arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to John Fearnley.
The main result of this paper is that computing the value of a one-clock priced timed game (OCPTG) is PSPACE-hard. Along the way, we provide a family of OCPTGs that have an exponential number of event points. Both results hold even in very restricted classes of games such as DAGs with treewidth three. Finally, we provide a number of positive results, including polynomial-time algorithms for even more restricted classes of OCPTGs such as trees.
This paper studies the complexity of problems in PPAD $\cap$ PLS that have unique solutions. Three well-known examples of such problems are the problem of finding a fixpoint of a contraction map, finding the unique sink of a Unique Sink Orientation (USO), and solving the P-matrix Linear Complementarity Problem (P-LCP). Each of these are promise-problems, and when the promise holds, they always possess unique solutions. We define the complexity class UEOPL to capture problems of this type. We first define a class that we call EOPL, which consists of all problems that can be reduced to End-of-Potential-Line. This problem merges the canonical PPAD-complete problem End-of-Line, with the canonical PLS-complete problem Sink-of-Dag, and so EOPL captures problems that can be solved by a line-following algorithm that also simultaneously decreases a potential function. Promise-UEOPL is a promise-subclass of EOPL in which the line in the End-of-Potential-Line instance is guaranteed to be unique via a promise. We turn this into a non-promise class UEOPL, by adding an extra solution type to EOPL that captures any pair of points that are provably on two different lines. We show that UEOPL $\subseteq$ EOPL $\subseteq$ CLS, and that all of our motivating problems are contained in UEOPL: specifically USO, P-LCP, and finding a fixpoint of a Piecewise-Linear Contraction under an $\ell_p$-norm all lie in UEOPL. Our results also imply that parity games, mean-payoff games, discounted games, and simple-stochastic games lie in UEOPL. All of our containment results are proved via a reduction to a problem that we call One-Permutation Discrete Contraction (OPDC). This problem is motivated by a discretized version of contraction, but it is also closely related to the USO problem. We show that OPDC lies in UEOPL, and we are also able to show that OPDC is UEOPL-complete.
Strategy improvement is a widely-used and well-studied class of algorithms for solving graph-based infinite games. These algorithms are parameterized by a switching rule, and one of the most natural rules is "all switches" which switches as many edges as possible in each iteration. Continuing a recent line of work, we study all-switches strategy improvement from the perspective of computational complexity. We consider two natural decision problems, both of which have as input a game $G$, a starting strategy $s$, and an edge $e$. The problems are: 1.) The edge switch problem, namely, is the edge $e$ ever switched by all-switches strategy improvement when it is started from $s$ on game $G$? 2.) The optimal strategy problem, namely, is the edge $e$ used in the final strategy that is found by strategy improvement when it is started from $s$ on game $G$? We show $\mathtt{PSPACE}$-completeness of the edge switch problem and optimal strategy problem for the following settings: Parity games with the discrete strategy improvement algorithm of Vöge and Jurdziński; mean-payoff games with the gain-bias algorithm [14,37]; and discounted-payoff games and simple stochastic games with their standard strategy improvement algorithms. We also show $\mathtt{PSPACE}$-completeness of an analogous problem to edge switch for the bottom-antipodal algorithm for finding the sink of an Acyclic Unique Sink Orientation on a cube.
We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing envy-free allocations, restricted to the case of four agents. The problem asks for a partition of the cake to four agents, so that every agent finds her piece at least as valuable as every other agent's piece. The problem has had an interesting history so far. Although the case of three agents is solvable with less than 15 queries, for four agents no bounded procedure was known until the recent breakthroughs of Aziz and Mackenzie (STOC 2016, FOCS 2016). The main drawback of these new algorithms, however, is that they are quite complicated and with a very high query complexity. With four agents, the number of queries required is close to 600. In this work we provide an improved algorithm for four agents, which reduces the current complexity by a factor of 3.4. Our algorithm builds on the approach of Aziz and Mackenzie (STOC 2016) by incorporating new insights and simplifying several steps. Overall, this yields an easier to grasp procedure with lower complexity.
We introduce the problem EndOfPotentialLine and the corresponding complexity class EOPL of all problems that can be reduced to it in polynomial time. This class captures problems that admit a single combinatorial proof of their joint membership in the complexity classes PPAD of fixpoint problems and PLS of local search problems. EOPL is a combinatorially-defined alternative to the class CLS (for Continuous Local Search), which was introduced in with the goal of capturing the complexity of some well-known problems in PPAD $\cap$ PLS that have resisted, in some cases for decades, attempts to put them in polynomial time. Two of these are Contraction, the problem of finding a fixpoint of a contraction map, and P-LCP, the problem of solving a P-matrix Linear Complementarity Problem. We show that EndOfPotentialLine is in CLS via a two-way reduction to EndOfMeteredLine. The latter was defined in to show query and cryptographic lower bounds for CLS. Our two main results are to show that both PL-Contraction (Piecewise-Linear Contraction) and P-LCP are in EOPL. Our reductions imply that the promise versions of PL-Contraction and P-LCP are in the promise class UniqueEOPL, which corresponds to the case of a single potential line. This also shows that simple-stochastic, discounted, mean-payoff, and parity games are in EOPL. Using the insights from our reduction for PL-Contraction, we obtain the first polynomial-time algorithms for finding fixed points of contraction maps in fixed dimension for any $\ell_p$ norm, where previously such algorithms were only known for the $\ell_2$ and $\ell_\infty$ norms. Our reduction from P-LCP to EndOfPotentialLine allows a technique of Aldous to be applied, which in turn gives the fastest-known randomized algorithm for the P-LCP.
Market making is a fundamental trading problem in which an agent provides liquidity by continually offering to buy and sell a security. The problem is challenging due to inventory risk, the risk of accumulating an unfavourable position and ultimately losing money. In this paper, we develop a high-fidelity simulation of limit order book markets, and use it to design a market making agent using temporal-difference reinforcement learning. We use a linear combination of tile codings as a value function approximator, and design a custom reward function that controls inventory risk. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by showing that our agent outperforms both simple benchmark strategies and a recent online learning approach from the literature.
Parity games play an important role in model checking and synthesis. In their paper, Calude et al. have shown that these games can be solved in quasi-polynomial time. We show that their algorithm can be implemented efficiently: we use their data structure as a progress measure, allowing for a backward implementation instead of a complete unravelling of the game. To achieve this, a number of changes have to be made to their techniques, where the main one is to add power to the antagonistic player that allows for determining her rational move without changing the outcome of the game. We provide a first implementation for a quasi-polynomial algorithm, test it on small examples, and provide a number of side results, including minor algorithmic improvements, a quasi bi-linear complexity in the number of states and edges for a fixed number of colours, and matching lower bounds for the algorithm of Calude et al.
We consider a stochastic online problem where $n$ applicants arrive over time, one per time step. Upon arrival of each applicant their cost per time step is revealed, and we have to fix the duration of employment, starting immediately. This decision is irrevocable, i.e., we can neither extend a contract nor dismiss a candidate once hired. In every time step, at least one candidate needs to be under contract, and our goal is to minimize the total hiring cost, which is the sum of the applicants' costs multiplied with their respective employment durations. We provide a competitive online algorithm for the case that the applicants' costs are drawn independently from a known distribution. Specifically, the algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 2.965 for the case of uniform distributions. For this case, we give an analytical lower bound of 2 and a computational lower bound of 2.148. We then adapt our algorithm to stay competitive even in settings with one or more of the following restrictions: (i) at most two applicants can be hired concurrently; (ii) the distribution of the applicants' costs is unknown; (iii) the total number $n$ of time steps is unknown. On the other hand, we show that concurrent employment is a necessary feature of competitive algorithms by proving that no algorithm has a competitive ratio better than $Ω(\sqrt{n} / \log n)$ if concurrent employment is forbidden.
This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented many-player games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed that there exists a small constant $ε$, such that it is PPAD-complete to find an (unconstrained) $ε$-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game. In the first part of the paper, we show that is NP-hard to decide if a polymatrix game has a constrained approximate equilibrium for 9 natural constraints and any non-trivial approximation guarantee. These results hold even for planar bipartite polymatrix games with degree 3 and at most 7 strategies per player, and all non-trivial approximation guarantees. These results stand in contrast to similar results for bimatrix games, which obviously need a non-constant number of actions, and which rely on stronger complexity-theoretic conjectures such as the exponential time hypothesis. In the second part, we provide a deterministic QPTAS for interaction graphs with bounded treewidth and with logarithmically many actions per player that can compute constrained approximate equilibria for a wide family of constraints that cover many of the constraints dealt with in the first part.
We study strategy improvement algorithms for solving parity games. While these algorithms are known to solve parity games using a very small number of iterations, experimental studies have found that a high step complexity causes them to perform poorly in practice. In this paper we seek to address this situation. Every iteration of the algorithm must compute a best response, and while the standard way of doing this uses the Bellman-Ford algorithm, we give experimental results that show that one-player strategy improvement significantly outperforms this technique in practice. We then study the best way to implement one-player strategy improvement, and we develop an efficient parallel algorithm for carrying out this task, by reducing the problem to computing prefix sums on a linked list. We report experimental results for these algorithms, and we find that a GPU implementation of this algorithm shows a significant speedup over single-core and multi-core CPU implementations.
We study the problem of finding approximate Nash equilibria that satisfy certain conditions, such as providing good social welfare. In particular, we study the problem $ε$-NE $δ$-SW: find an $ε$-approximate Nash equilibrium ($ε$-NE) that is within $δ$ of the best social welfare achievable by an $ε$-NE. Our main result is that, if the exponential-time hypothesis (ETH) is true, then solving $\left(\frac{1}{8} - \mathrm{O}(δ)\right)$-NE $\mathrm{O}(δ)$-SW for an $n\times n$ bimatrix game requires $n^{\mathrm{\widetilde Ω}(\log n)}$ time. Building on this result, we show similar conditional running time lower bounds on a number of decision problems for approximate Nash equilibria that do not involve social welfare, including maximizing or minimizing a certain player's payoff, or finding approximate equilibria contained in a given pair of supports. We show quasi-polynomial lower bounds for these problems assuming that ETH holds, where these lower bounds apply to $ε$-Nash equilibria for all $ε< \frac{1}{8}$. The hardness of these other decision problems has so far only been studied in the context of exact equilibria.
The complexity class CLS was introduced by Daskalakis and Papadimitriou with the goal of capturing the complexity of some well-known problems in PPAD$~\cap~$PLS that have resisted, in some cases for decades, attempts to put them in polynomial time. No complete problem was known for CLS, and in previous work, the problems ContractionMap, i.e., the problem of finding an approximate fixpoint of a contraction map, and PLCP, i.e., the problem of solving a P-matrix Linear Complementarity Problem, were identified as prime candidates. First, we present a new CLS-complete problem MetaMetricContractionMap, which is closely related to the ContractionMap. Second, we introduce EndOfPotentialLine, which captures aspects of PPAD and PLS directly via a monotonic directed path, and show that EndOfPotentialLine is in CLS via a two-way reduction to EndOfMeteredLine. The latter was defined to keep track of how far a vertex is on the PPAD path via a restricted potential function. Third, we reduce PLCP to EndOfPotentialLine, thus making EndOfPotentialLine and EndOfMeteredLine at least as likely to be hard for CLS as PLCP. This last result leverages the monotonic structure of Lemke paths for PLCP problems, making EndOfPotentialLine a likely candidate to capture the exact complexity of PLCP; we note that the structure of Lemke-Howson paths for finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game very directly motivated the definition of the complexity class PPAD, which eventually ended up capturing this problem's complexity exactly.
In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these games. We begin by studying Lipschitz games, which encompass, for example, all concave games with Lipschitz continuous payoff functions. We provide an efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria in these games. Then we turn our attention to penalty games, which encompass biased games and games in which players take risk into account. Here we show that if the penalty function is Lipschitz continuous, then we can provide a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme. Finally, we study distance biased games, where we present simple strongly polynomial time algorithms for finding best responses in $L_1$, $L_2^2$, and $L_\infty$ biased games, and then use these algorithms to provide strongly polynomial algorithms that find $2/3$, $5/7$, and $2/3$ approximations for these norms, respectively.
The Nash equilibrium is an important benchmark for behaviour in systems of strategic autonomous agents. Polymatrix games are a succinct and expressive representation of multiplayer games that model pairwise interactions between players. The empirical performance of algorithms to solve these games has received little attention, despite their wide-ranging applications. In this paper we carry out a comprehensive empirical study of two prominent algorithms for computing a sample equilibrium in these games, Lemke's algorithm that computes an exact equilibrium, and a gradient descent method that computes an approximate equilibrium. Our study covers games arising from a number of interesting applications. We find that Lemke's algorithm can compute exact equilibria in relatively large games in a reasonable amount of time. If we are willing to accept (high-quality) approximate equilibria, then we can deal with much larger games using the descent method. We also report on which games are most challenging for each of the algorithms.
We present a new, distributed method to compute approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that analyze the two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a single LP that combines the two players payoffs), our algorithm first solves two independent LPs, each of which is derived from one of the two payoff matrices, and then compute approximate Nash equilibria using only limited communication between the players. Our method has several applications for improved bounds for efficient computations of approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. First, it yields a best polynomial-time algorithm for computing \emph{approximate well-supported Nash equilibria (WSNE)}, which guarantees to find a 0.6528-WSNE in polynomial time. Furthermore, since our algorithm solves the two LPs separately, it can be used to improve upon the best known algorithms in the limited communication setting: the algorithm can be implemented to obtain a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses poly-logarithmic communication and finds a 0.6528-WSNE. The algorithm can also be carried out to beat the best known bound in the query complexity setting, requiring $O(n \log n)$ payoff queries to compute a 0.6528-WSNE. Finally, our approach can also be adapted to provide the best known communication efficient algorithm for computing \emph{approximate Nash equilibria}: it uses poly-logarithmic communication to find a 0.382-approximate Nash equilibrium.
While there have been a number of studies about the efficacy of methods to find exact Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, there has been little empirical work on finding approximate Nash equilibria. Here we provide such a study that compares a number of approximation methods and exact methods. In particular, we explore the trade-off between the quality of approximate equilibrium and the required running time to find one. We found that the existing library GAMUT, which has been the de facto standard that has been used to test exact methods, is insufficient as a test bed for approximation methods since many of its games have pure equilibria or other easy-to-find good approximate equilibria. We extend the breadth and depth of our study by including new interesting families of bimatrix games, and studying bimatrix games upto size $2000 \times 2000$. Finally, we provide new close-to-worst-case examples for the best-performing algorithms for finding approximate Nash equilibria.
In an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute epsilon-Nash equilibria, and for what values of epsilon a polynomial-time algorithm exists. An epsilon-well-supported Nash equilibrium (epsilon-WSNE) has the additional requirement that any strategy that is used with non-zero probability by a player must have payoff at most epsilon less than the best response. A recent algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis shows how to compute a 2/3-WSNE in polynomial time, for bimatrix games. Here we introduce a new technique that leads to an improvement to the worst-case approximation guarantee.
In an $ε$-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most $ε$ by unilaterally changing his behaviour. For two-player (bimatrix) games with payoffs in $[0,1]$, the best-known$ε$ achievable in polynomial time is 0.3393. In general, for $n$-player games an $ε$-Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time for an $ε$ that is an increasing function of $n$ but does not depend on the number of strategies of the players. For three-player and four-player games the corresponding values of $ε$ are 0.6022 and 0.7153, respectively. Polymatrix games are a restriction of general $n$-player games where a player's payoff is the sum of payoffs from a number of bimatrix games. There exists a very small but constant $ε$ such that computing an $ε$-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game is \PPAD-hard. Our main result is that a $(0.5+δ)$-Nash equilibrium of an $n$-player polymatrix game can be computed in time polynomial in the input size and $\frac{1}δ$. Inspired by the algorithm of Tsaknakis and Spirakis, our algorithm uses gradient descent on the maximum regret of the players. We also show that this algorithm can be applied to efficiently find a $(0.5+δ)$-Nash equilibrium in a two-player Bayesian game.