arXiv subjects

Jinwen Xin

Publications and source records attributed to Jinwen Xin.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Beyond the Editing Canvas: Evidence Divergence in OOXML-to-LLM Ingestion

LLM pipelines increasingly ingest Office Open XML (OOXML) documents (Word, Excel, and PowerPoint files) as first-class evidence in financial, compliance, and retrieval-augmented workflows, implicitly assuming semantic integrity: that the evidence consumed by the model matches the content shown in the Microsoft Office suite editing canvas. We show that this assumption can fail in OOXML-to-LLM pipelines. The same specification-valid OOXML file can yield one evidentiary view in Microsoft Office and another when extracted for an LLM. Each view is treated as authoritative by its consumer, a condition we call plural ground truth. The ingestion contract rarely states which view and semantic roles become model evidence or preserves how that evidence was derived. We call the specification-grounded OOXML constructions that induce such divergence evidence forks. We systematically traverse and mine the OOXML specification and confirm 21 evidence forks across Excel, Word, and PowerPoint, spanning six dimensions of view construction. All 13 tools in our extraction panel emit evidence from at least one fork. We test four native-ingestion LLM APIs and seven web chatbots. Each test document carries a trap: a task-relevant fact exposed by extraction but not shown in Office. Across this 21-mechanism evaluation, the four APIs return the trap in 48--76% of trials. For 20 of 21 mechanisms, at least one of the eleven interfaces returns the trap. Our measurements further show that exposure is shaped upstream of the model by the ingestion path and extractor configuration. A source-level survey of sixteen popular open-source LLM projects further shows that default OOXML ingestion paths concentrate on affected extractor families.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2026

Natural Backdoor Attacks on Speech Recognition Models

With the rapid development of deep learning, its vulnerability has gradually emerged in recent years. This work focuses on backdoor attacks on speech recognition systems. We adopt sounds that are ordinary in nature or in our daily life as triggers for natural backdoor attacks. We conduct experiments on two datasets and three models to validate the performance of natural backdoor attacks and explore the effects of poisoning rate, trigger duration and blend ratio on the performance of natural backdoor attacks. Our results show that natural backdoor attacks have a high attack success rate without compromising model performance on benign samples, even with short or low-amplitude triggers. It requires only 5% of poisoned samples to achieve a near 100% attack success rate. In addition, the backdoor will be automatically activated by the corresponding sound in nature, which is not easy to be detected and will bring severer harm.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

SpeechGuard: Online Defense against Backdoor Attacks on Speech Recognition Models

Backdoor attacks pose a critical threat to neural network models, allowing attackers to implant a backdoor during the training phase by manipulating a small portion of the training data. In security-sensitive applications such as voice interaction for autonomous driving, the presence of backdoor attacks introduces substantial security risks. This study focuses on implementing backdoor defense measures for speech recognition models in run-time, taking into account the characteristics of audio signals. We propose SpeechGuard, the first online backdoor defense pipeline designed to identify and purify poisoned audio samples. Specifically, we improve STRIP method to perform adaptive perturbation injection to detect and filter poisoned samples, named as S-STRIP. More importantly, we further consider the purification of poisoned samples. We utilize time-frequency (T-F) masking to suppress the expression of trigger signals and autonomously generate masks based on an autoencoder. The two-stage processing prevents the backdoor in the model from being triggered, and even input speech carrying triggers can be accurately predicted. Extensive experimental demonstrate that SpeechGuard can accurately filter out poisoned samples. Through purification, it can significantly mitigate the backdoor threat while maintaining a certain prediction accuracy.

cs.SD↗