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Jin-yi Cai

Publications and source records attributed to Jin-yi Cai.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Pure Nash Equilibria under the Affine Mechanism: A Potential Game of Exaggeration

The mean mechanism is known to be non-incentive-compatible, namely, rational players are incentivized to misreport their values. Despite this game-theoretic issue, the mean mechanism is prevalent in practice due to its other desirable properties. We give a full characterization of pure Nash equilibria--how the players will misreport--for the affine mechanism, of which the mean is a special case. Furthermore, we characterize both complete-information and Bayesian games under the affine mechanism. Our results highlight the inevitability of extreme exaggeration in such games.

cs.GT

Holographic Algorithm with Matchgates Is Universal for Planar $\#$CSP Over Boolean Domain

We prove a complexity classification theorem that classifies all counting constraint satisfaction problems ($\#$CSP) over Boolean variables into exactly three categories: (1) Polynomial-time tractable; (2) $\#$P-hard for general instances, but solvable in polynomial-time over planar graphs; and (3) $\#$P-hard over planar graphs. The classification applies to all sets of local, not necessarily symmetric, constraint functions on Boolean variables that take complex values. It is shown that Valiant's holographic algorithm with matchgates is a universal strategy for all problems in category (2).

cs.CC