arXiv subjects

Jon Schneider

Publications and source records attributed to Jon Schneider.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2025

Swap Regret and Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form Games

Swap regret is a notion that has proven itself to be central to the study of general-sum normal-form games, with swap-regret minimization leading to convergence to the set of correlated equilibria and guaranteeing non-manipulability against a self-interested opponent. However, the situation for more general classes of games -- such as Bayesian games and extensive-form games -- is less clear-cut, with multiple candidate definitions for swap-regret but no known efficiently minimizable variant of swap regret that implies analogous non-manipulability guarantees. In this paper, we present a new variant of swap regret for polytope games that we call ``profile swap regret'', with the property that obtaining sublinear profile swap regret is both necessary and sufficient for any learning algorithm to be non-manipulable by an opponent (resolving an open problem of Mansour et al., 2022). Although we show profile swap regret is NP-hard to compute given a transcript of play, we show it is nonetheless possible to design efficient learning algorithms that guarantee at most $O(\sqrt{T})$ profile swap regret. Finally, we explore the correlated equilibrium notion induced by low-profile-swap-regret play, and demonstrate a gap between the set of outcomes that can be implemented by this learning process and the set of outcomes that can be implemented by a third-party mediator (in contrast to the situation in normal-form games).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents

We consider the problem of a learning agent who has to repeatedly play a general sum game against a strategic opponent who acts to maximize their own payoff by optimally responding against the learner's algorithm. The learning agent knows their own payoff function, but is uncertain about the payoff of their opponent (knowing only that it is drawn from some distribution $\mathcal{D}$). What learning algorithm should the agent run in order to maximize their own total utility, either in expectation or in the worst-case over $\mathcal{D}$? When the learning algorithm is constrained to be a no-regret algorithm, we demonstrate how to efficiently construct an optimal learning algorithm (asymptotically achieving the optimal utility) in polynomial time for both the in-expectation and worst-case problems, independent of any other assumptions. When the learning algorithm is not constrained to no-regret, we show how to construct an $\varepsilon$-optimal learning algorithm (obtaining average utility within $\varepsilon$ of the optimal utility) for both the in-expectation and worst-case problems in time polynomial in the size of the input and $1/\varepsilon$, when either the size of the game or the support of $\mathcal{D}$ is constant. Finally, for the special case of the maximin objective, where the learner wishes to maximize their minimum payoff over all possible optimizer types, we construct a learner algorithm that runs in polynomial time in each step and guarantees convergence to the optimal learner payoff. All of these results make use of recently developed machinery that converts the analysis of learning algorithms to the study of the class of corresponding geometric objects known as menus.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Full Swap Regret and Discretized Calibration

We study the problem of minimizing swap regret in structured normal-form games. Players have a very large (potentially infinite) number of pure actions, but each action has an embedding into $d$-dimensional space and payoffs are given by bilinear functions of these embeddings. We provide an efficient learning algorithm for this setting that incurs at most $\tilde{O}(T^{(d+1)/(d+3)})$ swap regret after $T$ rounds. To achieve this, we introduce a new online learning problem we call \emph{full swap regret minimization}. In this problem, a learner repeatedly takes a (randomized) action in a bounded convex $d$-dimensional action set $\mathcal{K}$ and then receives a loss from the adversary, with the goal of minimizing their regret with respect to the \emph{worst-case} swap function mapping $\mathcal{K}$ to $\mathcal{K}$. For varied assumptions about the convexity and smoothness of the loss functions, we design algorithms with full swap regret bounds ranging from $O(T^{d/(d+2)})$ to $O(T^{(d+1)/(d+2)})$. Finally, we apply these tools to the problem of online forecasting to minimize calibration error, showing that several notions of calibration can be viewed as specific instances of full swap regret. In particular, we design efficient algorithms for online forecasting that guarantee at most $O(T^{1/3})$ $\ell_2$-calibration error and $O(\max(\sqrt{εT}, T^{1/3}))$ \emph{discretized-calibration} error (when the forecaster is restricted to predicting multiples of $ε$).

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Efficient Learning and Computation of Linear Correlated Equilibrium in General Convex Games

We propose efficient no-regret learning dynamics and ellipsoid-based methods for computing linear correlated equilibria$\unicode{x2014}$a relaxation of correlated equilibria and a strengthening of coarse correlated equilibria$\unicode{x2014}$in general convex games. These are games where the number of pure strategies is potentially exponential in the natural representation of the game, such as extensive-form games. Our work identifies linear correlated equilibria as the tightest known notion of equilibrium that is computable in polynomial time and is efficiently learnable for general convex games. Our results are enabled by a generalization of the seminal framework of of Gordon et al. [2008] for $Φ$-regret minimization, providing extensions to this framework that can be used even when the set of deviations $Φ$ is intractable to separate/optimize over. Our polynomial-time algorithms are similarly enabled by extending the Ellipsoid-Against-Hope approach of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] and its generalization to games of non-polynomial type proposed by Farina and Pipis [2024a]. We provide an extension to these approaches when we do not have access to the separation oracles required by these works for the dual player.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Computing Optimal Regularizers for Online Linear Optimization

Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithms are a popular class of learning algorithms for online linear optimization (OLO) that guarantee sub-linear regret, but the choice of regularizer can significantly impact dimension-dependent factors in the regret bound. We present an algorithm that takes as input convex and symmetric action sets and loss sets for a specific OLO instance, and outputs a regularizer such that running FTRL with this regularizer guarantees regret within a universal constant factor of the best possible regret bound. In particular, for any choice of (convex, symmetric) action set and loss set we prove that there exists an instantiation of FTRL which achieves regret within a constant factor of the best possible learning algorithm, strengthening the universality result of Srebro et al., 2011. Our algorithm requires preprocessing time and space exponential in the dimension $d$ of the OLO instance, but can be run efficiently online assuming a membership and linear optimization oracle for the action and loss sets, respectively (and is fully polynomial time for the case of constant dimension $d$). We complement this with a lower bound showing that even deciding whether a given regularizer is $α$-strongly-convex with respect to a given norm is NP-hard.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey

In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace this autobidding and cover a range of topics in this area, including bidding algorithms, equilibrium analysis and efficiency of common auction formats, and optimal auction design.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Rate-Preserving Reductions for Blackwell Approachability

Abernethy et al. (2011) showed that Blackwell approachability and no-regret learning are equivalent, in the sense that any algorithm that solves a specific Blackwell approachability instance can be converted to a sublinear regret algorithm for a specific no-regret learning instance, and vice versa. In this paper, we study a more fine-grained form of such reductions, and ask when this translation between problems preserves not only a sublinear rate of convergence, but also preserves the optimal rate of convergence. That is, in which cases does it suffice to find the optimal regret bound for a no-regret learning instance in order to find the optimal rate of convergence for a corresponding approachability instance? We show that the reduction of Abernethy et al. (2011) does not preserve rates: their reduction may reduce a $d$-dimensional approachability instance $I_1$ with optimal convergence rate $R_1$ to a no-regret learning instance $I_2$ with optimal regret-per-round of $R_2$, with $R_{2}/R_{1}$ arbitrarily large (in particular, it is possible that $R_1 = 0$ and $R_{2} > 0$). On the other hand, we show that it is possible to tightly reduce any approachability instance to an instance of a generalized form of regret minimization we call improper $ϕ$-regret minimization (a variant of the $ϕ$-regret minimization of Gordon et al. (2008) where the transformation functions may map actions outside of the action set). Finally, we characterize when linear transformations suffice to reduce improper $ϕ$-regret minimization problems to standard classes of regret minimization problems in a rate preserving manner. We prove that some improper $ϕ$-regret minimization instances cannot be reduced to either subclass of instance in this way, suggesting that approachability can capture some problems that cannot be phrased in the language of online learning.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2024

Strategically-Robust Learning Algorithms for Bidding in First-Price Auctions

Learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions is a fundamental problem at the interface of game theory and machine learning, which has seen a recent surge in interest due to the transition of display advertising to first-price auctions. In this work, we propose a novel concave formulation for pure-strategy bidding in first-price auctions, and use it to analyze natural Gradient-Ascent-based algorithms for this problem. Importantly, our analysis goes beyond regret, which was the typical focus of past work, and also accounts for the strategic backdrop of online-advertising markets where bidding algorithms are deployed -- we provide the first guarantees of strategic-robustness and incentive-compatibility for Gradient Ascent. Concretely, we show that our algorithms achieve $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret when the highest competing bids are generated adversarially, and show that no online algorithm can do better. We further prove that the regret reduces to $O(\log T)$ when the competition is stationary and stochastic, which drastically improves upon the previous best of $O(\sqrt{T})$. Moving beyond regret, we show that a strategic seller cannot exploit our algorithms to extract more revenue on average than is possible under the optimal mechanism. Finally, we prove that our algorithm is also incentive compatible -- it is a (nearly) dominant strategy for the buyer to report her values truthfully to the algorithm as a whole. Altogether, these guarantees make our algorithms the first to simultaneously achieve both optimal regret and strategic-robustness.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Complex Dynamics in Autobidding Systems

It has become the default in markets such as ad auctions for participants to bid in an auction through automated bidding agents (autobidders) which adjust bids over time to satisfy return-over-spend constraints. Despite the prominence of such systems for the internet economy, their resulting dynamical behavior is still not well understood. Although one might hope that such relatively simple systems would typically converge to the equilibria of their underlying auctions, we provide a plethora of results that show the emergence of complex behavior, such as bi-stability, periodic orbits and quasi periodicity. We empirically observe how the market structure (expressed as motifs) qualitatively affects the behavior of the dynamics. We complement it with theoretical results showing that autobidding systems can simulate both linear dynamical systems as well logical boolean gates.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Adversarial Online Learning with Temporal Feedback Graphs

We study a variant of prediction with expert advice where the learner's action at round $t$ is only allowed to depend on losses on a specific subset of the rounds (where the structure of which rounds' losses are visible at time $t$ is provided by a directed "feedback graph" known to the learner). We present a novel learning algorithm for this setting based on a strategy of partitioning the losses across sub-cliques of this graph. We complement this with a lower bound that is tight in many practical settings, and which we conjecture to be within a constant factor of optimal. For the important class of transitive feedback graphs, we prove that this algorithm is efficiently implementable and obtains the optimal regret bound (up to a universal constant).

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Online Learning with Bounded Recall

We study the problem of full-information online learning in the "bounded recall" setting popular in the study of repeated games. An online learning algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is $M$-$\textit{bounded-recall}$ if its output at time $t$ can be written as a function of the $M$ previous rewards (and not e.g. any other internal state of $\mathcal{A}$). We first demonstrate that a natural approach to constructing bounded-recall algorithms from mean-based no-regret learning algorithms (e.g., running Hedge over the last $M$ rounds) fails, and that any such algorithm incurs constant regret per round. We then construct a stationary bounded-recall algorithm that achieves a per-round regret of $Θ(1/\sqrt{M})$, which we complement with a tight lower bound. Finally, we show that unlike the perfect recall setting, any low regret bound bounded-recall algorithm must be aware of the ordering of the past $M$ losses -- any bounded-recall algorithm which plays a symmetric function of the past $M$ losses must incur constant regret per round.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Combinatorial Bernoulli Factories

A Bernoulli factory is an algorithmic procedure for exact sampling of certain random variables having only Bernoulli access to their parameters. Bernoulli access to a parameter $p \in [0,1]$ means the algorithm does not know $p$, but has sample access to independent draws of a Bernoulli random variable with mean equal to $p$. In this paper, we study the problem of Bernoulli factories for polytopes: given Bernoulli access to a vector $x\in P$ for a given polytope $P\subset [0,1]^n$, output a randomized vertex such that the expected value of the $i$-th coordinate is \emph{exactly} equal to $x_i$. For example, for the special case of the perfect matching polytope, one is given Bernoulli access to the entries of a doubly stochastic matrix $[x_{ij}]$ and asked to sample a matching such that the probability of each edge $(i,j)$ be present in the matching is exactly equal to $x_{ij}$. We show that a polytope $P$ admits a Bernoulli factory if and and only if $P$ is the intersection of $[0,1]^n$ with an affine subspace. Our construction is based on an algebraic formulation of the problem, involving identifying a family of Bernstein polynomials (one per vertex) that satisfy a certain algebraic identity on $P$. The main technical tool behind our construction is a connection between these polynomials and the geometry of zonotope tilings. We apply these results to construct an explicit factory for the perfect matching polytope. The resulting factory is deeply connected to the combinatorial enumeration of arborescences and may be of independent interest. For the $k$-uniform matroid polytope, we recover a sampling procedure known in statistics as Sampford sampling.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

Pareto-Optimal Algorithms for Learning in Games

We study the problem of characterizing optimal learning algorithms for playing repeated games against an adversary with unknown payoffs. In this problem, the first player (called the learner) commits to a learning algorithm against a second player (called the optimizer), and the optimizer best-responds by choosing the optimal dynamic strategy for their (unknown but well-defined) payoff. Classic learning algorithms (such as no-regret algorithms) provide some counterfactual guarantees for the learner, but might perform much more poorly than other learning algorithms against particular optimizer payoffs. In this paper, we introduce the notion of asymptotically Pareto-optimal learning algorithms. Intuitively, if a learning algorithm is Pareto-optimal, then there is no other algorithm which performs asymptotically at least as well against all optimizers and performs strictly better (by at least $Ω(T)$) against some optimizer. We show that well-known no-regret algorithms such as Multiplicative Weights and Follow The Regularized Leader are Pareto-dominated. However, while no-regret is not enough to ensure Pareto-optimality, we show that a strictly stronger property, no-swap-regret, is a sufficient condition for Pareto-optimality. Proving these results requires us to address various technical challenges specific to repeated play, including the fact that there is no simple characterization of how optimizers who are rational in the long-term best-respond against a learning algorithm over multiple rounds of play. To address this, we introduce the idea of the asymptotic menu of a learning algorithm: the convex closure of all correlated distributions over strategy profiles that are asymptotically implementable by an adversary. We show that all no-swap-regret algorithms share the same asymptotic menu, implying that all no-swap-regret algorithms are ``strategically equivalent''.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Contracting with a Learning Agent

Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the principal and agent, taking place under uncertainty and over time. While appealing in theory, players seldom use complex dynamic strategies in practice, often preferring to circumvent complexity and approach uncertainty through learning. We initiate the study of repeated contracts with a learning agent, focusing on agents who achieve no-regret outcomes. Optimizing against a no-regret agent is a known open problem in general games; we achieve an optimal solution to this problem for a canonical contract setting, in which the agent's choice among multiple actions leads to success/failure. The solution has a surprisingly simple structure: for some $α> 0$, initially offer the agent a linear contract with scalar $α$, then switch to offering a linear contract with scalar $0$. This switch causes the agent to ``free-fall'' through their action space and during this time provides the principal with non-zero reward at zero cost. Despite apparent exploitation of the agent, this dynamic contract can leave \emph{both} players better off compared to the best static contract. Our results generalize beyond success/failure, to arbitrary non-linear contracts which the principal rescales dynamically. Finally, we quantify the dependence of our results on knowledge of the time horizon, and are the first to address this consideration in the study of strategizing against learning agents.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Optimal cross-learning for contextual bandits with unknown context distributions

We consider the problem of designing contextual bandit algorithms in the ``cross-learning'' setting of Balseiro et al., where the learner observes the loss for the action they play in all possible contexts, not just the context of the current round. We specifically consider the setting where losses are chosen adversarially and contexts are sampled i.i.d. from an unknown distribution. In this setting, we resolve an open problem of Balseiro et al. by providing an efficient algorithm with a nearly tight (up to logarithmic factors) regret bound of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{TK})$, independent of the number of contexts. As a consequence, we obtain the first nearly tight regret bounds for the problems of learning to bid in first-price auctions (under unknown value distributions) and sleeping bandits with a stochastic action set. At the core of our algorithm is a novel technique for coordinating the execution of a learning algorithm over multiple epochs in such a way to remove correlations between estimation of the unknown distribution and the actions played by the algorithm. This technique may be of independent interest for other learning problems involving estimation of an unknown context distribution.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Is Learning in Games Good for the Learners?

We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of $\textit{generalized equilibrium}$ which allows for asymmetric regret constraints, and yields polytopes of feasible values for each agent and pair of regret constraints, where we show that any such equilibrium is reachable by a pair of algorithms which maintain their regret guarantees against arbitrary opponents. As a central example, we highlight the case one agent is no-swap and the other's regret is unconstrained. We show that this captures an extension of $\textit{Stackelberg}$ equilibria with a matching optimal value, and that there exists a wide class of games where a player can significantly increase their utility by deviating from a no-swap-regret algorithm against a no-swap learner (in fact, almost any game without pure Nash equilibria is of this form). Additionally, we make use of generalized equilibria to consider tradeoffs in terms of the opponent's algorithm choice. We give a tight characterization for the maximal reward obtainable against $\textit{some}$ no-regret learner, yet we also show a class of games in which this is bounded away from the value obtainable against the class of common "mean-based" no-regret algorithms. Finally, we consider the question of learning reward-optimal strategies via repeated play with a no-regret agent when the game is initially unknown. Again we show tradeoffs depending on the opponent's learning algorithm: the Stackelberg strategy is learnable in exponential time with any no-regret agent (and in polynomial time with any no-$\textit{adaptive}$-regret agent) for any game where it is learnable via queries, and there are games where it is learnable in polynomial time against any no-swap-regret agent but requires exponential time against a mean-based no-regret agent.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

U-Calibration: Forecasting for an Unknown Agent

We consider the problem of evaluating forecasts of binary events whose predictions are consumed by rational agents who take an action in response to a prediction, but whose utility is unknown to the forecaster. We show that optimizing forecasts for a single scoring rule (e.g., the Brier score) cannot guarantee low regret for all possible agents. In contrast, forecasts that are well-calibrated guarantee that all agents incur sublinear regret. However, calibration is not a necessary criterion here (it is possible for miscalibrated forecasts to provide good regret guarantees for all possible agents), and calibrated forecasting procedures have provably worse convergence rates than forecasting procedures targeting a single scoring rule. Motivated by this, we present a new metric for evaluating forecasts that we call U-calibration, equal to the maximal regret of the sequence of forecasts when evaluated under any bounded scoring rule. We show that sublinear U-calibration error is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to achieve sublinear regret guarantees. We additionally demonstrate how to compute the U-calibration error efficiently and provide an online algorithm that achieves $O(\sqrt{T})$ U-calibration error (on par with optimal rates for optimizing for a single scoring rule, and bypassing lower bounds for the traditionally calibrated learning procedures). Finally, we discuss generalizations to the multiclass prediction setting.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

The Power of Menus in Contract Design

We study the power of menus of contracts in principal-agent problems with adverse selection (agents can be one of several types) and moral hazard (we cannot observe agent actions directly). For principal-agent problems with $T$ types and $n$ actions, we show that the best menu of contracts can obtain a factor $Ω(\max(n, \log T))$ more utility for the principal than the best individual contract, partially resolving an open question of Guruganesh et al. (2021). We then turn our attention to randomized menus of linear contracts, where we likewise show that randomized linear menus can be $Ω(T)$ better than the best single linear contract. As a corollary, we show this implies an analogous gap between deterministic menus of (general) contracts and randomized menus of contracts (as introduced by Castiglioni et al. (2022)).

cs.GT↗