arXiv subjects

Jingsheng Yu

Publications and source records attributed to Jingsheng Yu.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

The core in the housing market model with fractional endowments

We explore the core concept in a generalization of the housing market model where agents own fractional endowments while maintaining ordinal preferences. Recognizing that individuals are easier than coalitions to block an allocation, we adopt a definition in which individuals block an allocation if their received assignments do not first-order stochastically dominate their endowment, while a non-singleton coalition blocks an allocation if they can reallocate their endowments to obtain new assignments that first-order stochastically dominate their original assignments. Our findings show that, unlike the original model, the strong core may be empty, while the weak core is nonempty. The weak core always contains elements that satisfy equal treatment of equals, but it may not contain elements satisfying equal-endowment no envy.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Efficient Major Transition Exchange under Distributional and Dual Priority-respecting Constraints

Many real matching markets encounter distributional and fairness constraints. Motivated by the Chinese Major Transition Program (CMT), this paper studies the design of exchange mechanisms within a fresh framework of both distributional and dual priority-respecting constraints. Specifically, each student has an initial assigned major and applies to transfer to a more desirable one. A student can successfully transfer majors only if they obtain eligibility from both their initial major and the applied major. Each major has a dual priority: a strict priority over current students who wish to transfer out and a strict priority over students from other majors who wish to transfer in. Additionally, each major faces a ceiling constraint and a floor constraint to regulate student distribution. We show that the existing mechanisms of CMT result in avoidable inefficiencies, and propose two mechanisms that can match students to majors in an efficient way as well as respecting each major's distributional and dual priority. The efficient mechanisms are based on a proposed solution concept: eligibility maximization (EM), and two processes for identifying improvement cycles--specifically, transfer-in exchangeable cycles and transfer-out exchangeable cycles.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2020

Efficient and fair trading mechanisms on the full preference domain

Yu and Zhang (2025) introduce a new method for defining trading mechanisms in market design and apply it to develop new mechanisms that achieve efficiency and fairness in various models. However, their assumption of strict preferences limits its applicability. This paper extends their approach to the full preference domain, allowing for indifferences while preserving key efficiency and fairness properties. As a corollary, we generalize the probabilistic serial mechanism in the house allocation model to the full preference domain without relying on operations research tools.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2020

Efficient and fair trading mechanisms for resource exchange in market design

We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering flexibility to incorporate fairness concerns through the selection of equation parameters. Applying this method to models including fractional endowment exchange, priority-based allocation, and house allocation with existing tenants, we obtain new mechanisms that are both efficient and fair in these models.

econ.TH↗