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Joshua Jung

Publications and source records attributed to Joshua Jung.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Ensemble Deep Learning Approaches for AI-Altered Video Detection

The increasing accessibility of artificial intelligence has led to a rapid rise in AI-generated videos, making it more difficult to distinguish between real and manipulated content. Many existing detection methods rely on a single model and often struggle to generalize across different types of deepfakes. In this work, we developed a multimodal deepfake detection system that combines both audio and visual analysis using an ensemble of models. The system includes AASIST for audio-based detection, and EfficientNet, XceptionNet, and MesoNet for analyzing visual features in video frames. The pipeline takes a video as input, separates the audio, and extracts face frames using MTCNN. Each model produces a score indicating the likelihood of the input being fake. These scores are then combined using ensemble strategies, including mean averaging and stacking. Mean fusion provides a simple and stable baseline, while stacking uses a trained meta-model to learn how to combine predictions more effectively. Results show that while individual models perform well on the datasets they were trained on, their performance drops when tested on more diverse datasets. The ensemble approach helps improve overall robustness by combining predictions from multiple models, leading to more consistent performance across different types of deepfakes. This suggests that using both audio and visual information together is a more reliable approach for deepfake detection. Our results highlight generalization to unseen manipulations as the central open challenge, with average accuracy around 70%.

cs.CV

Trust-ya: design of a multiplayer game for the study of small group processes

This paper presents the design of a cooperative multi-player betting game, Trust-ya, as a model of some elements of status processes in human groups. The game is designed to elicit status-driven leader-follower behaviours as a means to observe and influence social hierarchy. It involves a Bach/Stravinsky game of deference in a group, in which people on each turn can either invest with another player or hope someone invests with them. Players who receive investment capital are able to gamble for payoffs from a central pool which then can be shared back with those who invested (but a portion of it may be kept, including all of it). The bigger gambles (people with more investors) get bigger payoffs. Thus, there is a natural tendency for players to coalesce as investors around a 'leader' who gambles, but who also shares sufficiently from their winnings to keep the investors 'hanging on'. The 'leader' will want to keep as much as possible for themselves, however. The game is played anonymously, but a set of 'status symbols' can be purchased which have no value in the game itself, but can serve as a 'cheap talk' communication device with other players. This paper introduces the game, relates it to status theory in social psychology, and shows some simple simulated and human experiments that demonstrate how the game can be used to study status processes and dynamics in human groups.

cs.SI