arXiv subjects

Johann Rehberger

Publications and source records attributed to Johann Rehberger.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Agent Security is a Systems Problem

We take the position that agent security must be approached as a systems problem: the AI model powering the agent must be treated as an untrusted component, and security invariants must be enforced at the system level. Through this lens, efforts to increase model robustness (the dominant viewpoint in the community) are insufficient on their own. Instead, we must complement existing efforts with techniques from the systems security domain. Based on our experience as cybersecurity researchers in operating systems, networks, formal methods, and adversarial machine learning, we articulate a set of core principles, grounded in decades of systems security research, that provide a foundation for designing agentic systems with predictable guarantees. As evidence, we analyze eleven representative real-world attacks on agents and discuss how systems principles, if realized, could have prevented these attacks. We also identify the research challenges that stand in the way of implementing these principles in agents.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Systems Security Foundations for Agentic Computing

In recent years, agentic artificial intelligence (AI) systems are becoming increasingly widespread. These systems allow agents to use various tools, such as web browsers, compilers, and more. However, despite their popularity, agentic AI systems also introduce a myriad of security concerns, due to their constant interaction with third-party servers. For example, a malicious adversary can cause data exfiltration by executing prompt injection attacks, as well as other unwarranted behavior. These security concerns have recently motivated researchers to improve the safety and reliability of agentic systems. However, most of the literature on this topic is from the AI standpoint and lacks the system-security perspective and guarantees. In this work, we begin bridging this gap and present an analysis through the lens of classic cybersecurity research. Specifically, motivated by decades of progress in this domain, we identify short- and long-term research problems in agentic AI safety by examining end-to-end security properties of entire systems, rather than standalone AI models running in isolation. Our key goal is to examine where research challenges arise when applying traditional security principles in the context of AI agents and, as a secondary goal, distill these ideas for AI practitioners. Furthermore, we extensively cover 11 case studies of real-world attacks on agentic systems, as well as define a series of new research problems that are specific to this important domain.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Trust No AI: Prompt Injection Along The CIA Security Triad

The CIA security triad - Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability - is a cornerstone of data and cybersecurity. With the emergence of large language model (LLM) applications, a new class of threat, known as prompt injection, was first identified in 2022. Since then, numerous real-world vulnerabilities and exploits have been documented in production LLM systems, including those from leading vendors like OpenAI, Microsoft, Anthropic and Google. This paper compiles real-world exploits and proof-of concept examples, based on the research conducted and publicly documented by the author, demonstrating how prompt injection undermines the CIA triad and poses ongoing risks to cybersecurity and AI systems at large.

cs.CR↗