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Jonas R. B. Arenhart

Publications and source records attributed to Jonas R. B. Arenhart.

14 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2025

Disentangling scientific realism from anti-exceptionalism

Scientific realism is, currently, one of the most well-entrenched background assumptions of some relevant versions of anti-exceptionalism about logic. We argue that this is a sort of sociological contingency rather than a metaphilosophical necessity. Drawing parallels with the metaphysics of science (as applied to quantum foundations), we try to bring the realist assumptions of anti-exceptionalism to light, to demotivate the necessary connection between realism and anti-exceptionalism, briefly exploring the possibility of adopting antirealism as the background default view of science instead.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2024

A note on Grigoriev and Zaitsev's system CNL$^2_4$

The present article examines a system of four-valued logic recently introduced by Oleg Grigoriev and Dmitry Zaitsev. In particular, besides other interesting results, we will clarify the connection of this system to related systems developed by Paul Ruet and Norihiro Kamide. By doing so, we discuss two philosophical problems that arise from making such connections quite explicit: first, there is an issue with how to make intelligible the meaning of the connectives and the nature of the truth values involved in the many-valued setting employed -- what we have called `the Haackian theme'. We argue that this can be done in a satisfactory way, when seen according to the classicist's light. Second, and related to the first problem, there is a complication arising from the fact that the proof system advanced may be made sense of by advancing at least four such different and incompatible readings -- a sharpening of the so-called `Carnap problem'. We make explicit how the problems connect with each other precisely and argue that what results is a kind of underdetermination by the deductive apparatus for the system.

cs.LO↗
arXiv2024

The Power of Generalized Clemens Semantics

In this paper, we elaborate on the ordered-pair semantics originally presented by Matthew Clemens for LP (Priest's Logic of Paradox). For this purpose, we build on a generalization of Clemens semantics to the case of n-tuple semantics, for every n. More concretely, i) we deal with the case of a language with quantifiers, and ii) we consider philosophical implications of the semantics. The latter includes, first, a reading of the semantics in epistemic terms, involving multiple agents. Furthermore, we discuss the proper understanding of many-valued logics, namely LP and K3 (Kleene strong 3-valued logic), from the perspective of classical logic, along the lines suggested by Susan Haack. We will also discuss some applications of the semantics to issues related to informative contradictions, i.e. contradictions involving quantification over different respects a vague predicate may have, as advanced by Paul Égré, and also to the mixed consequence relations, promoted by Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley and Robert van Rooij.

cs.LO↗
arXiv2023

The elimination of metaphysics through the epistemological analysis: lessons (un)learned from metaphysical underdetermination

This chapter argues that the general philosophy of science should learn metaphilosophical lessons from the case of metaphysical underdetermination, as it occurs in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Section 2 presents the traditional discussion of metaphysical underdetermination regarding the individuality and non-individuality of quantum particles. Section 3 discusses three reactions to it found in the literature: eliminativism about individuality; conservatism about individuality; eliminativism about objects. Section 4 wraps it all up with metametaphysical considerations regarding the epistemology of metaphysics of science.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2023

The roads to non-individuals (and how not to read their maps)

Ever since its beginnings, standard quantum mechanics has been associated with a metaphysical view according to which the theory deals with non-individual objects, i.e., objects deprived of individuality in some sense of the term. We shall examine the grounds of the claim according to which quantum mechanics is so closely connected with a metaphysics of non-individuals. In particular, we discuss the attempts to learn the required `metaphysical lessons' required by quantum mechanics coming from four distinct roads: from the formalism of the theory, treating separately the case of the physics and the underlying logic; from the ontology of the theory, understood as the furniture of the world according to the theory; and, at last, we analyze whether a metaphysics of non-individuals is indispensable from a purely metaphysical point of view. We argue that neither non-individuality nor individuality is not to be found imposed on us in any of these levels so that it should be seen as a metaphysical addition to the theory, rather than as a lesson from it.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2022

The (meta)metaphysics of science: the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics

Traditionally, to be a realist about something means believing in the independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms about what exists, scientific realism can be understood as involving the adoption of an ontology that is scientifically informed. But according to some philosophers, the realistic attitude must go beyond ontology. The way in which this requirement has been understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a productive relationship between science and metaphysics.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2022

Realism and metaphysics in quantum mechanics

According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2020

Floating free from physics: the metaphysics of quantum mechanics

We discuss some methodological aspects of the relation between physics and metaphysics by dealing specifically with the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Our main claim is that current attempts to productively integrate quantum mechanics and metaphysics are best seen as approaches of what should be called `the metaphysics of science', which is developed by applying already existing metaphysical concepts to scientific theories. We argue that, in this perspective, metaphysics must be understood as an autonomous discipline. It results that this metaphysics cannot hope to derive any kind of justification from science. Thus, one of the main motivations of such project, which is the obtaining of a scientifically respectable justification for the attribution of a single true metaphysical profile to the posits of a scientific theory, is doomed because of the emergence of metaphysical underdetermination from the outset. If metaphysics floats free from physics, which is a premise of such project of integration between these two areas, then it is always possible to attribute more than one metaphysical profile to dress physical entities.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2020

Identical particles in quantum mechanics: favouring the Received View

The so-called Received View (RV) on quantum non-individuality states, basically, that quantum particles are not individuals. It has received an amount of criticism in the recent literature, most of it concerning the relation between the RV and the relation of identity. In this chapter we carefully characterise a family of concepts involved in clarifying the view, indicating how the very idea of failure of identity, commonly used to define the RV, may be understood. By doing so, we hope to dissipate some misunderstandings about the RV, which shall also be seen as evidence of its tenability.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2015

Presenting Nonreflexive Quantum Mechanics: Formalism and Metaphysics

Nonreflexive quantum mechanics is a formulation of quantum theory based on a non-classical logic termed \ita{nonreflexive logic} (a.k.a. `non-reflexive'). In these logics, the standard notion of identity, as encapsulated in classical logic and set theories, does not hold in full. The basic aim of this kind of approach to quantum mechanics is to take seriously the claim made by some authors according to whom quantum particles are \ita{non-individuals} in some sense, and also to take into account the fact that they may be absolutely indistinguishable (or indiscernible). The nonreflexive formulation of quantum theory assumes these features of the objects already at the level of the underlying logic, so that no use is required of symmetrization postulates or other mathematical devices that serve to pretend that the objects are indiscernible (when they are not: all objects that obey classical logic are \ita{individuals} in a sense). Here, we present the ideas of the development of nonreflexive quantum mechanics and discuss some philosophical (mainly metaphysical) motivations and consequences of it.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2015

A logical account of quantum superpositions

In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2014

Potentiality and Contradiction in Quantum Mechanics

Following J.-Y.Béziau in his pioneer work on non-standard interpretations of the traditional square of opposition, we have applied the abstract structure of the square to study the relation of opposition between states in superposition in orthodox quantum mechanics in \cite{are14}. Our conclusion was that such states are \ita{contraries} (\ita{i.e.} both can be false, but both cannot be true), contradicting previous analyzes that have led to different results, such as those claiming that those states represent \ita{contradictory} properties (\ita{i. e.} they must have opposite truth values). In this chapter we bring the issue once again into the center of the stage, but now discussing the metaphysical presuppositions which underlie each kind of analysis and which lead to each kind of result, discussing in particular the idea that superpositions represent potential contradictions. We shall argue that the analysis according to which states in superposition are contrary rather than contradictory is still more plausible.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2014

Contradiction, Quantum Mechanics, and the Square of Opposition

We discuss the idea that superpositions in quantum mechanics may involve contradictions or contradictory properties. A state of superposition such as the one comprised in the famous Schrödinger's cat, for instance, is sometimes said to attribute contradictory properties to the cat: being dead and alive at the same time. If that were the case, we would be facing a revolution in logic and science, since we would have one of our greatest scientific achievements showing that real contradictions exist. We analyze that claim by employing the traditional square of opposition. We suggest that it is difficult to make sense of the idea of contradiction in the case of quantum superpositions. From a metaphysical point of view the suggestion also faces obstacles, and we present some of them.

quant-ph↗