SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Jihyeok Jung

Publications and source records attributed to Jihyeok Jung.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

EgoGapBench: Benchmarking Egocentric Action Selection in Multi-Agent Scenes

Existing egocentric benchmarks have primarily constructed the egocentric setting from first-person-view data, which makes it difficult to evaluate egocentric perspective itself in isolation. However, understanding first-person-view input and taking an egocentric perspective are separable abilities, especially when first-person body cues are absent or when other agents are present. To isolate egocentric perspective understanding, we introduce EgoGapBench, a diagnostic benchmark for measuring action selection in multi-agent egocentric scenes. We define the ability measured by this benchmark as Egocentric Action Selection (EAS): selecting an appropriate action from the agent's perspective in the presence of other agents. On EgoGapBench, humans answer reliably, whereas both open-source and proprietary MLLMs perform substantially worse and systematically select actions performed by other visible agents. Fine-tuning on existing egocentric data fails to close this gap and can even be detrimental. In contrast, fine-tuning on EgoGapBench training data improves accuracy but does not reach human performance. These results show that EAS is difficult to acquire from first-person-view data alone, and that MLLMs should be evaluated and trained not only for scene understanding but also for egocentric action selection.

cs.CV

Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack Environment

This study introduces an optimal mechanism in a dynamic stochastic knapsack environment. The model features a single seller who has a fixed quantity of a perfectly divisible item. Impatient buyers with a piece-wise linear utility function arrive randomly and they report the two-dimensional private information: marginal value and demanded quantity. We derive a revenue-maximizing dynamic mechanism in a finite discrete time framework that satisfies incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and feasibility conditions. It is achieved by characterizing buyers' utility and deriving the Bellman equation. Moreover, we propose the essential penalty scheme for incentive compatibility, as well as the allocation and payment policies. Lastly, we propose algorithms to approximate the optimal policy, based on the Monte Carlo simulation-based regression method and reinforcement learning.

cs.GT