arXiv subjects

Juan Villacis

Publications and source records attributed to Juan Villacis.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

The Consensus Number of Untraceable Cryptocurrencies

Sender untraceability hides the account spent by a cryptocurrency transfer among a set of candidates, its masking set. What a transfer does to that set separates two designs: classical schemes retain the whole set and append a nullifier marking the spent account, so the ledger grows with every transfer; constant-state schemes instead consume and replace the entire set. We ask how this choice affects synchronization. We formalize the two designs as the linear and constant untraceable asset transfer objects (LUAT and CUAT) and locate them in the consensus hierarchy. In LUAT, transfers from distinct accounts commute. Its consensus number is 2, compared with 1 for standard asset transfer, independently of the masking-set size and of the untraceability notion, and LUAT is starvation-free. Partitioning the accounts into fixed masking sets lets exhausted sets be garbage-collected without increasing that number. In CUAT, a transfer consumes and replaces every account of its masking set, so two transfers whose sets intersect cannot both take effect. We formalize this with the conflict graph on masking sets, whose edges join sets sharing an account. Under weak untraceability, which protects a transaction in isolation, the consensus number is unbounded already for one-round protocols. Under strong untraceability, which protects against an observer of the complete history, untraceability holds on a history exactly when any two accounts sharing a masking set occur in the same number of the masking sets in it. This uniform incidence bounds the conflict graph, and matching constructions attain it, so the consensus number is determined exactly and grows quadratically in the masking-set size. Finally, CUAT is not starvation-free. The two objects therefore pay for the same privacy differently: LUAT in storage, CUAT in synchronization and fairness.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2026

Symmetry all the way down

Asymmetric trust generalizes classical symmetric quorum systems by allowing each process to specify its own failure assumptions. While this flexibility enables tolerance of strictly more failure scenarios, it is not known if, in these cases, it is actually possible to solve distributed tasks, and if so, which. We answer this question using the depth hierarchy for asymmetric trust (Amores-Sesar et al., OPODIS~'25), which characterizes how much a process must rely on others to solve a task. We prove that asymmetric trust does not increase the solvability of tasks requiring depth two or more, such as reliable broadcast or consensus. Specifically, for any Byzantine asymmetric quorum system, every failure scenario that permits solving a task requiring depth at least two can also be tolerated by a suitably constructed Byzantine symmetric quorum system. We show this via a compiler that transforms asymmetric quorum systems into symmetric ones. The additional failure patterns tolerated exclusively by asymmetric trust correspond to scenarios in which only simpler tasks requiring depth one or less (such as consistent broadcast) can be solved. We further prove that this result is tight in the depth hierarchy, meaning that there exist no compilers that produce symmetric quorum systems that are valid also in failure scenarios where correct processes have depths one or less. Our results clarify the precise power of asymmetric trust. While it strictly enlarges the set of tolerable failure patterns, it does not provide additional strength for solving tasks requiring depth two or higher.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2026

Simple-IT: Practical Low-Latency Signature-Free BFT Consensus

Recent advances in quantum computing pose a looming threat to most current Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols, which rely on quantum-vulnerable public-key signature schemes such as Ed25519 and BLS12-381. Instead of switching to much more expensive post-quantum secure signature schemes, an alternative is to use signature-free protocols, which rely only on cheap, post-quantum secure authenticated channels. In this paper, we ask whether signature-free BFT consensus protocols can match the performance of current state-of-the-art, quantum-vulnerable BFT consensus protocols. While previous work on the Sailfish++ protocol showed that state-of-the-art throughput is attainable signature-free, the question of latency is still open. Several recent signature-free protocols have low latency in theory, but they are all very intricate, and no practical implementation has so far been presented. In this work, we propose Simple-IT, a new leader-based, signature-free BFT consensus protocol that achieves a theoretical latency of 4 message delays (one more than the optimum), and only 3 on its optimistic path. Crucially, Simple-IT is simple enough to be amenable to implementation and to practical optimizations such as speculative pipelining, and, as we show experimentally in a geo-distributed testbed, it achieves both throughput and latency competitive with state-of-the-art quantum-vulnerable protocols.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2026

Weaker Assumptions for Asymmetric Trust

In distributed systems with asymmetric trust, each participant is free to make its own trust assumptions about others, captured by an asymmetric quorum system. This contrasts with ordinary, symmetric quorum systems and threshold models, where trust assumptions are uniformly shared among participants. Fundamental problems like reliable broadcast and consensus are unsolvable in the asymmetric model if quorum systems satisfy only the classical properties of consistency and availability. Existing approaches overcome this by introducing stronger assumptions. We show that some of these assumptions are overly restrictive, so much so that they effectively eliminate the benefits of asymmetric trust. To address this, we propose a new approach to characterize asymmetric problems and, building upon it, present algorithms for reliable broadcast and consensus that require weaker assumptions than previous solutions. Our methods are general and can be extended to other core problems in systems with asymmetric trust.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2025

DAG-based Consensus with Asymmetric Trust [Extended Version]

In protocols with asymmetric trust, each participant is free to make its own individual trust assumptions about others, captured by an asymmetric quorum system. This contrasts with ordinary, symmetric quorum systems and with threshold models, where all participants share the same trust assumption. It is already known how to realize reliable broadcasts, shared-memory emulations, and binary consensus with asymmetric quorums. In this work, we introduce Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)-based consensus protocols with asymmetric trust. To achieve this, we extend the key building-blocks of the well-known DAG-Rider protocol to the asymmetric model. Counter to expectation, we find that replacing threshold quorums with their asymmetric counterparts in the existing constant-round gather protocol does not result in a sound asymmetric gather primitive. This implies that asymmetric DAG-based consensus protocols, specifically those based on the existence of common-core primitives, need new ideas in an asymmetric-trust model. Consequently, we introduce the first asymmetric protocol for computing a common core, equivalent to that in the threshold model. This leads to the first randomized asynchronous DAG-based consensus protocol with asymmetric quorums. It decides within an expected constant number of rounds after an input has been submitted, where the constant depends on the quorum system.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2025

Deanonymizing Ethereum Validators: The P2P Network Has a Privacy Issue

Many blockchain networks aim to preserve the anonymity of validators in the peer-to-peer (P2P) network, ensuring that no adversary can link a validator's identifier to the IP address of a peer due to associated privacy and security concerns. This work demonstrates that the Ethereum P2P network does not offer this anonymity. We present a methodology that enables any node in the network to identify validators hosted on connected peers and empirically verify the feasibility of our proposed method. Using data collected from four nodes over three days, we locate more than 15% of Ethereum validators in the P2P network. The insights gained from our deanonymization technique provide valuable information on the distribution of validators across peers, their geographic locations, and hosting organizations. We further discuss the implications and risks associated with the lack of anonymity in the P2P network and propose methods to help validators protect their privacy. The Ethereum Foundation has awarded us a bug bounty, acknowledging the impact of our results.

cs.CR↗