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Joel David Hamkins

Publications and source records attributed to Joel David Hamkins.

At least 73 records · Page 4Linked to original sources
arXiv2014

Superstrong and other large cardinals are never Laver indestructible

Superstrong cardinals are never Laver indestructible. Similarly, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, superhuge cardinals, rank-into-rank cardinals, extendible cardinals, 1-extendible cardinals, 0-extendible cardinals, weakly superstrong cardinals, uplifting cardinals, pseudo-uplifting cardinals, superstrongly unfoldable cardinals, Σ_n-reflecting cardinals, Σ_n-correct cardinals and Σ_n-extendible cardinals (all for n>2) are never Laver indestructible. In fact, all these large cardinal properties are superdestructible: if κ exhibits any of them, with corresponding target θ, then in any forcing extension arising from nontrivial strategically <κ-closed forcing Q in V_θ, the cardinal κ will exhibit none of the large cardinal properties with target θ or larger.

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arXiv2014

Resurrection axioms and uplifting cardinals

We introduce the resurrection axioms, a new class of forcing axioms, and the uplifting cardinals, a new large cardinal notion, and prove that various instances of the resurrection axioms are equiconsistent over ZFC with the existence of an uplifting cardinal.

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arXiv2014

Transfinite game values in infinite chess

We investigate the transfinite game values arising in infinite chess, providing both upper and lower bounds on the supremum of these values---the omega one of chess---with two senses depending on whether one considers only finite positions or also positions with infinitely many pieces. For lower bounds, we present specific infinite positions with transfinite game values of omega, omega^2, omega^2 times k, and omega^3. By embedding trees into chess, we show that there is a computable infinite chess position that is a win for white if the players are required to play according to a deterministic computable strategy, but which is a draw without that restriction. Finally, we prove that every countable ordinal arises as the game value of a position in infinite three-dimensional chess, and consequently the omega one of infinite three-dimensional chess is as large as it can be, namely, true omega one.

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arXiv2014

Every countable model of set theory embeds into its own constructible universe

The main theorem of this article is that every countable model of set theory M, including every well-founded model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe. In other words, there is an embedding $j:M\to L^M$ that is elementary for quantifier-free assertions. The proof uses universal digraph combinatorics, including an acyclic version of the countable random digraph, which I call the countable random Q-graded digraph, and higher analogues arising as uncountable Fraisse limits, leading to the hypnagogic digraph, a set-homogeneous, class-universal, surreal-numbers-graded acyclic class digraph, closely connected with the surreal numbers. The proof shows that $L^M$ contains a submodel that is a universal acyclic digraph of rank $Ord^M$. The method of proof also establishes that the countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability: for any two countable models of set theory, one of them is isomorphic to a submodel of the other. Indeed, they are pre-well-ordered by embedability in order-type exactly $ω_1+1$. Specifically, the countable well-founded models are ordered by embeddability in accordance with the heights of their ordinals; every shorter model embeds into every taller model; every model of set theory $M$ is universal for all countable well-founded binary relations of rank at most $Ord^M$; and every ill-founded model of set theory is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. Finally, strengthening a classical theorem of Ressayre, the same proof method shows that if $M$ is any nonstandard model of PA, then every countable model of set theory---in particular, every model of ZFC---is isomorphic to a submodel of the hereditarily finite sets $HF^M$ of $M$. Indeed, $HF^M$ is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

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arXiv2014

Algebraicity and implicit definability in set theory

We analyze the effect of replacing several natural uses of definability in set theory by the weaker model-theoretic notion of algebraicity. We find, for example, that the class of hereditarily ordinal algebraic sets is the same as the class of hereditarily ordinal definable sets, that is, HOA = HOD. Moreover, we show that every (pointwise) algebraic model of ZF is actually pointwise definable. Finally, we consider the implicitly constructible universe Imp---an algebraic analogue of the constructible universe---which is obtained by iteratively adding not only the sets that are definable over what has been built so far, but also those that are algebraic (or equivalently, implicitly definable) over the existing structure. While we know Imp can differ from L, the subtler properties of this new inner model are just now coming to light. Many questions remain open.

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arXiv2013

The least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable, weakly measurable and nearly $θ$-supercompact

We prove from suitable large cardinal hypotheses that the least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable, weakly measurable and even nearly $θ$-supercompact, for any desired $θ$. In addition, we prove several global results showing how the entire class of weakly compact cardinals, a proper class, can be made to coincide with the class of unfoldable cardinals, with the class of weakly measurable cardinals or with the class of nearly $θ_κ$-supercompact cardinals $κ$, for nearly any desired function $κ\mapstoθ_κ$. These results answer several questions that had been open in the literature and extend to these large cardinals the identity-crises phenomenon, first identified by Magidor with the strongly compact cardinals.

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arXiv2012

A multiverse perspective on the axiom of constructiblity

I shall argue that the commonly held V not equal L via maximize position, which rejects the axiom of constructibility V = L on the basis that it is restrictive, implicitly takes a stand in the pluralist debate in the philosophy of set theory by presuming an absolute background concept of ordinal. The argument appears to lose its force, in contrast, on an upwardly extensible concept of set, in light of the various facts showing that models of set theory generally have extensions to models of V = L inside larger set-theoretic universes.

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arXiv2012

Moving up and down in the generic multiverse

We give a brief account of the modal logic of the generic multiverse, which is a bimodal logic with operators corresponding to the relations "is a forcing extension of" and "is a ground model of". The fragment of the first relation is called the modal logic of forcing and was studied by us in earlier work. The fragment of the second relation is called the modal logic of grounds and will be studied here for the first time. In addition, we discuss which combinations of modal logics are possible for the two fragments.

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arXiv2012

Structural connections between a forcing class and its modal logic

The modal logic of forcing arises when one considers a model of set theory in the context of all its forcing extensions, interpreting necessity as "in all forcing extensions" and possibility as "in some forcing extension". In this modal language one may easily express sweeping general forcing principles, such as the assertion that every possibly necessary statement is necessarily possible, which is valid for forcing, or the assertion that every possibly necessary statement is true, which is the maximality principle, a forcing axiom independent of but equiconsistent with ZFC (Stavi-Väänänen, Hamkins). Every definable forcing class similarly gives rise to the corresponding forcing modalities, for which one considers extensions only by forcing notions in that class. In previous work, we proved that if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of the class of all forcing are precisely the assertions of the modal theory S4.2. In this article, we prove that the provably valid principles of collapse forcing, Cohen forcing and other classes are in each case exactly S4.3; the provably valid principles of c.c.c. forcing, proper forcing, and others are each contained within S4.3 and do not contain S4.2; the provably valid principles of countably closed forcing, CH-preserving forcing and others are each exactly S4.2; and the provably valid principles of $ω_1$-preserving forcing are contained within S4.tBA. All these results arise from general structural connections we have identified between a forcing class and the modal logic of forcing to which it gives rise, including the connection between various control statements, such as buttons, switches and ratchets, and their corresponding forcing validities. These structural connections therefore support a forcing-only analysis of other diverse forcing classes.

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arXiv2012

Well-founded Boolean ultrapowers as large cardinal embeddings

Boolean ultrapowers extend the classical ultrapower construction to work with ultrafilters on any complete Boolean algebra, rather than only on a power set algebra. When they are well-founded, the associated Boolean ultrapower embeddings exhibit a large cardinal nature, and the Boolean ultrapower construction thereby unifies two central themes of set theory---forcing and large cardinals---by revealing them to be two facets of a single underlying construction, the Boolean ultrapower.

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arXiv2012

Pointwise Definable Models of Set Theory

A pointwise definable model is one in which every object is definable without parameters. In a model of set theory, this property strengthens V=HOD, but is not first-order expressible. Nevertheless, if ZFC is consistent, then there are continuum many pointwise definable models of ZFC. If there is a transitive model of ZFC, then there are continuum many pointwise definable transitive models of ZFC. What is more, every countable model of ZFC has a class forcing extension that is pointwise definable. Indeed, for the main contribution of this article, every countable model of Godel-Bernays set theory has a pointwise definable extension, in which every set and class is first-order definable without parameters.

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arXiv2012

Singular cardinals and strong extenders

We investigate the circumstances under which there exist a singular cardinal $μ$ and a short $(κ, μ)$-extender $E$ witnessing "$κ$ is $μ$-strong", such that $μ$ is singular in $\Ult(V, E)$.

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arXiv2012

Generalizations of the Kunen Inconsistency

We present several generalizations of the well-known Kunen inconsistency that there is no nontrivial elementary embedding from the set-theoretic universe V to itself. For example, there is no elementary embedding from the universe V to a set-forcing extension V[G], or conversely from V[G] to V, or more generally from one ground model of the universe to another, or between any two models that are eventually stationary correct, or from V to HOD, or conversely from HOD to V, or indeed from any definable class to V, among many other possibilities we consider, including generic embeddings, definable embeddings and results not requiring the axiom of choice. We have aimed in this article for a unified presentation that weaves together some previously known unpublished or folklore results, several due to Woodin and others, along with our new contributions.

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arXiv2012

The mate-in-n problem of infinite chess is decidable

Infinite chess is chess played on an infinite edgeless chessboard. The familiar chess pieces move about according to their usual chess rules, and each player strives to place the opposing king into checkmate. The mate-in-n problem of infinite chess is the problem of determining whether a designated player can force a win from a given finite position in at most n moves. A naive formulation of this problem leads to assertions of high arithmetic complexity with 2n alternating quantifiers---there is a move for white, such that for every black reply, there is a counter-move for white, and so on. In such a formulation, the problem does not appear to be decidable; and one cannot expect to search an infinitely branching game tree even to finite depth. Nevertheless, the main theorem of this article, confirming a conjecture of the first author and C. D. A. Evans, establishes that the mate-in-n problem of infinite chess is computably decidable, uniformly in the position and in n. Furthermore, there is a computable strategy for optimal play from such mate-in-n positions. The proof proceeds by showing that the mate-in-n problem is expressible in what we call the first-order structure of chess, which we prove (in the relevant fragment) is an automatic structure, whose theory is therefore decidable. Indeed, it is definable in Presburger arithmetic. Unfortunately, this resolution of the mate-in-n problem does not appear to settle the decidability of the more general winning-position problem, the problem of determining whether a designated player has a winning strategy from a given position, since a position may admit a winning strategy without any bound on the number of moves required. This issue is connected with transfinite game values in infinite chess, and the exact value of the omega one of chess is not known.

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arXiv2012

The hierarchy of equivalence relations on the natural numbers under computable reducibility

The notion of computable reducibility between equivalence relations on the natural numbers provides a natural computable analogue of Borel reducibility. We investigate the computable reducibility hierarchy, comparing and contrasting it with the Borel reducibility hierarchy from descriptive set theory. Meanwhile, the notion of computable reducibility appears well suited for an analysis of equivalence relations on the c.e.\ sets, and more specifically, on various classes of c.e.\ structures. This is a rich context with many natural examples, such as the isomorphism relation on c.e.\ graphs or on computably presented groups. Here, our exposition extends earlier work in the literature concerning the classification of computable structures. An abundance of open questions remains.

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arXiv2012

Is the dream solution to the continuum hypothesis attainable?

The dream solution of the continuum hypothesis (CH) would be a solution by which we settle the continuum hypothesis on the basis of a newly discovered fundamental principle of set theory, a missing axiom, widely regarded as true. Such a dream solution would indeed be a solution, since we would all accept the new axiom along with its consequences. In this article, however, I argue that such a dream solution to CH is unattainable. The article is adapted from and expands upon material in my article, "The set-theoretic multiverse", to appear in the Review of Symbolic Logic (see arXiv:1108.4223).

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arXiv2011

Inner models with large cardinal features usually obtained by forcing

We construct a variety of inner models exhibiting features usually obtained by forcing over universes with large cardinals. For example, if there is a supercompact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a Laver indestructible supercompact cardinal. If there is a supercompact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a supercompact cardinal κfor which 2^κ=κ^+, another for which 2^κ=κ^++ and another in which the least strongly compact cardinal is supercompact. If there is a strongly compact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a strongly compact cardinal, for which the measurable cardinals are bounded below it and another inner model W with a strongly compact cardinal κ, such that H_{κ^+}^V\subseteq HOD^W. Similar facts hold for supercompact, measurable and strongly Ramsey cardinals. If a cardinal is supercompact up to a weakly iterable cardinal, then there is an inner model of the Proper Forcing Axiom and another inner model with a supercompact cardinal in which GCH+V=HOD holds. Under the same hypothesis, there is an inner model with level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness, and indeed, another in which there is level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness. If a cardinal is strongly compact up to a weakly iterable cardinal, then there is an inner model in which the least measurable cardinal is strongly compact. If there is a weakly iterable limit δof <δ-supercompact cardinals, then there is an inner model with a proper class of Laver-indestructible supercompact cardinals. We describe three general proof methods, which can be used to prove many similar results.

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