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Jose Faustino

Publications and source records attributed to Jose Faustino.

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Fragility of Value under Imperfect Alignment

As more responsibility is placed upon AI systems, it becomes increasingly important to guarantee that these systems are aligned with humanity. A common fear in AI safety is that human value is fragile -- that is, optimizing too heavily for an imperfect proxy to human values will lead to a catastrophic outcome. In this paper, we present a model of the alignment problem where an agent undergoes idealized alignment training that guarantees its value function satisfies a proxy condition before optimizing the world. Our primary results identify conditions on the human value function and the accuracy of several proxy conditions under which an agent with an $\eta$-catastrophic value function, one that is guaranteed to take the expectation of human value below $\eta$ in the limit of optimizing power, would be deployed. Our results highlight the danger of overoptimization and motivate AI designs that limit optimization pressure, such as quantilizers, rather than relying solely on pre-deployment training.

cs.AI

Calculating Mutual Information between a Reward Maximizer and its Environment

An important question in the field of AI is the extent to which successful behaviour requires an internal representation of the world. In this work, we quantify the amount of information an optimal policy provides about the underlying environment. We consider a Controlled Markov Process (CMP) with $n$ states and $m$ actions, assuming a uniform prior over the space of possible transition dynamics. We prove that observing a deterministic policy that is optimal for any non-constant reward function then conveys exactly $n \log m$ bits of information about the environment. Specifically, we show that the mutual information between the environment and the optimal policy is $n \log m$ bits. This bound holds across a broad class of objectives, including finite-horizon, infinite-horizon discounted, and time-averaged reward maximization. These findings provide a precise information-theoretic lower bound on the ``implicit world model'' necessary for optimality.

cs.AI