arXiv subjects

Joffrey Derchu

Publications and source records attributed to Joffrey Derchu.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2023

Equilibria and incentives for illiquid auction markets

We study a toy two-player game for periodic double auction markets to generate liquidity. The game has imperfect information, which allows us to link market spreads with signal strength. We characterize Nash equilibria in cases with or without incentives from the exchange. This enables us to derive new insights about price formation and incentives design. We show in particular that without any incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to any trade between market participants. We however prove that quadratic fees indexed on each players half spread leads to a transaction and we propose a quantitative value for the optimal fees that the exchange has to propose in this model to generate liquidity.

q-fin.TR↗

arXiv2021

A Bayesian viewpoint on the price formation process

We introduce a simple framework in which market participants update their prior about an efficient price with a model-based learning process. We show that exponential intensities for the arrival of aggressive orders arise naturally in this setting. Our approach allows us to fully describe market dynamics in the case with Brownian efficient price and informed market takers. We are also able to revisit the emergence of market impact due to meta-order splitting, making several connections with existing literature.

q-fin.TR↗

arXiv2021

On Z-mean reflected BSDEs

In this paper we provide conditions for the existence of supersolutions to BSDEs with mean-reflections on the $Z$ component. We show that, contrary to BSDEs with mean-reflections on the $Y$ component, we cannot expect a supersolution with a deterministic increasing process $K$. Nonetheless, we give conditions for the existence of a supersolution for a stochastic component $K$ and under various constraints. We formalize some previous arguments on the time-inconsistency of such problems, proving that a minimal supersolution is necessarily a solution in our framework.

math.PR↗

arXiv2020

AHEAD : Ad-Hoc Electronic Auction Design

We introduce a new matching design for financial transactions in an electronic market. In this mechanism, called ad-hoc electronic auction design (AHEAD), market participants can trade between themselves at a fixed price and trigger an auction when they are no longer satisfied with this fixed price. In this context, we prove that a Nash equilibrium is obtained between market participants. Furthermore, we are able to assess quantitatively the relevance of ad-hoc auctions and to compare them with periodic auctions and continuous limit order books. We show that from the investors' viewpoint, the microstructure of the asset is usually significantly improved when using AHEAD.

q-fin.TR↗

arXiv2020

An approximate solution for options market-making in high dimension

Managing a book of options on several underlying involves controlling positions of several thousands of financial assets. It is one of the most challenging financial problems involving both pricing and microstructural modeling. An options market maker has to manage both long- and short-dated options having very different dynamics. In particular, short-dated options inventories cannot be managed as a part of an aggregated inventory, which prevents the use of dimensionality reduction techniques such as a factorial approach or first-order Greeks approximation. In this paper, we show that a simple analytical approximation of the solution of the market maker's problem provides significantly higher flexibility than the existing algorithms designing options market making strategies.

q-fin.TR↗

arXiv2020

On bid and ask side-specific tick sizes

The tick size, which is the smallest increment between two consecutive prices for a given asset, is a key parameter of market microstructure. In particular, the behavior of high frequency market makers is highly related to its value. We take the point of view of an exchange and investigate the relevance of having different tick sizes on the bid and ask sides of the order book. Using an approach based on the model with uncertainty zones, we show that when side-specific tick sizes are suitably chosen, it enables the exchange to improve the quality of liquidity provision.

q-fin.TR↗