Stabilizer-Public-Key Authentication: Partial Prediction Bounds and Limits of Key Reuse
We propose an information-theoretic authentication protocol based on a finite supply of quadratic-stabilizer public-key states over an odd-prime field. A computationally unbounded adversary observes one valid classical signature and may jointly process $N$ public-key copies, while verification uses one additional independent copy. We show that, conditioned on the exposed signature, the security problem reduces to a partial-prediction game for a uniform stabilizer ensemble on $r=n-\ell$ residual qudits, with a partial query along $d=rank(Y-Y')$ directions, where $n$ is the number of qudits, $\ell$ is the message-space dimension, and $Y$ and $Y'$ denote the honestly signed and target-forged messages, respectively. Surprisingly, although the target requires only partial information, there is no first-order reduction in the required copy rate when $d/r\toβ\in(0,1]$. The optimal average fixed-target forgery probability tends to zero for $N/r\toα<1$ and to one for $α>1$, revealing a sharp threshold at $α=1$. Thus, our results guarantee security against fixed-target forgery under a single-signature-exposure model.