arXiv subjects

Johannes Fankhauser

Publications and source records attributed to Johannes Fankhauser.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

The View from Within: What Can Embedded Observers (Not) Learn?

Physics is usually done from a third-person perspective, as if the world were described from outside. Yet, observers are themselves physical systems within the world they observe. Here, we investigate this tension using a toy model of classical particles. Observers are physical systems characterised by a choice of (i) a manifest variable, whose value constitutes their empirical record, and (ii) ready states, which provide initial information. We ask what such observers (subjects) can learn about the world through interactions that establish a correlation with another system (the object). For each combination of the three types of learning (about the past, the future, or both), manifest variables, and ready states, we determine what the subject can learn. This shows that many subjects face an epistemic horizon---a limitation to what they can learn about the world---even though the model is classical and deterministic. For example, a subject with a complete manifest variable---one whose ontic state is the empirical record---and partial initial information can learn at most half the object's variables, recovering Spekkens' knowledge-balance principle, i.e. an analogue of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. More generally, we find that subjects face more severe epistemic horizons when predicting than when retrodicting, and that learning by repeatable measurements can be more limited than either prediction or retrodiction alone. Our work provides language and tools to study how the first-person perspective can differ from the third-person perspective beyond the toy model studied here, and invites explanations of the inherent uncertainty in quantum theory from the standpoint of embedded observers.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2026

Interpreting Quantum Learning Models via Stochastic Processes

Quantum machine learning models define probabilistic input--output maps through coherent quantum evolution and measurement. While such models can exhibit computational advantages, their internal functioning and decision making generally resists interpretation in terms of stochastic trajectories through intermediate configurations. In contrast to classical (Markovian) stochastic processes, quantum dynamics generically violates the Chapman--Kolmogorov divisibility condition, preventing a decomposition into probabilistically meaningful intermediate transitions. We develop a probabilistic framework for representing quantum learning models as stochastic processes over configuration spaces where the dynamics are modeled as linear maps on probability distributions. Starting from a fixed POVM, arbitrary quantum channels induce transition kernels on the associated probability representation. For informationally complete POVMs, and in particular SIC-POVMs, these kernels are Markovian but generally quasi-stochastic, with non-classicality appearing as negativity. By contrast, projective spaces admit positive stochastic kernels but generally require non-Markovian dynamics due to the failure of Chapman--Kolmogorov divisibility. This yields a trade-off between negativity and dependence on past configurations, i.e. quantum dynamics can be represented either by Markovian quasi-stochastic maps or by positive stochastic processes with higher Markov order. We discuss how such representations of quantum dynamics can be interpreted as stochastic walks through a memory space in the spirit of Projective Simulation, a model of learning and agency in which decisions arise from random walks over an episodic memory network. We further outline how finite-order stochastic kernels can approximate such quantum deliberation processes and show in what regimes the classical machine learning model is recovered.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2025

Gravitational redshift revisited: inertia, geometry, and charge

Gravitational redshift effects undoubtedly exist; moreover, the experimental setups which confirm the existence of these effects-the most famous of which being the Pound-Rebka experiment-are well-known. Nonetheless-and perhaps surprisingly-there remains a great deal of confusion in the literature regarding what these experiments establish. Our goal in the present article is to clarify these issues, in three concrete ways. First, although (i) Brown and Read (2016) are correct to point out that, given their sensitivity, the outcomes of experimental setups such as the original Pound-Rebka configuration can be accounted for using solely the machinery of accelerating frames in special relativity (barring some subtleties due to the Rindler spacetime necessary to model the effects rigorously), nevertheless (ii) an explanation of the results of more sensitive gravitational redshift outcomes does in fact require more. Second, although typically this 'more' is understood as the invocation of spacetime curvature within the framework of general relativity, in light of the so-called 'geometric trinity' of gravitational theories, in fact curvature is not necessary to explain even these results. Thus (a) one can often explain the results of these experiments using only the resources of special relativity, and (b) even when one cannot, one need not invoke spacetime curvature. And third: while one might think that the absence of gravitational redshift effects would imply that spacetime is flat, this can be called into question given the possibility of the cancelling of gravitational redshift effects by charge in the context of the Reissner-Nordström metric. This argument is shown to be valid and both attractive forces as well as redshift effects can be effectively shielded in the charged setting. Thus, it is not the case that the absence of gravitational effects implies a Minkowskian spacetime setting.

gr-qc↗

arXiv2025

How (Not) to Understand Weak Measurements of Velocities

To-date, the most elaborated attempt to complete quantum mechanics by the addition of hidden variables is the de Broglie-Bohm (pilot wave) theory (dBBT). It endows particles with definite positions at all times. Their evolution is governed by a deterministic dynamics. By construction, however, the individual particle trajectories generically defy detectability in principle. Of late, this lore might seem to have been called into question in light of so-called weak measurements. Due to their characteristic weak coupling between the measurement device and the system under study, they permit the experimental probing of quantum systems without essentially disturbing them. It's natural therefore to think that weak measurements of velocity in particular offer to actually observe the particle trajectories. If true, such a claim would not only experimentally demonstrate the incompleteness of quantum mechanics: it would provide support of dBBT in its standard form, singling it out from an infinitude of empirically equivalent alternative choices for the particle dynamics. Here we examine this possibility. Our result is deflationary: weak velocity measurements constitute no new arguments, let alone empirical evidence, in favour of standard dBBT; One mustn't naïvely identify weak and actual positions. Weak velocity measurements admit of a straightforward standard quantum mechanical interpretation, independent of any commitment to particle trajectories and velocities. This is revealed by a careful reconstruction of the physical arguments on which the description of weak velocity measurements rests. It turns out that for weak velocity measurements to be reliable, one must already presuppose dBBT in its standard form: in this sense, they can provide no new argument, empirical or otherwise, for dBBT and its standard guidance equation.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2025

The (un)detectability of trajectories in pilot-wave theory

Pilot wave theory endows particles with definite positions at all times governed by deterministic dynamics. However, individual particle trajectories are generically undetectable by experiment. This idea might seem to be contested in light of two proposals: (1) So-called 'weak velocity measurements', allegedly detecting Bohmian trajectories by weakly probing a quantum system without essentially disturbing it, and (2) the so-called 'surrealistic' trajectories experiment which supposedly establishes a conflict between the 'actual' position of a particle and its position derived from pilot wave theory. Although both attempts shed light on the nature of Bohmian particles, neither constitute empirical or theoretical evidence in favour or against pilot wave theory. Both instances admit a straightforward standard quantum mechanical interpretation compatible with the predictions of Bohmian theories. It is concluded that the puzzles arise from the absence of a coherent account of what quantum mechanical measurements signify.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2024

Epistemic Boundaries and Quantum Uncertainty: What Local Observers Can (Not) Predict

One of quantum theory's salient features is its apparent indeterminism, i.e. measurement outcomes are typically probabilistic. We formally define and address whether this uncertainty is unavoidable or whether post-quantum theories can offer a predictive advantage while conforming to the Born rule on average. We present a no-go claim combining three aspects: predictive advantage, no-signalling, and reliable intersubjectivity between quantum observers. The results of the analysis lead to the conclusion that there exists a fundamental limitation on genuine predictive advantage. However, we uncover a fascinating possibility: When the assumption of reliable intersubjectivity between different observers is violated, subjective predictive advantage can, in principle, exist. This, in turn, entails an epistemic boundary between different observers of the same theory. The findings reconcile us to quantum uncertainty as an aspect of limits on Nature's predictability.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2024

Observability and Predictability in Quantum and Post-Quantum Physics

I introduce a framework to distinguish two domains of physics - the manifest (i.e. the directly observable empirical records in terms of manifest configurations) and the non-manifest domain of physics (i.e. the things that the manifest configurations signify according to a physical theory). I show that many quantum 'paradoxes' rest on ambiguous reasoning about the two domains. More concretely, I study so-called 'surrealistic' trajectories, the 'delayed choice quantum eraser', and 'weak measurements'. Finally, I show how the alleged puzzles resolve in the framework provided. I then formally define and address the question of whether quantum uncertainty could be fundamental or whether post-quantum theories could have predictive advantage whilst conforming to the Born rule on average. This notion of what I call 'empirical completeness' refers to actual prediction-making beyond the Born probabilities, and thus delineates the operational notion of predictability from a 'hidden variable' programme in quantum theory. I study how empirical completeness connects to signal-locality, and argue that a partial proof for the impossibility of predictive advantage can be established for bi-partite quantum systems. The relevant results demonstrate signal-locality as a sufficient principle that might explain the fundamental chanciness in present and future quantum theories and, in turn, reconciles us to many quantum features as aspects of limits on Nature's predictability.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2024

Epistemic Horizons From Deterministic Laws: Lessons From a Nomic Toy Theory

Quantum theory has an epistemic horizon, i.e. exact values cannot be assigned simultaneously to incompatible physical quantities. As shown by Spekkens' toy theory, positing an epistemic horizon akin to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in a classical mechanical setting also leads to a plethora of quantum phenomena. We introduce a deterministic theory - nomic toy theory - in which information gathering agents are explicitly modelled as physical systems. Our main result shows the presence of an epistemic horizon for such agents. They can only simultaneously learn the values of observables whose Poisson bracket vanishes. Therefore, nomic toy theory has incompatible measurements and the complete state of a physical system cannot be known. The best description of a system by an agent is via an epistemic state of Spekkens' toy theory. Our result reconciles us to measurement uncertainty as an aspect of the inseparability of subjects and objects. Significantly, the claims follow even though nomic toy theory is essentially classical. This work invites further investigations of epistemic horizons, such as the one of (full) quantum theory.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2019

Taming the Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser

I discuss the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment (DCQE) by drawing an analogy to a Bell-type measurement and giving a straightforward account in standard quantum mechanics. The delayed choice quantum eraser experiment turns out to resemble a Bell-type scenario in which the paradox's resolution is rather trivial, and so there really is no mystery. At first glance, the experiment suggests that measurements on one part of an entangled photon pair (the idler) can be employed to control whether the measurement outcome of the other part of the photon pair (the signal) produces interference fringes at a screen after being sent through a double slit. Significantly, the choice whether there is interference or not can be made long after the signal photon encounters the screen. The results of the experiment have been alleged to invoke some sort of 'backwards in time influence'. I argue that this issue can be eliminated by taking into proper account the role of the signal photon. Likewise, in the de Broglie-Bohm picture the particle's trajectories can be given a well-defined description at any instant of time during the experiment. Thus, it is again clear that there is no need to resort to any kind of 'backwards in time influence'.

quant-ph↗