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Juan Alvarado

Publications and source records attributed to Juan Alvarado.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Constrained Multi-Relational Graphons with Maximum Entropy

The principle of maximum entropy provides a fundamental framework for characterizing typical structures of large random networks subject to observable constraints. In their pioneering numerical experiments \cite{radin2014asymptotics}, Radin, Ren, and Sadun conjectured that entropy-maximizing graphons satisfying subgraph density constraints are stochastic block models a conjecture we term the RRS conjecture. While several special cases have been proven for single-relation graphs with specific constraint families, the general problem has remained open, particularly for multi-relational networks. We resolve the RRS conjecture for constrained multi-relational graphons in the non-extremal regime, proving that entropy-maximizing solutions are step functions with finitely many blocks under the condition the subgraph density constraints are analytically independent and for almost all feasible combinations of sufficient statistics. Our proof employs a differential geometric technique to study solutions of constrained optimization problems in function space via functions with a finite parametrization (step functions). The two cornerstones of this work are: the generalization of subgraph density notion to $h$-subgraph density and the proof that manifolds that define the constrained region for the solutions maintain topological stability without developing new connected components under refinement. Together, these enable proving that no new global optima emerge in higher-dimensional spaces.

math.CO↗

Constrained Multi-Relational Hyper-Graphons with Maximum Entropy

This work has two contributions. The first one is extending the Large Deviation Principle for uniform hyper-graphons from Lubetzky and Zhao \cite{lubetzky2015replica} to the multi-relational setting where each hyper-graphon can have different arities. This extension enables the formulation of the most typical possible world in Relational Probabilistic Logic with symmetric relational symbols in terms of entropy maximization subjected to constraints of quantum sub-hypergraph densities. The second contribution is to prove the most typical constrained multi-relational hyper-graphons (the most typical possible worlds) are computable by proving the solutions of the maximum entropy subjected by quantum sub-hypergraph densities in the space of multi-relational hyper-graphons are step functions except for in a zero measure set of combinations of quantum hyper-graphs densities with multiple relations. This result proves in a very general context the conjecture formulated by Radin et al.\ \cite{radin2014asymptotics} that states the constrained graphons with maximum entropy are step functions.

math.GM↗

A Fragile multi-CPR Game

A Fragile CPR Game is an instance of a resource sharing game where a common-pool resource, which is prone to failure due to overuse, is shared among several players. Each player has a fixed initial endowment and is faced with the task of investing in the common-pool resource without forcing it to fail. The return from the common-pool resource is subject to uncertainty and is perceived by the players in a prospect-theoretic manner. It is shown in [A.~R.~Hota, S.~Garg, S.~Sundaram, \textit{Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes}, Games and Economic Behavior \textbf{98} (2016) 135--164.] that, under some mild assumptions, a Fragile CPR Game admits a unique Nash equilibrium. In this article we investigate an extended version of a Fragile CPR Game, in which players are allowed to share multiple common-pool resources that are also prone to failure due to overuse. We refer to this game as a Fragile multi-CPR Game. Our main result states that, under some mild assumptions, a Fragile multi-CPR Game admits a Generalized Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we show that, when there are more players than common-pool resources, the set consisting of all Generalized Nash equilibria of a Fragile multi-CPR Game is of Lebesgue measure zero.

cs.GT↗