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John Rust

Publications and source records attributed to John Rust.

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Dynamic Discrete Choice and Inverse Reinforcement Learning: Inferring Preferences and Beliefs From Human Behavior

This article surveys two deeply connected literatures that approach the same fundamental problem from different disciplinary traditions: dynamic discrete choice (DDC) in structural econometrics and inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) in machine learning. Both seek to infer the preferences of decision makers from observed sequential behavior, assuming that individuals act to maximize an expected reward function within a dynamic, uncertain environment formalized as a Markov decision process (MDP). Despite independent origins, the two fields have converged on similar mathematical formulations. We show that the (soft Q-learning) framework now prevalent in IRL is closely related to DDC models under additive extreme value preference shocks, yielding the same softmax (multinomial logit) choice probabilities and smooth Bellman equations that underpin structural estimation in economics. We compare the estimation and computational methods developed in each field. DDC has emphasized maximum likelihood estimation, conditional choice probability estimators, and policy iteration methods. IRL has developed scalable alternatives, including maximum entropy methods, adversarial approaches, and model-free temporal difference estimators that extend to high-dimensional state spaces using deep neural networks. Model-free IRL estimators that combine temporal difference learning with classical two-step methods from econometrics represent a promising direction for bridging the two literatures. Both fields confront shared foundational challenges: the identification problem, whereby multiple reward functions can rationalize the same observed behavior, and the curse of dimensionality in solving the underlying MDP. We believe that cross-fertilization offers substantial opportunities for methodological progress in both fields.

econ.EM

Who is More Bayesian: Humans or ChatGPT?

We compare the performance of human and artificially intelligent (AI) decision makers in simple binary classification tasks where the optimal decision rule is given by Bayes Rule. We reanalyze choices of human subjects gathered from laboratory experiments conducted by El-Gamal and Grether and Holt and Smith. We confirm that while overall, Bayes Rule represents the single best model for predicting human choices, subjects are heterogeneous and a significant share of them make suboptimal choices that reflect judgement biases described by Kahneman and Tversky that include the ``representativeness heuristic'' (excessive weight on the evidence from the sample relative to the prior) and ``conservatism'' (excessive weight on the prior relative to the sample). We compare the performance of AI subjects gathered from recent versions of large language models (LLMs) including several versions of ChatGPT. These general-purpose generative AI chatbots are not specifically trained to do well in narrow decision making tasks, but are trained instead as ``language predictors'' using a large corpus of textual data from the web. We show that ChatGPT is also subject to biases that result in suboptimal decisions. However we document a rapid evolution in the performance of ChatGPT from sub-human performance for early versions (ChatGPT 3.5) to superhuman and nearly perfect Bayesian classifications in the latest versions (ChatGPT 4o).

econ.GN