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Joshua S. Gans

Publications and source records attributed to Joshua S. Gans.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

Fourfold Is Enough: Connected LEGO Models from One Brick Type

Can a LEGO model built from many kinds of rectangular bricks be rebuilt using only the familiar $2\times4$ brick? Enlarging every dimension by four makes the pieces fit, but they must also connect. We give a four-layer arrangement that joins every finite face-connected union of lattice cubes, using eight upright bricks per source cube, and show that no smaller universal enlargement works. A second question has an unexpected answer: if connectivity is set aside, the minimum integer scale is always $1$, $2$, or $4$, never $3$. The missing value follows from a checkerboard argument applied separately inside each enlarged cell.

math.GM

Training AI For When Humans Will Use It

AI predicts; humans use its predictions to make decisions. These predictions are combined with human verification and analysis, queries to other statistical models, and so on. The economic value of an AI, therefore, depends on how it interacts with the surrounding decision environment. We describe the value of AI as part of this ``composite experiment'' where AI makes a coarse prediction of the state of the world, show what this means for optimal model training via a geometric argument, explain why optimal training can be discontinuous in economic variables, and study how heterogeneous users or monopoly model trainers affect these results. In particular, maximizing the unconditional accuracy of AI predictions is generally suboptimal.

econ.TH

When Agents Talk: Honeytokens under Shared Memory

During a 2026 cyber-capability evaluation, short-lived AI agents turned a shared package repository into persistent memory, passing exploit findings to later agents and rebuilding the channel after it was removed. The broader evaluation culminated in an intrusion into Hugging Face. This episode raises a question for defensive deception: can a honeytoken be harmless to trusted agents without becoming recognisable to an attacker who shares their information and can implement the trusted policy? The answer is no. A trusted rule that selects genuine objects while avoiding decoys can be copied by the attacker, while a total-variation bound limits legitimate compatibility when decoys resemble genuine objects. Shared memory creates a second leakage channel by pooling weak fingerprints. For a fixed candidate, repeated non-triggering probes drive the minimum Bayes classification error to zero when type-dependent response laws differ and are known or learnable. If probing triggers containment, learning also requires the coalition to remain active long enough. Transfer across objects requires a stable deployment rule and information that orients the classes. A separate detection bound distinguishes reliable token activation from reliable attack coverage. The architectural response is to keep token identity in a private reference monitor and route legitimate agents through a provenance-enforcing broker. This produces high-confidence detection only for a specified policy violation. Honeytokens remain useful sensors, but a separate security boundary is still required.

cs.CR

Optimal Use of Preferences in Artificial Intelligence Algorithms

Machine learning systems embed preferences either in training losses or through post-processing of calibrated predictions. Applying information design methods from Strack and Yang (2024), this paper provides decision problem agnostic conditions under which separation training preference free and applying preferences ex post is optimal. Unlike prior work that requires specifying downstream objectives, the welfare results here apply uniformly across decision problems. The key primitive is a diminishing-value-of-information condition: relative to a fixed (normalised) preference-free loss, preference embedding makes informativeness less valuable at the margin, inducing a mean-preserving contraction of learned posteriors. Because the value of information is convex in beliefs, preference-free training weakly dominates for any expected utility decision problem. This provides theoretical foundations for modular AI pipelines that learn calibrated probabilities and implement asymmetric costs through downstream decision rules. However, separation requires users to implement optimal decision rules. When cognitive constraints bind, as documented in human AI decision-making, preference embedding can dominate by automating threshold computation. These results provide design guidance: preserve optionality through post-processing when objectives may shift; embed preferences when decision-stage frictions dominate.

econ.TH

"Zero Cost'' Majority Attacks on Permissionless Blockchains

The core premise of permissionless blockchains is their reliable and secure operation without the need to trust any individual agent. At the heart of blockchain consensus mechanisms is an explicit cost (whether work or stake) for participation in the network and the opportunity to add blocks to the blockchain. A key rationale for that cost is to make attacks on the network, which could be theoretically carried out if a majority of nodes were controlled by a single entity, too expensive to be worthwhile. We demonstrate that a majority attacker can successfully attack with a {\em negative cost}, which shows that the protocol mechanisms are insufficient to create a secure network, and emphasizes the importance of socially driven mechanisms external to the protocol. At the same time, negative cost enables a new type of majority attack that is more likely to elude external scrutiny.

cs.CR

Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus

Blockchain consensus is a state whereby each node in a network agrees on the current state of the blockchain. Existing protocols achieve consensus via a contest or voting procedure to select one node as a dictator to propose new blocks. However, this procedure can still lead to potential attacks that make consensus harder to achieve or lead to coordination issues if multiple, competing chains (i.e., forks) are created with the potential that an untruthful fork might be selected. We explore the potential for mechanisms to be used to achieve consensus that are triggered when there is a dispute impeding consensus. Using the feature that nodes stake tokens in proof of stake (POS) protocols, we construct revelation mechanisms in which the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium involves validating nodes propose truthful blocks using only the information that exists amongst all nodes. We construct operationally and computationally simple mechanisms under both Byzantine Fault Tolerance and a Longest Chain Rule, and discuss their robustness to attacks. Our perspective is that the use of simple mechanisms is an unexplored area of blockchain consensus and has the potential to mitigate known trade-offs and enhance scalability.

econ.TH

A Solomonic Solution to Ownership Disputes: An Application to Blockchain Front-Running

Blockchain front-running involves multiple agents, other than the legitimate agent, claiming a payment from performing a contract. It arises because of the public nature of blockchain transactions and potential network congestion. This paper notes that disputes over payments are similar to classic ownership disputes (such as King Solomon's dilemma). We propose a simultaneous report mechanism that resolves Solomon's dilemma (using only ordinal preference information) and also eliminates blockchain front-running. In each case, the mechanism relies on threats to remove ownership from all claimants and preferences from the legitimate claimant over allocations to other agents.

cs.GT

More (or Less) Economic Limits of the Blockchain

This paper extends the blockchain sustainability framework of Budish (2018) to consider proof of stake (in addition to proof of work) consensus mechanisms and permissioned (where the number of nodes are fixed) networks. It is demonstrated that an economically sustainable network will involve the same cost regardless of whether it is proof of work or proof of stake although in the later the cost will take the form of illiquid financial resources. In addition, it is shown that regulating the number of nodes (as in a permissioned network) does not lead to additional cost savings that cannot otherwise be achieved via a setting of block rewards in a permissionless (i.e., free entry) network. This suggests that permissioned networks will not be able to economize on costs relative to permissionless networks.

cs.CR

Self-Regulating Artificial General Intelligence

Here we examine the paperclip apocalypse concern for artificial general intelligence (or AGI) whereby a superintelligent AI with a simple goal (ie., producing paperclips) accumulates power so that all resources are devoted towards that simple goal and are unavailable for any other use. We provide conditions under which a paper apocalypse can arise but also show that, under certain architectures for recursive self-improvement of AIs, that a paperclip AI may refrain from allowing power capabilities to be developed. The reason is that such developments pose the same control problem for the AI as they do for humans (over AIs) and hence, threaten to deprive it of resources for its primary goal.

cs.AI