Formation of Circular Directed Networks with Shared Link Costs
This paper develops a noncooperative model of directed network formation in which agents create links to access valuable information while sharing the costs generated along the paths through which information is obtained. Each agent is endowed with a positive amount of information and chooses, simultaneously, which other agents to contact. A directed link initiated by one agent allows her to access the information of the contacted agent and of the latter's reachable network, but each link in the resulting information path entails a unit cost. Payoffs therefore depend on the total value of accessible information net of the accumulated connection costs required to obtain it. The paper characterizes the relationship between strategy profiles and directed graphs, defines accessibility, paths, components, and minimal connectedness, and studies the Nash architectures induced by individual best responses. The central result is that strict Nash equilibria must take the form of circular directed networks. Moreover, circular networks are exactly the Nash networks that use the minimum number of links while allowing every agent to access all available information. Although noncircular weak Nash networks may exist, they are structurally redundant and do not satisfy the same minimality property. The model also shows that strict Nash networks are both Pareto optimal and efficient in terms of aggregate welfare. Finally, the paper compares this framework with Bala and Goyal's model, emphasizing that shared path costs and heterogeneous information values generate different equilibrium implications. The analysis supports the equivalence between strict stability and minimal connectivity in directed information networks.