Variable annuities: A closer look at ratchet guarantees, hybrid contract designs, and taxation
This paper investigates optimal withdrawal strategies and behavior of policyholders in a variable annuity (VA) contract with a guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit (GMWB) rider incorporating taxation and a ratchet mechanism for enhancing the benefit base during the life of the contract. Mathematically, this is accomplished by solving a backward dynamic programming problem associated with optimizing the discounted risk-neutral expectation of cash flows from the contract from the policyholder's perspective. Furthermore, inspired by traded VA contracts in the market, we consider hybrid products providing policyholders access to a cash fund which functions as an intermediate repository of earnings from the VA and earns interest at a contractually specified cash rate. We contribute to the literature by revealing several significant interactions among taxation, the cash fund, and the benefit base update mechanism. The policyholder's valuation of the contract increases when a cash fund is included in the contract or when the benefit base updates via a ratchet mechanism. When the tax rate is sufficiently high, including both features is necessary to stimulate demand for the contract. Furthermore, the ratchet mechanism tends to discourage early surrender as it provides enhanced downside market risk protection. Similarly, the cash fund discourages active withdrawals, with policyholders preferring to transfer the guaranteed withdrawal amount to the cash fund to leverage the cash fund rate and the varying taxation rules around interest earnings.