arXiv subjects

Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

Publications and source records attributed to Juan D. Moreno-Ternero.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Integrating equity and productivity in health evaluation

This paper develops a unified framework for evaluating health outcomes that jointly incorporates equity and productivity. Extending beyond traditional QALYs, PALYs, and the more recent PQALYs, we introduce a broader class of evaluation functions that integrate equity- and productivity-sensitive conditions. By imposing several normative criteria, including independence from measurement scales and Pigou-Dalton transfer principles, we obtain tractable power-form representations. In balancing equity and efficiency, the framework provides a coherent foundation for assessing interventions in contexts where both health and productive capacity are at stake.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture when agents have needs

We consider a setting in which a set of agents are hierarchically organized for a joint venture. They each generate revenues for the joint venture and have individual needs to cover. The aim is to distribute aggregate revenues appropriately. We characterize a family of need-adjusted geometric rules where the net revenue (after covering needs) "bubbles up" in the hierarchy, as well as a need-adjusted serial rule in which the net revenue is equally shared among each agent and his predecessors in the hierarchy.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Intergenerational geometric transfers of income

We study intergenerational transfers of income. In our stylized model, each generation in an infinite (but countable) stream is endowed with some income. An allocation rule associates with each infinite stream another stream, thus involving intergenerational transfers of income. We single out a family of geometric rules as a consequence of imposing axioms formalizing the principles of consistency, continuity and independence (as well as the basic requirements of feasibility and scale invariance).

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

On the fair abatement of riparian pollution

We study the design of fair allocation rules for the abatement of riparian pollution. To do so, we consider the so-called river pollution claims model, recently introduced by Yang et al. (2025) to distribute a budget of emissions permits among agents (cities, provinces, or countries) located along a river. In such a model, each agent has a claim reflecting population, emission history, and business-as-usual emissions, and the issue is to allocate among them a budget that is lower (or equal) than the aggregate claim. For environmental reasons, the specific location along the river where pollutants are emitted is an important concern (the more upstream the location is the higher the damage of polluting the river). We characterize a class of geometric rules that adjust proportional allocations to compromise between fairness and environmental concerns. Our class is an alternative to the one proposed by Yang et al. (2025). We compare both alternatives through an axiomatic study, as well as an illustration for the case study of the Tuojiang Basin in China.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

The geometric adjudication of water rights in international rivers

We study the adjudication of water rights in international rivers. We characterize allocation rules that formalize focal principles to deal with water disputes in a basic model. Central to our analysis is a family of geometric rules that implement concatenated transfers downstream. They can be seen as formalizing Limited Territorial Sovereignty, as suggested in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. We apply our rules to the case of the Nile River, with a long history of disputes between downstream and upstream nations

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

The economics of sportscast revenue sharing

Sports are one of the most significant products of the entertainment industry, accounting for a large portion of all television (and even platform) viewing. Consequently, the sale of broadcasting and media rights is the most important source of revenue for professional sports clubs. We survey the economic literature dealing with this issue, with a special emphasis on the crucial problem that arises with the allocation of revenues when they are raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Historical claims problems

We explore the resolution of claims problems with history. At a given period of time, a group of agents holds claims over an insufficient endowment, as they did in previous periods. The solution to the present-period problem might be influenced by the solutions at previous-periods problems (history). We introduce a natural historical operator, which extends standard rules (solving one-shot claims problems) to construct rules that solve claims problems with history. We study the preservation of properties by this operator and also obtain a characterization result for it.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Proportional redistribution

The ethic of proportional redistribution is a compromise between the extremely compensatory ethic of full redistribution and the needs-blind ethic of laissez-faire. In a basic model of redistribution problems with needs, we characterize proportional redistribution with a combination of axioms that formalize minimal requirements of accountability, functionality, and impartiality. Consequently, we provide a new ethical rationalization for the ancient Aristotelian maxim of proportionality.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

New methods to compensate artists in music streaming platforms

We study the problem of measuring the popularity of artists in music streaming platforms and the ensuing methods to compensate them (from the revenues platforms raise by charging users). We uncover the space of popularity indices upon exploring the implications of several axioms capturing principles with normative appeal. As a result, we characterize several families of indices. Some of them are intimately connected to the Shapley value, the central tool in cooperative game theory. Our characterizations might help to address the rising concern in the music industry to explore new methods that reward artists more appropriately. We actually connect our families to the new royalties models, recently launched by Spotify and Deezer.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Streaming problems as (multi-issue) claims problems

We study the problem of allocating the revenues raised via paid subscriptions to music streaming platforms among participating artists. We show that the main methods to solve streaming problems (pro-rata, user-centric and families generalizing them) can be seen as specific (well-known) rules to solve (multi-issue) claims problems. Our results permit to provide strong links between the well-established literature on claims problems and the emerging literature on streaming problems.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

The Shapley index for music streaming platforms

We study an index to measure the popularity of artists in music streaming platforms. This index, which can be used to allocate the amount raised via paid subscriptions among participating artists, is based on the Shapley value, a centerpiece in cooperative game theory. We characterize this Shapley index combining several axioms formalizing principles with normative appeal. This permits to place the index in the literature, as an alternative to the well-known (and widely used in the industry) pro-rata and user-centric indices.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Fair allocation of riparian water rights

We take an axiomatic approach to the allocation of riparian water rights. We formalize ethical or structural properties as axioms of allocation rules. We show that several combinations of these axioms characterize focal rules implementing the principle of Territorial Integration of all Basin States in various forms. One of them connects to the Shapley value, the long-standing centerpiece of cooperative game theory. The others offer natural compromises between the polar principles of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty and Unlimited Territorial Integrity. We complete our study with an empirical application to the allocation of riparian water rights in the Nile River.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Productivity and quality-adjusted life years: QALYs, PALYs and beyond

We develop a unified framework for the measurement and valuation of health and productivity. Within this framework, we characterize evaluation functions allowing for compromises between the classical quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and its polar productivity-adjusted life years (PALYs). Our framework and characterization results provide a new normative basis for the economic evaluation of health care interventions, as well as occupational health and safety policies, aimed to impact both health and productivity of individuals.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Domestic Competitive Balance and International Success: The Case of The Football Industry

This paper examines the interdependence of international success and competitive balance of domestic sports competitions. More specifically, we apply the notion of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to examine the effect of international rewards on distortion of competitive balance in domestic competitions and derive conditions under which the level of domestic competitive balance raises or falls. Our results yield interesting policy implications for the regulation of prize schemes in international competitions.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Redistribution with Needs

We take an axiomatic approach to study redistribution problems when agents report income and needs. We formalize axioms reflecting ethical and operational principles such as additivity, impartiality and individual rationality. Different combinations of those axioms characterize three focal rules (laissez faire, full redistribution, and need-adjusted full redistribution) as well as compromises among them. We also uncover the structure of those compromises exploring the Lorenz dominance criterion as well as majority voting. Our analysis provides an axiomatic justification for a linear income tax system. We conclude our analysis resorting to Eurostat's Household Budget Survey from where we illustrate the different redistribution patterns accounting for needs across European countries.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Successive Incentives

We study the design of optimal incentives in sequential processes. To do so, we consider a basic and fundamental model in which an agent initiates a value-creating sequential process through costly investment with random success. If unsuccessful, the process stops. If successful, a new agent thereafter faces a similar investment decision, and so forth. For any outcome of the process, the total value is distributed among the agents using a reward rule. Reward rules thus induce a game among the agents. By design, the reward rule may lead to an asymmetric game, yet we are able to show equilibrium existence with optimal symmetric equilibria. We characterize optimal reward rules that yield the highest possible welfare created by the process, and the highest possible expected payoff for the initiator of the process. Our findings show that simple reward rules invoking short-run incentives are sufficient to meet long-run objectives.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Revenue sharing at music streaming platforms

We study the problem of sharing the revenues raised from subscriptions to music streaming platforms among content providers. We provide direct, axiomatic and game-theoretical foundations for two focal (and somewhat polar) methods widely used in practice: pro-rata and user-centric. The former rewards artists proportionally to their number of total streams. With the latter, each user's subscription fee is proportionally divided among the artists streamed by that user. We also provide foundations for a family of methods compromising among the previous two, which addresses the rising concern in the music industry to explore new streaming models that better align the interests of artists, fans and streaming services.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Solidarity to achieve stability

Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.

econ.TH↗