arXiv subjects

Joshua B. Tenenbaum

Publications and source records attributed to Joshua B. Tenenbaum.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

CogGym: Towards Large-Scale Comparative Evaluation of Human and Machine Cognition

Understanding and modeling human intelligence are parallel goals shared by artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. As AI systems grow increasingly capable, in what ways do model responses resemble human responses, and where do they systematically diverge? The sheer breadth and diversity of the tasks humans can perform and think about pose a challenge for scalable and rigorous comparison between humans and models. We introduce CogGym, a scalable, unified framework grounded in cognitive science for systematically comparing model and human behavior on matched experimental trials. CogGym uses a semi-automated, human-in-the-loop pipeline to standardize diverse experimental paradigms into a task-agnostic Experiment Markup Language (EML), enabling reproducible and faithful comparison at scale. For initial release, we curate and standardize 258 cognitive experiments from 100 papers that focuses on human commonsense reasoning, and evaluate 50 large language models against human responses. We find a clear scaling trend where larger and more recent AI models better reproduce human judgments. Yet AI models' improvement on such common reasoning tasks is considerably slower than the gains observed on formal-reasoning benchmarks like math and coding, and model--human fit remains well below human splithalf reliability ($R^2 = 0.93$ on text, $0.95$ on image, and $0.92$ on video) with the best models achieving $R^2 = 0.59$ on text, $0.58$ on image, and $0.43$ on video experiments. We intend for CogGym to provide a living evaluation framework that continually incorporates new cognitive science experiments to characterize where model behavior resembles human behavior, where it systematically diverges, and how those patterns change as models and experiments evolve.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Theories of Mind as Domain-Specific Languages of Thought

What kind of thing is a ``theory of mind''? We propose to formalize theories of mind as domain-specialized programming languages, which can be used to reason about the mental states of other agents. Our proposal builds on the longstanding idea that thinking is akin to programming in an internal ``language of thought.'' But rather than positing a single general-purpose language for all of thought, we posit a collection of domain-specific languages of thought, whose respective syntaxes and semantices encode the theories of various domains. We make this idea concrete in the domain of intuitive psychology using a real-world programming language called memo, which is specialized for theory-of-mind reasoning via domain-specialized syntactic constructs like ``knows,'' ``wants,'' and ``thinks.'' In our view, using one's theory-of-mind to think about a social situation is analogous to using memo to write a program that models that situation. Through a series of worked examples, we show how formally representing a theory of mind as a memo-like programming language can lend insight into a variety of theoretical issues in theory-of-mind research: (1) how a single, fixed intuitive theory can be used to reason about social situations with unbounded structural variation; (2) how a modular, domain-specialized, and informationally-encapsulated system for social cognition might interface with external world knowledge, as well as other cognitive systems like intuitive physics; and (3) how different theories of mind, such as those of children and adults, differ, what exactly is gained as theories grow over the course of development, and how that growth might occur.

cs.PL↗

arXiv2026

Inverse planning of social interactions in relationships

We propose a formal account of how structured, shared knowledge about social relationships shapes action interpretation. The model represents relationships as constraints in a social environment, analogous to boundaries or obstacles in a physical environment and operating within the same generative model, but exerting distinct constraints on action. As an initial test of this framework, we draw on research across the social sciences to capture in the models how one dimension of relationships -- formality versus intimacy -- shapes how people interpret interpersonally vulnerable behavior. We test this account in stories of naturalistic everyday situations, extending structured models of action understanding to open-ended contexts. Across six preregistered experiments (N = 1,554), the model captures people's inferences about desires, physical environments, and social relationships. This work formalizes how relationships can constrain -- and be revealed through -- everyday action.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

On Benchmarking Human-Like Intelligence in Machines

Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have yielded powerful computational models that, by learning from vast amounts of human-generated data, are increasingly posited as approximate models of human cognition. However, we argue that many current evaluation paradigms for AI are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities in these models. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on nine existing AI benchmarks, suggesting major limitations in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for future AI evaluation efforts that will enable more rigorous and meaningful understanding of human-like cognitive capacities in AI models.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Human agency in initial human-AI proof formalization workflows

For centuries, human mathematicians have written proofs to substantiate their mathematical arguments; yet, the ability to automatically verify the validity of proofs has long been a challenge. Advances in AI systems' ability to generate code and engage in increasingly high-level mathematical reasoning promise to transform people's ability to formalize and thereby verify proofs. While many works focus on benchmarking the current frontier, we instead study how people use these tools and apply agency in doing so. We conduct a mixed-methods analysis into the initial impact of AI on people's formalization workflows: what people claim they want, what they see as the barriers to those visions, and how they actually use and adapt AI in practice. A qualitative survey reveals that people's preferences are diverse, but with a general desire for AI assistance in formalization that preserves high-level human control and agency over the proof discovery process. To assess how people actually engage with AI for formalization, we conduct a controlled user study in which participants formalize informal math problems and their proofs, with and without AI, across a range of mathematical problems at varying levels of difficulty and domains. Despite limitations of the tools at the time for autoformalization, participants tended to attain higher formalization accuracy when allowed access to AI tools than when formalizing on their own, with most participants flexibly choosing to use multiple different AI tools. Taken together, our work sheds light on the early stages of AI integration into formalization workflows, involving an intimate interplay of human agency and AI engagement.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Using Theory of Mind to Arbitrate between Social and Non-social Learning

Social learning is a powerful mechanism through which agents learn about the world from others. However, humans sometimes choose direct experience over social learning, which can carry time and cognitive resource costs. How do people balance social and non-social learning? We propose a Rational Mentalizing model of the decision to engage in social learning. This model estimates the utility of social learning by reasoning about another agent's goal and the informativeness of their future actions. It then weighs the utility of social learning against the utility of non-social learning. Using a novel game where players choose between observing other agents or exploring the environment, we show that the Rational Mentalizing model can quantitatively capture human trade-offs between these strategies. These findings suggest that selective social learning is guided by 'Theory of Mind' in the service of utility maximization.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Pragmatic Reasoning in Design

People can often understand and use novel artifacts after only a few interactions, suggesting that design choices communicate underlying affordances and causal structure. We propose a formal account of this process by framing cooperative, user-centered design as a cooperative game in which the user is the principal and the designer is an assistant. Inspired by prior work on pragmatic communication (e.g. RSA), our model treats a designer's design decisions as communicative signals and predicts user judgments via recursive mentalizing: designers make design decisions to trade off informativeness about the artifact with efficiency, and users infer the true model of the artifact by inverting this cooperative designer model. We evaluate the model in a design game where designers place visually identical keys on trays to help a user infer which keys unlock which doors in grid-world layouts. We find that pragmatic designer and user models better match human judgments than non-mentalizing literal baselines.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2026

Generation and Evaluation in the Human Invention Process through the Lens of Game Design

The human ability to learn rules and solve problems has been a central concern of cognitive science research since the field's earliest days. But we do not just follow rules and solve problems given to us by others: we modify those rules, create new problems, and set new goals and tasks for ourselves and others. Arguably, even more than rule following and problem solving, human intelligence is about creatively breaking and stretching the rules, changing the game, and inventing new problems worth thinking about. Creating a good rule or a good problem depends not just on the ideas one can think up but on how one evaluates such proposals. Here, we study invention through the lens of game design. We focus particularly on the early stages of novice, "everyday" game creation, where the stakes are low. We draw on a dataset of over 450 human created games, created by participants who saw an initial seed set of two-player grid-based strategy games. We consider two different cognitive mechanisms that may be at work during the early processes of intuitive game invention: an associative proposal based on previous games one has seen and compute-bounded model-based evaluation that an everyday game creator may use to refine their initial draft proposals. In our preliminary work, we conduct a model-based analysis of how people invented new games based on prior experience and find that generated games are best described by a model which incorporates model-based estimates of game quality at a population level. Our work points to how human invention is based not only on what people propose, but how they evaluate and offers a computational toolkit to scale empirical studies of model-based simulation in open-ended human innovation.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2026

People use fast and flat simulation to reason about new games

Games have long been a microcosm for studying planning and reasoning in both natural and artificial intelligence (AI), often focusing on expert-level or even super-human play. But real life also pushes human intelligence along a different frontier, requiring people to flexibly navigate decision-making problems that they have never thought about before. Here, we use novice gameplay to study how people reason about new problem settings. Through a series of large-scale behavioral studies with over 1000 participants and 121 two-player strategic board games (almost all novel to our participants), we show that people are systematic and adaptively rational in how they play a game for the first time, or evaluate a game (e.g., how fair or how fun it is likely to be) before they have played it even once. We explain these capacities via a computational cognitive model that we call the 'Intuitive Gamer', a model based on mechanisms of fast and flat (depth-limited) goal-directed probabilistic simulation. Our work offers new insights into how people rapidly evaluate, act, and make suggestions when encountering novel problems, and could inform the design of more flexible and human-like AI systems that can determine not just how to solve new tasks, but whether a task is worth thinking about at all.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

GenMatter: Perceiving Physical Objects with Generative Matter Models

Human visual perception offers valuable insights for understanding computational principles of motion-based scene interpretation. Humans robustly detect and segment moving entities that constitute independently moveable chunks of matter, whether observing sparse moving dots, textured surfaces, or naturalistic scenes. In contrast, existing computer vision systems lack a unified approach that works across these diverse settings. Inspired by principles of human perception, we propose a generative model that hierarchically groups low-level motion cues and high-level appearance features into particles (small Gaussians representing local matter), and groups particles into clusters capturing coherently and independently moveable physical entities. We develop a hardware-accelerated inference algorithm based on parallelized block Gibbs sampling to recover stable particle motion and groupings. Our model operates on different kinds of inputs (random dots, stylized textures, or naturalistic RGB video), enabling it to work across settings where biological vision succeeds but existing computer vision approaches do not. We validate this unified framework across three domains: on 2D random dot kinematograms, our approach captures human object perception including graded uncertainty across ambiguous conditions; on a Gestalt-inspired dataset of camouflaged rotating objects, our approach recovers correct 3D structure from motion and thereby accurate 2D object segmentation; and on naturalistic RGB videos, our model tracks the moving 3D matter that makes up deforming objects, enabling robust object-level scene understanding. This work thus establishes a general framework for motion-based perception grounded in principles of human vision.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2026

A Matter of Interest: Understanding Interestingness of Math Problems in Humans and Language Models

The evolution of mathematics is shaped importantly by interestingness: researchers choose which problems to pursue, and students choose which problems to engage with, based on expectations of interest and challenge. As AI systems, particularly large language models (LLMs) that operate flexibly over natural language and formal mathematics, are increasingly used in mathematics research and education, it becomes crucial to characterize how closely their judgments align with people from different mathematical backgrounds. We study whether LLMs align with human interestingness judgments by comparing LLM ratings with those of two populations, crowdsourced participants with college math experience and International Math Olympiad competitors. Although many LLMs broadly agree with human notions of interestingness, they largely fail to match the distribution of human judgments. They also weakly align with why humans find problems interesting, with low correlation to human-selected rationales. Finally, we evaluate LLMs' ability to generate interesting problems and find that, after filtering for validity, LLMs are able to generate engaging problems. We conclude with takeaways, including the need for multi-LLM human-AI collaborative systems, that highlight both the promise and current limits of LLMs as partners in mathematical reasoning.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Evaluating Language Models' Evaluations of Games

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over 100 novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Medical Model Synthesis Architectures: A Case Study

Medicine is rife with high-stakes uncertainty. Doctors routinely make clinical judgments and decisions that juggle many fundamental unknowns, like predictions about what might be causing a patients' symptoms or decisions about what treatment to try next. Despite increasing interest in developing AI systems that aid or even replace doctors in clinical settings, current systems struggle with calibrated reasoning under uncertainty, and are often deeply opaque about their reasoning. We propose a framework for AI systems that can make practically useful but formally transparent clinical predictions under uncertainty. Given a clinical situation, our framework (MedMSA) uses language models to retrieve relevant prior knowledge, but constructs a formal probabilistic model to support calibrated and verifiable inferences under uncertainty. We show how an initial proof-of-concept of this framework can be used for differential diagnosis, producing an uncertainty-weighted list of potential diagnoses that could explain a patients' symptoms, and discuss future applications and directions for applying this framework more generally for safe clinical collaborations.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Reason to Play: Behavioral and Brain Alignment Between Frontier LRMs and Human Game Learners

Humans rapidly learn abstract knowledge when encountering novel environments and flexibly deploy this knowledge to guide efficient and intelligent action. Can modern AI systems learn and plan in a similar way? We study this question using a dataset of complex human gameplay with concurrent fMRI recordings, in which participants learn novel video games that require rule discovery, hypothesis revision, and multi-step planning. We jointly evaluate models by their ability to play the games, match human learning behavior, and predict brain activity during the same task, comparing a suite of frontier Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) against model-free and model-based deep reinforcement learning agents and a Bayesian theory-based agent. We find that frontier LRMs most closely match human behavioral patterns during game discovery and predict brain activity an order of magnitude better than both reinforcement learning alternatives across cortical and subcortical regions, with effects robust to permutation controls. Through targeted manipulations, we further show that brain alignment reflects the model's in-context representation of the game state rather than its downstream planning or reasoning. Our results establish LRMs as compelling computational accounts of human learning and decision making in complex, naturalistic environments. Project page with interactive replays: https://botcs.github.io/reason-to-play/

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Benchmarking World-Model Learning with Environment-Level Queries

World models are central to building AI agents capable of flexible reasoning and planning. Yet current evaluations (i) test only properties measurable from observed interactions, such as next-frame prediction or task return, and (ii) do not test whether a learned model supports diverse queries about the environment. In contrast, humans build $\textit{general-purpose}$ models that can answer many different questions about an environment$\unicode{x2014}$including questions that require understanding global structure and counterfactual consequences. We propose $\textit{WorldTest}$: a protocol for evaluating whether agents learn models that support multiple $\textit{environment-level queries}\unicode{x2014}$questions whose answers depend on properties of the full environment, not just observed trajectories. Individually, these queries can target properties (e.g., reachability or the effects of interventions) that no single rollout distribution determines. Collectively, they assess model generality across query types. We instantiate WorldTest as $\textit{AutumnBench}$, a benchmark of 43 interactive grid-world environments and 129 tasks across three query families for both humans and learning agents. Experiments with 517 human participants and five frontier models show that humans substantially outperform these models, a gap we attribute to differences in exploration and belief updating. AutumnBench provides a framework for evaluating world-model learning in grid-world environments with environment-level queries, and WorldTest provides a template for extending such evaluations to richer domains.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Grounding Social Perception in Intuitive Physics

People infer rich social information from others' actions. These inferences are often constrained by the physical world: what agents can do, what obstacles permit, and how the physical actions of agents causally change an environment and other agents' mental states and behavior. We propose that such rich social perception is more than visual pattern matching, but rather a reasoning process grounded in an integration of intuitive psychology with intuitive physics. To test this hypothesis, we introduced PHASE (PHysically grounded Abstract Social Events), a large dataset of procedurally generated animations, depicting physically simulated two-agent interactions on a 2D surface. Each animation follows the style of the Heider and Simmel movie, with systematic variation in environment geometry, object dynamics, agent capacities, goals, and relationships (friendly/adversarial/neutral). We then present a computational model, SIMPLE, a physics-grounded Bayesian inverse planning model that integrates planning, probabilistic planning, and physics simulation to infer agents' goals and relations from their trajectories. Our experimental results showed that SIMPLE achieved high accuracy and agreement with human judgments across diverse scenarios, while feedforward baseline models -- including strong vision-language models -- and physics-agnostic inverse planning failed to achieve human-level performance and did not align with human judgments. These results suggest that our model provides a computational account for how people understand physically grounded social scenes by inverting a generative model of physics and agents.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

ExoPredicator: Learning Abstract Models of Dynamic Worlds for Robot Planning

Long-horizon embodied planning is challenging because the world does not only change through an agent's actions: exogenous processes (e.g., water heating, dominoes cascading) unfold concurrently with the agent's actions. We propose a framework for abstract world models that jointly learns (i) symbolic state representations and (ii) causal processes for both endogenous actions and exogenous mechanisms. Each causal process models the time course of a stochastic cause-effect relation. We learn these world models from limited data via variational Bayesian inference combined with LLM proposals. Across five simulated tabletop robotics environments, the learned models enable fast planning that generalizes to held-out tasks with more objects and more complex goals, outperforming a range of baselines.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Resource Rational Contractualism Should Guide AI Alignment

AI systems will soon have to navigate human environments and make decisions that affect people and other AI agents whose goals and values diverge. Contractualist alignment proposes grounding those decisions in agreements that diverse stakeholders would endorse under the right conditions, yet securing such agreement at scale remains costly and slow -- even for advanced AI. We therefore propose Resource-Rational Contractualism (RRC): a framework where AI systems approximate the agreements rational parties would form by drawing on a toolbox of normatively-grounded, cognitively-inspired heuristics that trade effort for accuracy. An RRC-aligned agent would not only operate efficiently, but also be equipped to dynamically adapt to and interpret the ever-changing human social world.

cs.AI↗