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Johannes Langner

Publications and source records attributed to Johannes Langner.

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Bipolar Theorems for Sets of Non-negative Random Variables

This paper assumes a robust, in general not dominated, probabilistic framework and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a bipolar representation of subsets of the set of all quasi-sure equivalence classes of non-negative random variables, without any further conditions on the underlying measure space. This generalizes and unifies existing bipolar theorems proved under stronger assumptions on the robust framework. Applications are in areas of robust financial modeling.

math.PR

P-Sensitive Functions and Localizations

This paper assumes a robust stochastic model where a set $\mathcal{P}$ of probability measures replaces the single probability measure of dominated models. We introduce and study $\mathcal{P}$-sensitive functions defined on robust function spaces of random variables. We show that $\mathcal{P}$-sensitive functions are precisely those that admit a representation via so-called functional localization. The theory is applied to solving robust optimization problems, to convex risk measures, and to the study of no arbitrage in robust one-period financial models.

math.PR

Markov-Nash equilibria in mean-field games under model uncertainty

We propose and analyze a framework for mean-field Markov games under model uncertainty. In this framework, a state-measure flow describing the collective behavior of a population affects the given reward function as well as the unknown transition kernel of the representative agent. The agent's objective is to choose an optimal Markov policy in order to maximize her worst-case expected reward, where worst-case refers to the most adverse scenario among all transition kernels considered to be feasible to describe the unknown true law of the environment. We prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium under model uncertainty, where the agent chooses the optimal policy that maximizes the worst-case expected reward, and the state-measure flow aligns with the agent's state distribution under the optimal policy and the worst-case transition kernel. Moreover, we prove that for suitable multi-agent Markov games under model uncertainty the optimal policy from the mean-field equilibrium forms an approximate Markov-Nash equilibrium whenever the number of agents is large enough.

math.OC