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John S. McAlister

Publications and source records attributed to John S. McAlister.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

Myopic Best Response Replicates the Mean Curvature Flow

In a continuous coordination game, under myopic best response, players change strategies, and thus strategic communities change their shapes in time. We show that the boundaries of these strategic communities evolve according to Free Boundary Mean Curvature Flow in the continuous time limit. The convergence relies on an approximation scheme for the Mean Curvature Flow, which has previously been used to describe other threshold dynamics. With this equivalence, we can characterize Nash equilibria of the continuous coordination game as minimal surfaces and explore related consequences in biased versions of the same game.

math.DS↗

Structured Coordination Games on Planar Graphs: a Dual Approach

Finding Nash equilibria in the pure coordination game is trivial when every player interacts with every other player evenly. However, when players have a relational structure, the question becomes harder to answer. Here, we show that Nash equilibria to the structured coordination game represent a local notion of the Min-cut partition by way of the potential function. Using the standard relationship between partitions and subgraphs in the planar dual, we define a quasimetric space for which Nash equilibria are local minimizers of a global objective. When the game is restricted to only two strategies, these results allow us to construct a dynamic subgraph process which recapitulates the Myopic Best Response dynamics of the coordination game.

cs.GT↗

Classification of dynamics for a two person model of planned behavior

We study a dynamical system modeling the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) in which each individual's behavioral intention evolves continuously under an ODE driven by internal attitudes, perceived social norms, and perceived behavioral control. Actions occur as discrete threshold events: when intention reaches a fixed threshold it is reset to 0 and produces a transient "nudge" that jumps to 1 and then decays exponentially. This yields a hybrid ODE-threshold system with psychologically interpretable parameters. We derive a partial classification in the general case of n individuals. Focusing on the two-individual case (n=2), we obtain explicit formulas for trajectories between action events and derive bounds for first-action times. In the mixed setting where one individual is intrinsically increasing and the other is not, we identify a scalar invariant, M, measuring the net effect of one period of excitation. We prove that non-positive M is equivalent to a partial-action state (only the intrinsically active individual acts countable infinitely often), while positive M is equivalent to full action (both individuals act countably infinitely often). Finally, we demonstrate numerically that these analytic boundaries partition the parameter space with near-perfect agreement, and we provide exploratory simulations suggesting analogous structures for three individuals.

math.DS↗

Nonlinear Nonlocal Diffusion Equations for the Analysis of Continuous Coordination and Anti-Coordination Type Games

Coordination games with explicit spatial or relational structure are of interest to economists, ecologists, sociologists, and others studying emergent global properties in collective behavior. When assemblies of individuals seek to coordinate action with one another through myopic best response or other replicator dynamics, the resulting dynamical system can exhibit many rich behaviors. However, these behaviors have been studied only in the case where the number of players is countable and the relational structure is described discretely. By giving an extension of a general class of coordination-like games, including true coordination games themselves, into a continuous setting, we can begin to study coordination and cooperative behavior with a new host of tools from PDEs and nonlocal equations. In this study, we propose a rigorously supported extension of structured coordination-type games into a setting with continuous space and continuous strategies and show that, under certain hypotheses, the dynamics of these games are described through a nonlinear, nonlocal diffusion equation. We go on to prove existence and uniqueness for the initial value problem in the case where no boundary data are prescribed. For true coordination games, we go further and prove a maximum principle, weak regularity results, as well as some numerical results toward understanding how solutions to the coordination equation behave. We present several modeling results, characterizing stationary solutions both rigorously and through numerical experiments and conclude with a result towards the inhomogeneous problem.

math.DS↗

A Game Theoretic Treatment of Contagion in Trade Networks

Global trade of material goods involves the potential to create pathways for the spread of infectious pathogens. One trade sector in which this synergy is clearly critical is that of wildlife trade networks. This highly complex system involves important and understudied bidirectional coupling between the economic decision making of the stakeholders and the contagion dynamics on the emergent trade network. While each of these components are independently well studied, there is a meaningful gap in understanding the feedback dynamics that can arise between them. In the present study, we describe a general game theoretic model for trade networks of goods susceptible to contagion. The primary result relies on the acyclic nature of the trade network and shows that, through the course of trading with stochastic infections, the probability of infection converges to a directly computable fixed point. This allows us to compute best responses and thus identify equilibria in the game. We present ways to use this model to describe and evaluate trade networks in terms of global and individual risk of infection under a wide variety of structural or individual modifications to the trade network. In capturing the bidirectional coupling of the system, we provide critical insight into the global and individual drivers and consequences for risks of infection inherent in and arising from the global wildlife trade, and any economic trade network with associated contagion risks.

econ.TH↗

Insights into the Structured Coordination Game with Neutral Options through Simulation

Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the coordination game with discrete structure have been limited in scope, often relying on symmetric reduction of the state space, or other constraints which limit the power of the model to give insight into desired applications. In this paper, we introduce a new way of thinking about equilibria of the structured coordination game with neutral strategies by means of graph partitioning. We begin with a few elementary game theoretical results and then catalogue all the Nash equilibria of the coordination game with neutral options for graphs with seven or fewer vertices. We extend our observations through the use of simulation on larger Erdős-Rényi random graphs to form the basis for proposing some conjectures about the general relationships among edge density, cluster number, and consensus stability.

cs.GT↗

An Interdisciplinary Perspective of the Built-Environment Microbiome

The built environment provides an excellent setting for interdisciplinary research on the dynamics of microbial communities. The system is simplified compared to many natural settings, and to some extent the entire environment can be manipulated, from architectural design, to materials use, air flow, human traffic, and capacity to disrupt microbial communities through cleaning. Here we provide an overview of the ecology of the microbiome in the built environment. We address niche space and refugia, population and community (metagenomic) dynamics, spatial ecology within a building, including the major microbial transmission mechanisms, as well as evolution. We also address the landscape ecology connecting microbiomes between physically separated buildings. At each stage we pay particular attention to the actual and potential interface between disciplines, such as ecology, epidemiology, materials science, and human social behavior. We end by identifying some opportunities for future interdisciplinary research on the microbiome of the built environment.

q-bio.PE↗