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Jonathan Y. Tan

Publications and source records attributed to Jonathan Y. Tan.

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Learning Fair Demand Models

Data-driven pricing is increasingly prevalent in sectors such as airlines, lending, insurance, and retail. By learning demand models from customer features and setting prices accordingly, these systems may generate discriminatory outcomes that raise fairness concerns. This leads to fundamental questions - how and where should systems incorporate fairness considerations in the pricing pipeline, and how does it ultimately affect societal outcomes? To answer these, we study a stylized model where a seller has a two-stage decision pipeline comprising linear demand model estimation followed by price optimization. The seller considers fairness notions in training loss, price, and demand, under both parity-wise and Rawlsian perspectives. We show that equalizing training loss across consumer groups leads to multiple solutions, which in turn can result in undesirable outcomes despite being a standard approach in fair machine learning. Focusing instead on fairness applied directly to prices or demand, we compare two strategies that enforce fairness in either the demand estimation stage or the price optimization stage. For parity-wise fairness, we characterize when each strategy yields higher social welfare under small fairness levels. We show that when market sizes and prices in the dataset are similar, imposing price fairness in the estimation stage is more beneficial to consumers, whereas imposing demand fairness in the optimization stage yields better consumer outcomes. For Rawlsian fairness, the two strategies coincide exactly. Lastly, we extend our model to alternate demand functions and conduct a case study using real-world vaccine pricing data.

cs.CY

Designing Agentic AI-Based Screening for Portfolio Investment

We introduce a new agentic artificial intelligence (AI) platform for portfolio management. Our architecture consists of three layers. First, two large language model (LLM) agents are assigned specialized tasks: one agent screens for firms with desirable fundamentals, while a sentiment analysis agent screens for firms with desirable news. Second, these agents deliberate to generate and agree upon buy and sell signals from a large portfolio, substantially narrowing the pool of candidate assets. Finally, we apply a high-dimensional precision matrix estimation procedure to determine optimal portfolio weights. We show, through information acquisition theory, that screening with agentic AI can bring utility gains in screening compared with humans. We introduce the concept of \emph{sensible screening} and establish that, under mild screening errors, the squared Sharpe ratio of the screened portfolio consistently estimates its target. Empirically, our method achieves superior Sharpe ratios relative to an unscreened baseline portfolio and to conventional screening approaches, evaluated on S\&P~500 data over both short and medium terms.

q-fin.PM