arXiv subjects

Johnnatan Messias

Publications and source records attributed to Johnnatan Messias.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

On Exercising Governance Power in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations

A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is a governance entity that allows its stakeholders to manage blockchain-based protocols through smart contracts. The DAO explicitly specifies how stakeholders make and enforce decisions concerning a protocol's operation in a smart contract, aptly referred to as its governance contract. The design of this governance contract, therefore, has far-reaching implications for the security (trust) and privacy (transparency) of the smart contracts managed by the DAO and its stakeholders. In this work, we (i) explicate the trust and transparency trade-offs of the design choices in implementing a DAO and (ii) highlight how poor choices introduce critical vulnerabilities, using real-world examples as case studies. To this end, we analyze $48$ public, actively used Ethereum-based DAOs that control a vast capital. We classify the design choices into a handful of key dimensions that succinctly capture how a DAO's stakeholders initiate a protocol change, vote on it, and, based on the voting outcome, execute that change. Our analyses crucially uncover a new class of attacks, which we call governance attacks, that directly exploit the fundamental design of a DAO's governance mechanisms, even if we assume bug-free implementations.

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arXiv2026

There Will Be Spam: Characterizing State-Invariant Transactions and Speculative MEV

Blockchains rely on transparency and immutability to ensure trust, but these guarantees come at the cost of an ever-growing ledger that increasingly threatens decentralization by making it more expensive to store and maintain the full transaction history. In this work, we introduce state-invariant transactions, defined as transactions whose inclusion or removal does not affect the resulting blockchain state beyond transaction fees. We argue that these transactions constitute a form of on-chain spam because they consume execution, bandwidth, storage, and blockspace without contributing to the final ledger state. We present the first large-scale measurement of state-invariant transactions across Ethereum, Optimism, and Base, identifying nearly 1.4 billion such transactions. While only 2.6% of Ethereum transactions are state-invariant, they account for 24% of transactions on Optimism and 37% on Base, representing a significant source of unnecessary resource consumption on Layer-2 blockchains. We show that speculative Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is the dominant source of state-invariant transactions on Optimism and Base, accounting for 57% and 68%, respectively, but is not the only source as previously assumed. Moreover, despite its popularity, speculative MEV is not the most profitable strategy once the costs of state-invariant transactions are considered. Beyond MEV, we identify substantial malicious activity, with address poisoning campaigns accounting for 53% of non-reverted state-invariant transactions on Ethereum. Our findings suggest that mitigating state-invariant transactions could substantially reduce blockchain resource consumption and transaction costs while limiting phishing campaigns and other forms of blockchain abuse.

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arXiv2026

The Express Lane to Spam and Centralization: An Empirical Analysis of Arbitrum's Timeboost

DeFi applications are vulnerable to MEV, where specialized actors profit by reordering or inserting transactions. To mitigate latency races and internalize MEV revenue, Arbitrum introduced Timeboost, an auction-based transaction sequencing mechanism that grants short-term priority access to an express lane. In this paper we present the first large-scale empirical study of Timeboost, analyzing over 48.5 million express lane transactions and 494 thousand auctions between January 2026 and April 2026. Our results reveal five main findings. First, express lane control is highly centralized, with three entities winning 99.74% of auctions. Second, while express lane access provides earlier inclusion, profitable MEV opportunities cluster at the end of blocks, limiting the value of priority access. Third, approximately 30% of time-boosted transactions are reverted, indicating that the Timeboost does not effectively mitigate spam. Fourth, secondary markets for reselling express lane rights experience difficulties in sustaining themselves due to poor execution reliability and unsustainable economics. Finally, auction competition declined over time, leading to steadily reduced revenue for the Arbitrum DAO. Taken together, these findings show that Timeboost fails to deliver on its stated goals of fairness, decentralization, and spam reduction. Instead, it reinforces collusion and narrows adoption, highlighting the limitations of auction-based ordering as a mechanism for fair transaction sequencing in rollups.

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arXiv2026

Fairness in Token Delegation: Mitigating Voting Power Concentration in DAOs

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) aim to enable participatory governance, but in practice face challenges of voter apathy, concentration of voting power, and misaligned delegation. Existing delegation mechanisms often reinforce visibility biases, where a small set of highly ranked delegates accumulate disproportionate influence regardless of their alignment with the broader community. In this paper, we conduct an empirical study of delegation in DAO governance off-chain discussions from 14 DAO forums. We develop a methodology to link forum participants to on-chain addresses, extract governance interests using large language models, and compare these interests against delegates' historical behavior. Our analysis reveals that delegations are frequently misaligned with token holders' expressed priorities and that current ranking-based interfaces exacerbate power concentration. We argue that incorporating interest alignment into delegation processes could mitigate these imbalances and improve the representativeness of DAO decision-making. To support future research, we will release our dataset and code in a public repository.

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arXiv2026

On the Centralization of Governance Power in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations

A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is a governing entity that empowers its stakeholders (i.e., users who hold one or more of its tokens) to manage blockchain-based protocols (i.e., smart contracts) collaboratively. The governance of a DAO is explicitly encoded in the DAO's governance contract, which defines how stakeholders participate in governance and how much influence (or voting power) they have in any decision. While decentralization and autonomy are the fundamental tenets of a DAO's design, empirical evidence suggests that in practice governance is often highly centralized. In this work, we study the designs and implementations of 48 public and actively used DAOs, with substantially large capital, deployed on Ethereum. We identify how three key governance mechanisms--token registration, staking, and delegation--originally introduced to improve security or participation, contribute to the concentration of voting power. Unlike prior work on centralization of voting power in specific DAOs, our findings reveal that these governance mechanisms of DAOs themselves systematically reinforce centralization. By elucidating the relationship between governance design and voting centralization, this work advances the understanding of DAO governance structures and highlights the inherent trade-offs between decentralization, security, and usability of DAOs.

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arXiv2025

Understanding Blockchain Governance: Analyzing Decentralized Voting to Amend DeFi Smart Contracts

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have emerged as a novel governance mechanism in blockchain ecosystems, particularly within Decentralized Finance (DeFi). By enabling token holders to propose and vote on protocol changes, these systems promise transparent and equitable decision-making without centralized control. In this paper, we present an in-depth empirical study of the governance protocols of Compound and Uniswap, two of the most widely used DAOs in DeFi. Analyzing over 370 governance proposals and millions of on-chain events from their inception until August 2024, we uncover significant centralization of voting power: as few as 3--5 voters were sufficient to sway the majority of proposals. We also find that the cost of voting disproportionately burdens smaller token holders, and that strategic voting behaviors, such as delayed participation and coalition formation, further distort governance outcomes. Our findings suggest that despite their decentralized ideals, current DAO governance mechanisms fall short in practice.

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arXiv2025

Airdrops: Giving Money Away Is Harder Than It Seems

Airdrops are a popular mechanism used by blockchain protocols to bootstrap communities, reward early adopters, and decentralize token distribution. Despite their widespread adoption, the effectiveness of airdrops in achieving long-term user engagement and ecosystem growth remains poorly understood. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive empirical study of nine major airdrops across Ethereum and Layer-2 ecosystems. Our analysis reveals that a substantial share of tokens--up to 66% in some cases--are rapidly sold, often in recipients' first post-claim transaction. We show that this behavior is largely driven by "airdrop farmers," who strategically optimize eligibility criteria to extract value without contributing meaningfully to the ecosystem. We complement our quantitative findings with a case study of the Arbitrum airdrop, illustrating how short-term activity spikes fail to translate into sustained user involvement. Based on these results, we discuss common design pitfalls--such as Sybil vulnerability, poor incentive alignment, and governance token misuse--and propose actionable guidelines for designing more effective airdrop strategies.

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arXiv2025

The Writing is on the Wall: Analyzing the Boom of Inscriptions and its Impact on EVM-compatible Blockchains

This paper examines inscription-related transactions on Ethereum and major EVM-compatible rollups, assessing their impact on scalability during transaction surges. Our results show that, on certain days, inscriptions accounted for nearly 90% of transactions on Arbitrum and ZKsync Era, while 53% on Ethereum, with 99% of these inscriptions involving meme coin minting. Furthermore, we show that ZKsync and Arbitrum saw lower median gas fees during these surges. ZKsync Era, a ZK-rollup, showed a greater fee reduction than the optimistic rollups studied -- Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism.

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arXiv2025

A Public Dataset For the ZKsync Rollup

Despite blockchain data being publicly available, practical challenges and high costs often hinder its effective use by researchers, thus limiting data-driven research and exploration in the blockchain space. This is especially true when it comes to Layer-2 (L2) ecosystems, and ZKsync, in particular. To address these issues, we have curated a dataset from 1 year of activity extracted from a ZKsync Era archive node and made it freely available to external parties. We provide details on this dataset and how it was created, showcase a few example analyses that can be performed with it, and discuss some future research directions.

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arXiv2024

Cross-Rollup MEV: Non-Atomic Arbitrage Across L2 Blockchains

This study quantifies the potential non-atomic MEV on Layer-2 (L2) blockchains by measuring the arbitrage opportunities between cross-rollup and DEX-CEX. Over recent years, we observe a shift in trading activities from Ethereum to rollups, with swaps on rollups occurring 2-3 times more frequently, albeit with lower trade volumes. By analyzing the costs of swap on L2s and price discrepancies cross-rollup and DEX-CEX, we identify more than 500 000 unexplored arbitrage opportunities. In particular, we find that these opportunities persist, on average, for 10 to 20 blocks, necessitating the modification of the Loss Versus Rebalancing (LVR) metric to prevent double-counting. Our findings indicate that the arbitrage opportunities in Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism range between 0.03% and 0.05% of the trading volume, while in the ZKsync it fluctuates around 0.25%.

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arXiv2024

Liquid Staking Tokens in Automated Market Makers

This paper studies liquid staking tokens (LSTs) on automated market makers (AMMs), both theoretically and empirically. LSTs are tokenized representations of staked assets on proof-of-stake blockchains. First, we model LST-liquidity on AMMs theoretically, categorizing suitable AMM types for LST liquidity and deriving formulas for the necessary returns from trading fees to adequately compensate liquidity providers under the particular price trajectories of LSTs. For the latter, two relevant metrics are considered: (1) losses compared to holding the liquidity outside the AMM (loss-versus-holding, or "impermanent loss"), and (2) the relative profitability compared to fully staking the capital (loss-versus-staking) which is specifically tailored to the case of LST-liquidity. Next, we empirically measure these metrics for Ethereum LSTs across the most relevant AMM pools. We find that, while trading fees often compensate for impermanent loss, fully staking is more profitable for many pools, raising questions about the sustainability of the current LST liquidity allocation to AMMs.

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arXiv2024

Quantifying Arbitrage in Automated Market Makers: An Empirical Study of Ethereum ZK Rollups

Arbitrage can arise from the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same asset in different markets in order to profit from a difference in its price. This work systematically reviews arbitrage opportunities between Automated Market Makers (AMMs) on Ethereum ZK rollups, and Centralised Exchanges (CEXs). First, we propose a theoretical framework to measure such arbitrage opportunities and derive a formula for the related Maximal Arbitrage Value (MAV) that accounts for both price divergences and liquidity available in the trading venues. Then, we empirically measure the historical MAV available between SyncSwap, an AMM on zkSync Era, and Binance, and investigate how quickly misalignments in price are corrected against explicit and implicit market costs. Overall, the cumulative MAV from July to September 2023 on the USDC-ETH SyncSwap pool amounts to $104.96k (0.24% of trading volume).

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arXiv2024

The Writing is on the Wall: Analyzing the Boom of Inscriptions and its Impact on Rollup Performance and Cost Efficiency

Late 2023 witnessed significant user activity on EVM chains, resulting in a surge in transaction activity and putting many rollups into the first live test. While some rollups performed well, some others experienced downtime during this period, affecting transaction finality time and gas fees. To address the lack of empirical research on rollups, we perform the first study during a heightened activity during the late 2023 transaction boom, as attributed to inscriptions - a novel technique that enables NFT and ERC-20 token creation on Bitcoin and other blockchains. We observe that minting inscription-based meme tokens on zkSync Era allows for trading at a fraction of the costs, compared to the Bitcoin or Ethereum networks. We also found that the increased transaction activity, over 99% attributed to the minting of new inscription tokens, positively affected other users of zkSync Era, resulting in lowered gas fees. Unlike L1 blockchains, ZK rollups may experience lower gas fees with increased transaction volume. Lastly, the introduction of blobs - a form of temporary data storage - decreased the gas costs of Ethereum rollups, but also raised a number of questions about the security of inscription-based tokens.

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arXiv2024

Cross-border Exchange of CBDCs using Layer-2 Blockchain

This paper proposes a novel multi-layer blockchain architecture for the cross-border trading of CBDCs. The permissioned layer-2, by relying on the public consensus of the underlying network, assures the security and integrity of the transactions and ensures interoperability with domestic CBDCs implementations. Multiple Layer-3s operate various Automated Market Makers (AMMs) and compete with each other for the lowest costs. To provide insights into the practical implications of the system, simulations of trading costs are conducted based on historical FX rates, with Project Mariana as a benchmark. The study shows that, even with liquidity fragmentation, a multi-layer and multi-AMM setup is more cost-efficient than a single AMM.

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arXiv2023

Dissecting Bitcoin and Ethereum Transactions: On the Lack of Transaction Contention and Prioritization Transparency in Blockchains

In permissionless blockchains, transaction issuers include a fee to incentivize miners to include their transactions. To accurately estimate this prioritization fee for a transaction, transaction issuers (or blockchain participants, more generally) rely on two fundamental notions of transparency, namely contention and prioritization transparency. Contention transparency implies that participants are aware of every pending transaction that will contend with a given transaction for inclusion. Prioritization transparency states that the participants are aware of the transaction or prioritization fees paid by every such contending transaction. Neither of these notions of transparency holds well today. Private relay networks, for instance, allow users to send transactions privately to miners. Besides, users can offer fees to miners via either direct transfers to miners' wallets or off-chain payments -- neither of which are public. In this work, we characterize the lack of contention and prioritization transparency in Bitcoin and Ethereum resulting from such practices. We show that private relay networks are widely used and private transactions are quite prevalent. We show that the lack of transparency facilitates miners to collude and overcharge users who may use these private relay networks despite them offering little to no guarantees on transaction prioritization. The lack of these transparencies in blockchains has crucial implications for transaction issuers as well as the stability of blockchains. Finally, we make our data sets and scripts publicly available.

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arXiv2021

Selfish & Opaque Transaction Ordering in the Bitcoin Blockchain: The Case for Chain Neutrality

Most public blockchain protocols, including the popular Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains, do not formally specify the order in which miners should select transactions from the pool of pending (or uncommitted) transactions for inclusion in the blockchain. Over the years, informal conventions or "norms" for transaction ordering have, however, emerged via the use of shared software by miners, e.g., the GetBlockTemplate (GBT) mining protocol in Bitcoin Core. Today, a widely held view is that Bitcoin miners prioritize transactions based on their offered "transaction fee-per-byte." Bitcoin users are, consequently, encouraged to increase the fees to accelerate the commitment of their transactions, particularly during periods of congestion. In this paper, we audit the Bitcoin blockchain and present statistically significant evidence of mining pools deviating from the norms to accelerate the commitment of transactions for which they have (i) a selfish or vested interest, or (ii) received dark-fee payments via opaque (non-public) side-channels. As blockchains are increasingly being used as a record-keeping substrate for a variety of decentralized (financial technology) systems, our findings call for an urgent discussion on defining neutrality norms that miners must adhere to when ordering transactions in the chains. Finally, we make our data sets and scripts publicly available.

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arXiv2021

Modeling Coordinated vs. P2P Mining: An Analysis of Inefficiency and Inequality in Proof-of-Work Blockchains

We study efficiency in a proof-of-work blockchain with non-zero latencies, focusing in particular on the (inequality in) individual miners' efficiencies. Prior work attributed differences in miners' efficiencies mostly to attacks, but we pursue a different question: Can inequality in miners' efficiencies be explained by delays, even when all miners are honest? Traditionally, such efficiency-related questions were tackled only at the level of the overall system, and in a peer-to-peer (P2P) setting where miners directly connect to one another. Despite it being common today for miners to pool compute capacities in a mining pool managed by a centralized coordinator, efficiency in such a coordinated setting has barely been studied. In this paper, we propose a simple model of a proof-of-work blockchain with latencies for both the P2P and the coordinated settings. We derive a closed-form expression for the efficiency in the coordinated setting with an arbitrary number of miners and arbitrary latencies, both for the overall system and for each individual miner. We leverage this result to show that inequalities arise from variability in the delays, but that if all miners are equidistant from the coordinator, they have equal efficiency irrespective of their compute capacities. We then prove that, under a natural consistency condition, the overall system efficiency in the P2P setting is higher than that in the coordinated setting. Finally, we perform a simulation-based study to demonstrate that even in the P2P setting delays between miners introduce inequalities, and that there is a more complex interplay between delays and compute capacities.

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arXiv2018

On Microtargeting Socially Divisive Ads: A Case Study of Russia-Linked Ad Campaigns on Facebook

Targeted advertising is meant to improve the efficiency of matching advertisers to their customers. However, targeted advertising can also be abused by malicious advertisers to efficiently reach people susceptible to false stories, stoke grievances, and incite social conflict. Since targeted ads are not seen by non-targeted and non-vulnerable people, malicious ads are likely to go unreported and their effects undetected. This work examines a specific case of malicious advertising, exploring the extent to which political ads from the Russian Intelligence Research Agency (IRA) run prior to 2016 U.S. elections exploited Facebook's targeted advertising infrastructure to efficiently target ads on divisive or polarizing topics (e.g., immigration, race-based policing) at vulnerable sub-populations. In particular, we do the following: (a) We conduct U.S. census-representative surveys to characterize how users with different political ideologies report, approve, and perceive truth in the content of the IRA ads. Our surveys show that many ads are "divisive": they elicit very different reactions from people belonging to different socially salient groups. (b) We characterize how these divisive ads are targeted to sub-populations that feel particularly aggrieved by the status quo. Our findings support existing calls for greater transparency of content and targeting of political ads. (c) We particularly focus on how the Facebook ad API facilitates such targeting. We show how the enormous amount of personal data Facebook aggregates about users and makes available to advertisers enables such malicious targeting.

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