loss functions that significantly improve on those of the local model and sometimes match those of the central model.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade

We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly budget balanced mechanism can be efficient. I.e., no mechanism with these properties can guarantee a trade whenever buyer value exceeds seller cost. Given this, a natural question is whether there exists a mechanism with these properties that guarantees a constant fraction of the first-best gains-from-trade, namely a constant fraction of the gains-from-trade attainable whenever buyer's value weakly exceeds seller's cost. In this work, we positively resolve this long-standing open question on constant-factor approximation, mentioned in several previous works, using a simple mechanism.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World

In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve prices, however, usually do not help improve total welfare of the auctioneer and the bidders. In this paper, we focus on value maximizing bidders with return on spend constraints -- a paradigm that has drawn considerable attention recently as more advertisers adopt auto-bidding algorithms in advertising platforms -- and show that the introduction of reserve prices has a novel impact on the market. Namely, by choosing reserve prices appropriately the auctioneer can improve not only the total revenue but also the total welfare. Our results also demonstrate that reserve prices are robust to bidder types, i.e., reserve prices work well for different bidder types, such as value maximizers and utility maximizers, without using bidder type information. We generalize these results for a variety of auction mechanisms such as VCG, GSP, and first-price auctions. Moreover, we show how to combine these results with additive boosts to improve the welfare of the outcomes of the auction further. Finally, we complement our theoretical observations with an empirical study confirming the effectiveness of these ideas using data from online advertising auctions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade

We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define message complexity corresponding to the minimum number of interactive rounds necessary to achieve the best possible outcome. Our main result is that for bilateral trade, agents don't stop talking until they reach an efficient outcome: Either agents achieve an efficient allocation in finitely many rounds of communication; or the optimal communication protocol has infinite number of rounds. We show an important class of bilateral trade settings where efficient allocation is achievable with a small number of rounds of communication.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World

Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of bidding to auto-bidders. In this paper, we propose a family of auctions with boosts to improve welfare in auto-bidding environments with both return on ad spend constraints and budget constraints. Our empirical results validate our theoretical findings and show that both the welfare and revenue can be improved by selecting the weight of the boosts properly.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Connecting Robust Shuffle Privacy and Pan-Privacy

In the \emph{shuffle model} of differential privacy, data-holding users send randomized messages to a secure shuffler, the shuffler permutes the messages, and the resulting collection of messages must be differentially private with regard to user data. In the \emph{pan-private} model, an algorithm processes a stream of data while maintaining an internal state that is differentially private with regard to the stream data. We give evidence connecting these two apparently different models. Our results focus on \emph{robustly} shuffle private protocols, whose privacy guarantees are not greatly affected by malicious users. First, we give robustly shuffle private protocols and upper bounds for counting distinct elements and uniformity testing. Second, we use pan-private lower bounds to prove robustly shuffle private lower bounds for both problems. Focusing on the dependence on the domain size $k$, we find that robust approximate shuffle privacy and approximate pan-privacy have additive error $Θ(\sqrt{k})$ for counting distinct elements. For uniformity testing, we give a robust approximate shuffle private protocol with sample complexity $\tilde O(k^{2/3})$ and show that an $Ω(k^{2/3})$ dependence is necessary for any robust pure shuffle private tester. Finally, we show that this connection is useful in both directions: we give a pan-private adaptation of recent work on shuffle private histograms and use it to recover further separations between pan-privacy and interactive local privacy.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Pan-Private Uniformity Testing

A centrally differentially private algorithm maps raw data to differentially private outputs. In contrast, a locally differentially private algorithm may only access data through public interaction with data holders, and this interaction must be a differentially private function of the data. We study the intermediate model of pan-privacy. Unlike a locally private algorithm, a pan-private algorithm receives data in the clear. Unlike a centrally private algorithm, the algorithm receives data one element at a time and must maintain a differentially private internal state while processing this stream. First, we show that pure pan-privacy against multiple intrusions on the internal state is equivalent to sequentially interactive local privacy. Next, we contextualize pan-privacy against a single intrusion by analyzing the sample complexity of uniformity testing over domain $[k]$. Focusing on the dependence on $k$, centrally private uniformity testing has sample complexity $Θ(\sqrt{k})$, while noninteractive locally private uniformity testing has sample complexity $Θ(k)$. We show that the sample complexity of pure pan-private uniformity testing is $Θ(k^{2/3})$. By a new $Ω(k)$ lower bound for the sequentially interactive setting, we also separate pan-private from sequentially interactive locally private and multi-intrusion pan-private uniformity testing.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

The Role of Interactivity in Local Differential Privacy

We study the power of interactivity in local differential privacy. First, we focus on the difference between fully interactive and sequentially interactive protocols. Sequentially interactive protocols may query users adaptively in sequence, but they cannot return to previously queried users. The vast majority of existing lower bounds for local differential privacy apply only to sequentially interactive protocols, and before this paper it was not known whether fully interactive protocols were more powerful. We resolve this question. First, we classify locally private protocols by their compositionality, the multiplicative factor $k \geq 1$ by which the sum of a protocol's single-round privacy parameters exceeds its overall privacy guarantee. We then show how to efficiently transform any fully interactive $k$-compositional protocol into an equivalent sequentially interactive protocol with an $O(k)$ blowup in sample complexity. Next, we show that our reduction is tight by exhibiting a family of problems such that for any $k$, there is a fully interactive $k$-compositional protocol which solves the problem, while no sequentially interactive protocol can solve the problem without at least an $\tilde Ω(k)$ factor more examples. We then turn our attention to hypothesis testing problems. We show that for a large class of compound hypothesis testing problems --- which include all simple hypothesis testing problems as a special case --- a simple noninteractive test is optimal among the class of all (possibly fully interactive) tests.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Exponential Separations in Local Differential Privacy

We prove a general connection between the communication complexity of two-player games and the sample complexity of their multi-player locally private analogues. We use this connection to prove sample complexity lower bounds for locally differentially private protocols as straightforward corollaries of results from communication complexity. In particular, we 1) use a communication lower bound for the hidden layers problem to prove an exponential sample complexity separation between sequentially and fully interactive locally private protocols, and 2) use a communication lower bound for the pointer chasing problem to prove an exponential sample complexity separation between $k$ round and $k+1$ round sequentially interactive locally private protocols, for every $k$.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Locally Private Gaussian Estimation

We study a basic private estimation problem: each of $n$ users draws a single i.i.d. sample from an unknown Gaussian distribution, and the goal is to estimate the mean of this Gaussian distribution while satisfying local differential privacy for each user. Informally, local differential privacy requires that each data point is individually and independently privatized before it is passed to a learning algorithm. Locally private Gaussian estimation is therefore difficult because the data domain is unbounded: users may draw arbitrarily different inputs, but local differential privacy nonetheless mandates that different users have (worst-case) similar privatized output distributions. We provide both adaptive two-round solutions and nonadaptive one-round solutions for locally private Gaussian estimation. We then partially match these upper bounds with an information-theoretic lower bound. This lower bound shows that our accuracy guarantees are tight up to logarithmic factors for all sequentially interactive $(\varepsilon,δ)$-locally private protocols.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Sorted Top-k in Rounds

We consider the sorted top-$k$ problem whose goal is to recover the top-$k$ items with the correct order out of $n$ items using pairwise comparisons. In many applications, multiple rounds of interaction can be costly. We restrict our attention to algorithms with a constant number of rounds $r$ and try to minimize the sample complexity, i.e. the number of comparisons. When the comparisons are noiseless, we characterize how the optimal sample complexity depends on the number of rounds (up to a polylogarithmic factor for general $r$ and up to a constant factor for $r=1$ or 2). In particular, the sample complexity is $Θ(n^2)$ for $r=1$, $Θ(n\sqrt{k} + n^{4/3})$ for $r=2$ and $\tildeΘ\left(n^{2/r} k^{(r-1)/r} + n\right)$ for $r \geq 3$. We extend our results of sorted top-$k$ to the noisy case where each comparison is correct with probability $2/3$. When $r=1$ or 2, we show that the sample complexity gets an extra $Θ(\log(k))$ factor when we transition from the noiseless case to the noisy case. We also prove new results for top-$k$ and sorting in the noisy case. We believe our techniques can be generally useful for understanding the trade-off between round complexities and sample complexities of rank aggregation problems.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

Differentially Private Fair Learning

Motivated by settings in which predictive models may be required to be non-discriminatory with respect to certain attributes (such as race), but even collecting the sensitive attribute may be forbidden or restricted, we initiate the study of fair learning under the constraint of differential privacy. We design two learning algorithms that simultaneously promise differential privacy and equalized odds, a 'fairness' condition that corresponds to equalizing false positive and negative rates across protected groups. Our first algorithm is a private implementation of the equalized odds post-processing approach of [Hardt et al., 2016]. This algorithm is appealingly simple, but must be able to use protected group membership explicitly at test time, which can be viewed as a form of 'disparate treatment'. Our second algorithm is a differentially private version of the oracle-efficient in-processing approach of [Agarwal et al., 2018] that can be used to find the optimal fair classifier, given access to a subroutine that can solve the original (not necessarily fair) learning problem. This algorithm is more complex but need not have access to protected group membership at test time. We identify new tradeoffs between fairness, accuracy, and privacy that emerge only when requiring all three properties, and show that these tradeoffs can be milder if group membership may be used at test time. We conclude with a brief experimental evaluation.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Diversity and Exploration in Social Learning

In consumer search, there is a set of items. An agent has a prior over her value for each item and can pay a cost to learn the instantiation of her value. After exploring a subset of items, the agent chooses one and obtains a payoff equal to its value minus the search cost. We consider a sequential model of consumer search in which agents' values are correlated and each agent updates her priors based on the exploration of past agents before performing her search. Specifically, we assume the value is the sum of a common-value component, called the quality, and a subjective score. Fixing the variance of the total value, we say a population is more diverse if the subjective score has a larger variance. We ask how diversity impacts average utility. We show that intermediate diversity levels yield significantly higher social utility than the extreme cases of no diversity (when agents under-explore) or full diversity (when agents are unable to learn from each other) and quantify how the impact of the diversity level changes depending on the time spent searching.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Bayesian Exploration with Heterogeneous Agents

It is common in recommendation systems that users both consume and produce information as they make strategic choices under uncertainty. While a social planner would balance "exploration" and "exploitation" using a multi-armed bandit algorithm, users' incentives may tilt this balance in favor of exploitation. We consider Bayesian Exploration: a simple model in which the recommendation system (the "principal") controls the information flow to the users (the "agents") and strives to incentivize exploration via information asymmetry. A single round of this model is a version of a well-known "Bayesian Persuasion game" from [Kamenica and Gentzkow]. We allow heterogeneous users, relaxing a major assumption from prior work that users have the same preferences from one time step to another. The goal is now to learn the best personalized recommendations. One particular challenge is that it may be impossible to incentivize some of the user types to take some of the actions, no matter what the principal does or how much time she has. We consider several versions of the model, depending on whether and when the user types are reported to the principal, and design a near-optimal "recommendation policy" for each version. We also investigate how the model choice and the diversity of user types impact the set of actions that can possibly be "explored" by each type.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Selling to a No-Regret Buyer

We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single item to a single buyer (specifically, the buyer has a value drawn fresh from known distribution $D$ in every round). Prior work assumes that the buyer is fully rational and will perfectly reason about how their bids today affect the seller's decisions tomorrow. In this work we initiate a different direction: the buyer simply runs a no-regret learning algorithm over possible bids. We provide a fairly complete characterization of optimal auctions for the seller in this domain. Specifically: - If the buyer bids according to EXP3 (or any "mean-based" learning algorithm), then the seller can extract expected revenue arbitrarily close to the expected welfare. This auction is independent of the buyer's valuation $D$, but somewhat unnatural as it is sometimes in the buyer's interest to overbid. - There exists a learning algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ such that if the buyer bids according to $\mathcal{A}$ then the optimal strategy for the seller is simply to post the Myerson reserve for $D$ every round. - If the buyer bids according to EXP3 (or any "mean-based" learning algorithm), but the seller is restricted to "natural" auction formats where overbidding is dominated (e.g. Generalized First-Price or Generalized Second-Price), then the optimal strategy for the seller is a pay-your-bid format with decreasing reserves over time. Moreover, the seller's optimal achievable revenue is characterized by a linear program, and can be unboundedly better than the best truthful auction yet simultaneously unboundedly worse than the expected welfare.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Combinatorial Assortment Optimization

Assortment optimization refers to the problem of designing a slate of products to offer potential customers, such as stocking the shelves in a convenience store. The price of each product is fixed in advance, and a probabilistic choice function describes which product a customer will choose from any given subset. We introduce the combinatorial assortment problem, where each customer may select a bundle of products. We consider a model of consumer choice where the relative value of different bundles is described by a valuation function, while individual customers may differ in their absolute willingness to pay, and study the complexity of the resulting optimization problem. We show that any sub-polynomial approximation to the problem requires exponentially many demand queries when the valuation function is XOS, and that no FPTAS exists even for succinctly-representable submodular valuations. On the positive side, we show how to obtain constant approximations under a "well-priced" condition, where each product's price is sufficiently high. We also provide an exact algorithm for $k$-additive valuations, and show how to extend our results to a learning setting where the seller must infer the customers' preferences from their purchasing behavior.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

A Nearly Instance Optimal Algorithm for Top-k Ranking under the Multinomial Logit Model

We study the active learning problem of top-$k$ ranking from multi-wise comparisons under the popular multinomial logit model. Our goal is to identify the top-$k$ items with high probability by adaptively querying sets for comparisons and observing the noisy output of the most preferred item from each comparison. To achieve this goal, we design a new active ranking algorithm without using any information about the underlying items' preference scores. We also establish a matching lower bound on the sample complexity even when the set of preference scores is given to the algorithm. These two results together show that the proposed algorithm is nearly instance optimal (similar to instance optimal [FLN03], but up to polylog factors). Our work extends the existing literature on rank aggregation in three directions. First, instead of studying a static problem with fixed data, we investigate the top-$k$ ranking problem in an active learning setting. Second, we show our algorithm is nearly instance optimal, which is a much stronger theoretical guarantee. Finally, we extend the pairwise comparison to the multi-wise comparison, which has not been fully explored in ranking literature.

cs.DS↗