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Joel Sadler

Publications and source records attributed to Joel Sadler.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Big Brains, Tiny Board: Pupavision, an Agentic Physical AI Instrument for Monitoring Drosophila Pupariation and Lifecycle Transitions

Many biology experiments are limited by the availability and ease of use of instruments that monitor and record them. For example, the timing of pupariation in the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, a widely used model organism, can provide biologically relevant information about growth regulation and is often recorded manually. Here, we present Pupavision, a small physical AI instrument built from a single-board Linux computer and a day/night camera for roughly 45 to 75 US dollars in parts. The key idea is that a frontier coding agent runs its agentic harness directly on the tiny board. The model thinks in the cloud, but the agent works on the device. The agent assists image capture, writes code to repair errors, and checks the experiment every day to keep raw data capture reliable. If recording stops, the researcher gets a ping on their mobile phone. A simple deterministic capture service records one image every ten minutes and never depends on the agent. We report a 26-day pilot in a fly incubator (about 3,580 frames), including eleven days in which the agent was logged out and capture continued, and a 51-hour outage whose cause led to the layered design. A researcher-in-the-loop workflow then produces per-vial pupariation curves by tracing selected pupae backward in time from a late reference frame. Future work will validate the assay for lifecycle tracking accuracy against expert-labeled data and expand real-time computer vision analysis. Pupavision offers a blueprint for do-it-yourself agentic instruments that put frontier intelligence on a tiny board, with deterministic code underneath. We present this as an early case study from a pilot lab deployment and contribute lessons learned toward a future where scientific domain experts are empowered by DIY agentic hardware.

cs.AI↗

Big Enough to Break Out: Tracking the Rising Capability of LLM Penetration-Testing Agents

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly applied to penetration testing, but we still know little about what they can do or how they fail. We compare two PentestGPT-based systems: a legacy human-in-the-loop system running the open-weight Kimi K2.5, and a newer autonomous system running Claude Opus 4.8. Across three public targets, the autonomous system solves all three, including the two the legacy system never finishes. The legacy result is the more surprising of the two. Even on the machines the legacy system fails to solve, it completes about half the subtasks, while running on ordinary university GPUs with no provider guardrails. We can describe the trend but not explain it, since model, harness, autonomy, and memory architecture all change together. Its direction still points to the next question: what will limit these agents as they take on more complex tasks? The usual answer is long-horizon memory, the loss of access to earlier findings during long attack chains. We test it by adding a coverage-memory layer to both systems, and neither improves outcomes. In the legacy stalled runs we could review, the limiting factor appeared to be planning and commitment rather than lost memory: agents held the evidence for a route forward and never turned it into a concrete exploitation hypothesis, which may suggest that offensive capability will advance with agents' ability to plan rather than with better memory. The same subtask scoring that tracks this capability is available to defenders, who can measure it as it rises instead of waiting to meet it in the field.

cs.CR↗

Tiny Enough to Break In: Agentic Remote Access Trojans Powered by Small Language Models

Agentic artificial intelligence raises a new security concern: cyber threats that reason, act, and adapt locally without continuous human direction. We examine this threat through an Agentic Remote Access Trojan (agentic RAT): a Remote Access Trojan augmented with a locally deployed Small Language Model (SLM). The SLM interprets host and network observations, selects actions, recovers from failed steps, and reduces reliance on an external operator. We implement the concept in a controlled, network-isolated lab built from Kali Linux, a Metasploitable2 target, LM Studio, and a local 8-billion-parameter Dolphin-family model. We then test whether a model this small can support autonomous cyber decision-making. This is architecturally feasible today. On commodity hardware, with no cloud service and no operator in the loop, the SLM closed the full observe-decide-act cycle: it interpreted ranked reconnaissance evidence supplied by the controller, selected actions, and obtained verified root-shell access on real vulnerable services. However, it is not yet operationally reliable. The same model hallucinated commands, misread output, and recovered from failure inconsistently, completing 10.9% of a deliberately strict checklist. That gap reflects the limits of today's small models, not a ceiling on the concept. As SLMs improve, agentic endpoint systems may become more practical, more autonomous, and harder to detect, straining existing monitoring, containment, and policy-enforcement mechanisms. Real-world incidents in 2025-2026 already show AI-driven intrusions moving from concept toward practice. That makes the local, self-contained variant we study a plausible near-term direction, not a hypothetical one.

cs.CR↗