arXiv subjects

Johann Laux

Publications and source records attributed to Johann Laux.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Anticipatory Human Oversight of Agentic AI: A Philosophical Account

Human oversight is widely held to mitigate the risks of AI systems. Even for systems that produce discrete outputs at identifiable decision points, the realisation of human oversight as a reactive measure is empirically fragile, yet increasingly well understood. However, for agentic AI -- systems that plan, decompose goals, and execute multi-step actions over extended horizons -- reactive oversight reaches its structural limits: intervention on individual actions defeats the autonomy that motivates the deployment, while intervention on aggregate patterns is too coarse for harms whose cumulative consequences only become legible after the fact. This paper argues that reactive oversight must be complemented by an anticipatory mode: oversight exercised before the agent acts, by specifying the normative agenda that structures the space of permissible action and refining it iteratively through specification, runtime, and inspection. The two are complements -- the agenda's escalation conditions specify when reactive intervention is invoked. Drawing on Meaningful Human Control, we read anticipatory oversight as the operationalisation of distal-reason tracking. In addition, we argue that the proposed framework yields a specific responsibility architecture by design: occupying the anticipatory mode is the discharge of a role-grounded prospective obligation, and backward-looking responsibility takes the form of strict moral answerability -- rationalistic, relational, and holding regardless of fault, in virtue of the principal's prior opportunity for precaution. We develop bridging failure modes, address objections including moral luck and the illusion of control, and close with regulatory, architectural, and empirical implications

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Constitutive vs. Corrective: A Causal Taxonomy of Human Runtime Involvement in AI Systems

As AI systems permeate high-stakes decision-making, the terminology of human involvement---Human-in-the-Loop (HITL), Human-on-the-Loop (HOTL), and Human Oversight---has become vexingly ambiguous. This complicates interdisciplinary collaboration between computer science, law, philosophy, psychology, and sociology and breeds regulatory uncertainty. We propose a clarification grounded in causal structure, focused on runtime involvement. The distinction between HITL and HOTL is best drawn not spatially---in terms of a human's position "in" or "on" a loop---but causally: HITL is constitutive (a human contribution is necessary for the decision output), while HOTL is corrective (external to the primary causal chain, capable of preventing or modifying outputs). Within HOTL, we distinguish temporal modes---synchronous, asynchronous, and anticipatory---situated in a nested model of provider and deployer runtime. A second, orthogonal dimension captures cognitive integration: whether human and machine form complementary or hybrid intelligence, yielding four distinct configurations. Finally, we separate these descriptive categories from the normative requirements they serve: statutory "Human Oversight" is a normative mode of HOTL demanding not merely a corrective causal position but genuine preparedness and capacity for effective intervention. Because the same person may occupy both roles, this role duality must be treated as a design problem requiring architectural and epistemic mitigation.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Keeping an Eye on AI: A Framework for Effective Human Oversight of AI Systems

The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in high-risk, decision-making scenarios presents technical, safety, and normative challenges; problems that may only be ameliorated by human oversight. However, notions of human oversight lack a common foundational understanding: oversight architectures are not well defined, the roles involved remain unclear, and implementation steps are opaque. Hence, researchers and practitioners struggle to determine how to design, implement, and evaluate systems that enable effective human oversight. This paper advances a practical framework for effective human oversight of AI systems, based on a cross-disciplinary perspective that draws on insights from computer science, human-computer interaction, psychology, philosophy, and law. The core contributions are: (1) a foundational framework, with a working definition, architecture and processes for effective human oversight of AI systems; (2) an initial template for documenting oversight architectures and processes, applied to diverse domains; and (3) a synthesis of open research challenges that need to be considered in the emerging field of effective human oversight of AI systems.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Automation Bias in the AI Act: On the Legal Implications of Attempting to De-Bias Human Oversight of AI

This paper examines the legal implications of the explicit mentioning of automation bias (AB) in the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA). The AIA mandates human oversight for high-risk AI systems and requires providers to enable awareness of AB, i.e., the human tendency to over-rely on AI outputs. The paper analyses the embedding of this extra-juridical concept in the AIA, the asymmetric division of responsibility between AI providers and deployers for mitigating AB, and the challenges of legally enforcing this novel awareness requirement. The analysis shows that the AIA's focus on providers does not adequately address design and context as causes of AB, and questions whether the AIA should directly regulate the risk of AB rather than just mandating awareness. As the AIA's approach requires a balance between legal mandates and behavioural science, the paper proposes that harmonised standards should reference the state of research on AB and human-AI interaction, holding both providers and deployers accountable. Ultimately, further empirical research on human-AI interaction will be essential for effective safeguards.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Improving Task Instructions for Data Annotators: How Clear Rules and Higher Pay Increase Performance in Data Annotation in the AI Economy

The global surge in AI applications is transforming industries, leading to displacement and complementation of existing jobs, while also giving rise to new employment opportunities. Data annotation, encompassing the labelling of images or annotating of texts by human workers, crucially influences the quality of a dataset directly influences the quality of AI models trained on it. This paper delves into the economics of data annotation, with a specific focus on the impact of task instruction design (that is, the choice between rules and standards as theorised in law and economics) and monetary incentives on data quality and costs. An experimental study involving 307 data annotators examines six groups with varying task instructions (norms) and monetary incentives. Results reveal that annotators provided with clear rules exhibit higher accuracy rates, outperforming those with vague standards by 14%. Similarly, annotators receiving an additional monetary incentive perform significantly better, with the highest accuracy rate recorded in the group working with both clear rules and incentives (87.5% accuracy). In addition, our results show that rules are perceived as being more helpful by annotators than standards and reduce annotators' difficulty in annotating images. These empirical findings underscore the double benefit of rule-based instructions on both data quality and worker wellbeing. Our research design allows us to reveal that, in our study, rules are more cost-efficient in increasing accuracy than monetary incentives. The paper contributes experimental insights to discussions on the economical, ethical, and legal considerations of AI technologies. Addressing policymakers and practitioners, we emphasise the need for a balanced approach in optimising data annotation processes for efficient and ethical AI development and usage.

econ.GN↗