arXiv subjects

Joshua B. Tenenbaum

Publications and source records attributed to Joshua B. Tenenbaum.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2025

Synthesizing world models for bilevel planning

Modern reinforcement learning (RL) systems have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex environments, such as video games. However, they still fall short of achieving human-like sample efficiency and adaptability when learning new domains. Theory-based reinforcement learning (TBRL) is an algorithmic framework specifically designed to address this gap. Modeled on cognitive theories, TBRL leverages structured, causal world models - "theories" - as forward simulators for use in planning, generalization and exploration. Although current TBRL systems provide compelling explanations of how humans learn to play video games, they face several technical limitations: their theory languages are restrictive, and their planning algorithms are not scalable. To address these challenges, we introduce TheoryCoder, an instantiation of TBRL that exploits hierarchical representations of theories and efficient program synthesis methods for more powerful learning and planning. TheoryCoder equips agents with general-purpose abstractions (e.g., "move to"), which are then grounded in a particular environment by learning a low-level transition model (a Python program synthesized from observations by a large language model). A bilevel planning algorithm can exploit this hierarchical structure to solve large domains. We demonstrate that this approach can be successfully applied to diverse and challenging grid-world games, where approaches based on directly synthesizing a policy perform poorly. Ablation studies demonstrate the benefits of using hierarchical abstractions.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Adaptive Social Learning using Theory of Mind

Social learning is a powerful mechanism through which agents learn about the world from others. However, humans don't always choose to observe others, since social learning can carry time and cognitive resource costs. How do people balance social and non-social learning? In this paper, we propose a rational mentalizing model of the decision to engage in social learning. This model estimates the utility of social learning by reasoning about the other agent's goal and the informativity of their future actions. It then weighs the utility of social learning against the utility of self-exploration (non-social learning). Using a multi-player treasure hunt game, we show that our model can quantitatively capture human trade-offs between social and non-social learning. Furthermore, our results indicate that these two components allow agents to flexibly apply social learning to achieve their goals more efficiently.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

Language-Informed Synthesis of Rational Agent Models for Grounded Theory-of-Mind Reasoning On-The-Fly

Drawing real world social inferences usually requires taking into account information from multiple modalities. Language is a particularly powerful source of information in social settings, especially in novel situations where language can provide both abstract information about the environment dynamics and concrete specifics about an agent that cannot be easily visually observed. In this paper, we propose Language-Informed Rational Agent Synthesis (LIRAS), a framework for drawing context-specific social inferences that integrate linguistic and visual inputs. LIRAS frames multimodal social reasoning as a process of constructing structured but situation-specific agent and environment representations - leveraging multimodal language models to parse language and visual inputs into unified symbolic representations, over which a Bayesian inverse planning engine can be run to produce granular probabilistic judgments. On a range of existing and new social reasoning tasks derived from cognitive science experiments, we find that our model (instantiated with a comparatively lightweight VLM) outperforms ablations and state-of-the-art models in capturing human judgments across all domains.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Minding the Politeness Gap in Cross-cultural Communication

Misunderstandings in cross-cultural communication often arise from subtle differences in interpretation, but it is unclear whether these differences arise from the literal meanings assigned to words or from more general pragmatic factors such as norms around politeness and brevity. In this paper, we report three experiments examining how speakers of British and American English interpret intensifiers like "quite" and "very." To better understand these cross-cultural differences, we developed a computational cognitive model where listeners recursively reason about speakers who balance informativity, politeness, and utterance cost. Our model comparisons suggested that cross-cultural differences in intensifier interpretation stem from a combination of (1) different literal meanings, (2) different weights on utterance cost. These findings challenge accounts based purely on semantic variation or politeness norms, demonstrating that cross-cultural differences in interpretation emerge from an intricate interplay between the two.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

What's in the Box? Reasoning about Unseen Objects from Multimodal Cues

People regularly make inferences about objects in the world that they cannot see by flexibly integrating information from multiple sources: auditory and visual cues, language, and our prior beliefs and knowledge about the scene. How are we able to so flexibly integrate many sources of information to make sense of the world around us, even if we have no direct knowledge? In this work, we propose a neurosymbolic model that uses neural networks to parse open-ended multimodal inputs and then applies a Bayesian model to integrate different sources of information to evaluate different hypotheses. We evaluate our model with a novel object guessing game called ``What's in the Box?'' where humans and models watch a video clip of an experimenter shaking boxes and then try to guess the objects inside the boxes. Through a human experiment, we show that our model correlates strongly with human judgments, whereas unimodal ablated models and large multimodal neural model baselines show poor correlation.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Empathy in Explanation

Why do we give the explanations we do? Recent work has suggested that we should think of explanation as a kind of cooperative social interaction, between a why-question-asker and an explainer. Here, we apply this perspective to consider the role that emotion plays in this social interaction. We develop a computational framework for modeling explainers who consider the emotional impact an explanation might have on a listener. We test our framework by using it to model human intuitions about how a doctor might explain to a patient why they have a disease, taking into account the patient's propensity for regret. Our model predicts human intuitions well, better than emotion-agnostic ablations, suggesting that people do indeed reason about emotion when giving explanations.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2025

Testing the Limits of Fine-Tuning for Improving Visual Cognition in Vision Language Models

Pre-trained vision language models still fall short of human visual cognition. In an effort to improve visual cognition and align models with human behavior, we introduce visual stimuli and human judgments on visual cognition tasks, allowing us to systematically evaluate performance across cognitive domains under a consistent environment. We fine-tune models on ground truth data for intuitive physics and causal reasoning and find that this improves model performance in the respective fine-tuning domain. Furthermore, it can improve model alignment with human behavior. However, we find that task-specific fine-tuning does not contribute to robust human-like generalization to data with other visual characteristics or to tasks in other cognitive domains.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Scaling up the think-aloud method

The think-aloud method, where participants voice their thoughts as they solve a task, is a valuable source of rich data about human reasoning processes. Yet, it has declined in popularity in contemporary cognitive science, largely because labor-intensive transcription and annotation preclude large sample sizes. Here, we develop methods to automate the transcription and annotation of verbal reports of reasoning using natural language processing tools, allowing for large-scale analysis of think-aloud data. In our study, 640 participants thought aloud while playing the Game of 24, a mathematical reasoning task. We automatically transcribed the recordings and coded the transcripts as search graphs, finding moderate inter-rater reliability with humans. We analyze these graphs and characterize consistency and variation in human reasoning traces. Our work demonstrates the value of think-aloud data at scale and serves as a proof of concept for the automated analysis of verbal reports.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Can Large Language Models Understand Symbolic Graphics Programs?

Against the backdrop of enthusiasm for large language models (LLMs), there is a growing need to scientifically assess their capabilities and shortcomings. This is nontrivial in part because it is difficult to find tasks which the models have not encountered during training. Utilizing symbolic graphics programs, we propose a domain well-suited to test multiple spatial-semantic reasoning skills of LLMs. Popular in computer graphics, these programs procedurally generate visual data. While LLMs exhibit impressive skills in general program synthesis and analysis, symbolic graphics programs offer a new layer of evaluation: they allow us to test an LLM's ability to answer semantic questions about the images or 3D geometries without a vision encoder. To semantically understand the symbolic programs, LLMs would need to possess the ability to "imagine" and reason how the corresponding graphics content would look with only the symbolic description of the local curvatures and strokes. We use this task to evaluate LLMs by creating a large benchmark for the semantic visual understanding of symbolic graphics programs, built procedurally with minimal human effort. Particular emphasis is placed on transformations of images that leave the image level semantics invariant while introducing significant changes to the underlying program. We evaluate commercial and open-source LLMs on our benchmark to assess their ability to reason about visual output of programs, finding that LLMs considered stronger at reasoning generally perform better. Lastly, we introduce a novel method to improve this ability -- Symbolic Instruction Tuning (SIT), in which the LLM is finetuned with pre-collected instruction data on symbolic graphics programs. Interestingly, we find that SIT not only improves LLM's understanding on symbolic programs, but it also improves general reasoning ability on various other benchmarks.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Compositional Physical Reasoning of Objects and Events from Videos

Understanding and reasoning about objects' physical properties in the natural world is a fundamental challenge in artificial intelligence. While some properties like colors and shapes can be directly observed, others, such as mass and electric charge, are hidden from the objects' visual appearance. This paper addresses the unique challenge of inferring these hidden physical properties from objects' motion and interactions and predicting corresponding dynamics based on the inferred physical properties. We first introduce the Compositional Physical Reasoning (ComPhy) dataset. For a given set of objects, ComPhy includes limited videos of them moving and interacting under different initial conditions. The model is evaluated based on its capability to unravel the compositional hidden properties, such as mass and charge, and use this knowledge to answer a set of questions. Besides the synthetic videos from simulators, we also collect a real-world dataset to show further test physical reasoning abilities of different models. We evaluate state-of-the-art video reasoning models on ComPhy and reveal their limited ability to capture these hidden properties, which leads to inferior performance. We also propose a novel neuro-symbolic framework, Physical Concept Reasoner (PCR), that learns and reasons about both visible and hidden physical properties from question answering. After training, PCR demonstrates remarkable capabilities. It can detect and associate objects across frames, ground visible and hidden physical properties, make future and counterfactual predictions, and utilize these extracted representations to answer challenging questions.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2025

Belief Attribution as Mental Explanation: The Role of Accuracy, Informativity, and Causality

A key feature of human theory-of-mind is the ability to attribute beliefs to other agents as mentalistic explanations for their behavior. But given the wide variety of beliefs that agents may hold about the world and the rich language we can use to express them, which specific beliefs are people inclined to attribute to others? In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that people prefer to attribute beliefs that are good explanations for the behavior they observe. We develop a computational model that quantifies the explanatory strength of a (natural language) statement about an agent's beliefs via three factors: accuracy, informativity, and causal relevance to actions, each of which can be computed from a probabilistic generative model of belief-driven behavior. Using this model, we study the role of each factor in how people selectively attribute beliefs to other agents. We investigate this via an experiment where participants watch an agent collect keys hidden in boxes in order to reach a goal, then rank a set of statements describing the agent's beliefs about the boxes' contents. We find that accuracy and informativity perform reasonably well at predicting these rankings when combined, but that causal relevance is the single factor that best explains participants' responses.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Understanding Epistemic Language with a Language-augmented Bayesian Theory of Mind

How do people understand and evaluate claims about others' beliefs, even though these beliefs cannot be directly observed? In this paper, we introduce a cognitive model of epistemic language interpretation, grounded in Bayesian inferences about other agents' goals, beliefs, and intentions: a language-augmented Bayesian theory-of-mind (LaBToM). By translating natural language into an epistemic ``language-of-thought'' with grammar-constrained LLM decoding, then evaluating these translations against the inferences produced by inverting a generative model of rational action and perception, LaBToM captures graded plausibility judgments of epistemic claims. We validate our model in an experiment where participants watch an agent navigate a maze to find keys hidden in boxes needed to reach their goal, then rate sentences about the agent's beliefs. In contrast with multimodal LLMs (GPT-4o, Gemini Pro) and ablated models, our model correlates highly with human judgments for a wide range of expressions, including modal language, uncertainty expressions, knowledge claims, likelihood comparisons, and attributions of false belief.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Multiagent Finetuning: Self Improvement with Diverse Reasoning Chains

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance in recent years but are fundamentally limited by the underlying training data. To improve models beyond the training data, recent works have explored how LLMs can be used to generate synthetic data for autonomous self-improvement. However, successive steps of self-improvement can reach a point of diminishing returns. In this work, we propose a complementary approach towards self-improvement where finetuning is applied to a multiagent society of language models. A group of language models, all starting from the same base model, are independently specialized by updating each one using data generated through multiagent interactions among the models. By training each model on independent sets of data, we illustrate how this approach enables specialization across models and diversification over the set of models. As a result, our overall system is able to preserve diverse reasoning chains and autonomously improve over many more rounds of fine-tuning than single-agent self-improvement methods. We quantitatively illustrate the efficacy of the approach across a wide suite of reasoning tasks.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

VisualPredicator: Learning Abstract World Models with Neuro-Symbolic Predicates for Robot Planning

Broadly intelligent agents should form task-specific abstractions that selectively expose the essential elements of a task, while abstracting away the complexity of the raw sensorimotor space. In this work, we present Neuro-Symbolic Predicates, a first-order abstraction language that combines the strengths of symbolic and neural knowledge representations. We outline an online algorithm for inventing such predicates and learning abstract world models. We compare our approach to hierarchical reinforcement learning, vision-language model planning, and symbolic predicate invention approaches, on both in- and out-of-distribution tasks across five simulated robotic domains. Results show that our approach offers better sample complexity, stronger out-of-distribution generalization, and improved interpretability.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

What Makes a Maze Look Like a Maze?

A unique aspect of human visual understanding is the ability to flexibly interpret abstract concepts: acquiring lifted rules explaining what they symbolize, grounding them across familiar and unfamiliar contexts, and making predictions or reasoning about them. While off-the-shelf vision-language models excel at making literal interpretations of images (e.g., recognizing object categories such as tree branches), they still struggle to make sense of such visual abstractions (e.g., how an arrangement of tree branches may form the walls of a maze). To address this challenge, we introduce Deep Schema Grounding (DSG), a framework that leverages explicit structured representations of visual abstractions for grounding and reasoning. At the core of DSG are schemas--dependency graph descriptions of abstract concepts that decompose them into more primitive-level symbols. DSG uses large language models to extract schemas, then hierarchically grounds concrete to abstract components of the schema onto images with vision-language models. The grounded schema is used to augment visual abstraction understanding. We systematically evaluate DSG and different methods in reasoning on our new Visual Abstractions Dataset, which consists of diverse, real-world images of abstract concepts and corresponding question-answer pairs labeled by humans. We show that DSG significantly improves the abstract visual reasoning performance of vision-language models, and is a step toward human-aligned understanding of visual abstractions.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2025

Vision CNNs trained to estimate spatial latents learned similar ventral-stream-aligned representations

Studies of the functional role of the primate ventral visual stream have traditionally focused on object categorization, often ignoring -- despite much prior evidence -- its role in estimating "spatial" latents such as object position and pose. Most leading ventral stream models are derived by optimizing networks for object categorization, which seems to imply that the ventral stream is also derived under such an objective. Here, we explore an alternative hypothesis: Might the ventral stream be optimized for estimating spatial latents? And a closely related question: How different -- if at all -- are representations learned from spatial latent estimation compared to categorization? To ask these questions, we leveraged synthetic image datasets generated by a 3D graphic engine and trained convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to estimate different combinations of spatial and category latents. We found that models trained to estimate just a few spatial latents achieve neural alignment scores comparable to those trained on hundreds of categories, and the spatial latent performance of models strongly correlates with their neural alignment. Spatial latent and category-trained models have very similar -- but not identical -- internal representations, especially in their early and middle layers. We provide evidence that this convergence is partly driven by non-target latent variability in the training data, which facilitates the implicit learning of representations of those non-target latents. Taken together, these results suggest that many training objectives, such as spatial latents, can lead to similar models aligned neurally with the ventral stream. Thus, one should not assume that the ventral stream is optimized for object categorization only. As a field, we need to continue to sharpen our measures of comparing models to brains to better understand the functional roles of the ventral stream.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2025

People use fast, goal-directed simulation to reason about novel games

People can evaluate features of problems and their potential solutions well before we can effectively solve them. When considering a game we have never played, for instance, we might infer whether it is likely to be challenging, fair, or fun simply from hearing the game rules, prior to deciding whether to invest time in learning the game or trying to play it well. Many studies of game play have focused on optimality and expertise, characterizing how people and computational models play based on moderate to extensive search and after playing a game dozens (if not thousands or millions) of times. Here, we study how people reason about a range of simple but novel Connect-N style board games. We ask people to judge how fair and how fun the games are from very little experience: just thinking about the game for a minute or so, before they have ever actually played with anyone else, and we propose a resource-limited model that captures their judgments using only a small number of partial game simulations and almost no look-ahead search.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Representational Alignment Supports Effective Machine Teaching

A good teacher should not only be knowledgeable, but should also be able to communicate in a way that the student understands -- to share the student's representation of the world. In this work, we introduce a new controlled experimental setting, GRADE, to study pedagogy and representational alignment. We use GRADE through a series of machine-machine and machine-human teaching experiments to characterize a utility curve defining a relationship between representational alignment, teacher expertise, and student learning outcomes. We find that improved representational alignment with a student improves student learning outcomes (i.e., task accuracy), but that this effect is moderated by the size and representational diversity of the class being taught. We use these insights to design a preliminary classroom matching procedure, GRADE-Match, that optimizes the assignment of students to teachers. When designing machine teachers, our results suggest that it is important to focus not only on accuracy, but also on representational alignment with human learners.

cs.LG↗