arXiv subjects

Juba Ziani

Publications and source records attributed to Juba Ziani.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2025

Fairness Issues and Mitigations in (Differentially Private) Socio-Demographic Data Processes

Statistical agencies rely on sampling techniques to collect socio-demographic data crucial for policy-making and resource allocation. This paper shows that surveys of important societal relevance introduce sampling errors that unevenly impact group-level estimates, thereby compromising fairness in downstream decisions. To address these issues, this paper introduces an optimization approach modeled on real-world survey design processes, ensuring sampling costs are optimized while maintaining error margins within prescribed tolerances. Additionally, privacy-preserving methods used to determine sampling rates can further impact these fairness issues. This paper explores the impact of differential privacy on the statistics informing the sampling process, revealing a surprising effect: not only is the expected negative effect from the addition of noise for differential privacy negligible, but also this privacy noise can in fact reduce unfairness as it positively biases smaller counts. These findings are validated over an extensive analysis using datasets commonly applied in census statistics.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Algorithmic Collusion Without Threats

There has been substantial recent concern that pricing algorithms might learn to ``collude.'' Supra-competitive prices can emerge as a Nash equilibrium of repeated pricing games, in which sellers play strategies which threaten to punish their competitors who refuse to support high prices, and these strategies can be automatically learned. In fact, a standard economic intuition is that supra-competitive prices emerge from either the use of threats, or a failure of one party to optimize their payoff. Is this intuition correct? Would preventing threats in algorithmic decision-making prevent supra-competitive prices when sellers are optimizing for their own revenue? No. We show that supra-competitive prices can emerge even when both players are using algorithms which do not encode threats, and which optimize for their own revenue. We study sequential pricing games in which a first mover deploys an algorithm and then a second mover optimizes within the resulting environment. We show that if the first mover deploys any algorithm with a no-regret guarantee, and then the second mover even approximately optimizes within this now static environment, monopoly-like prices arise. The result holds for any no-regret learning algorithm deployed by the first mover and for any pricing policy of the second mover that obtains them profit at least as high as a random pricing would -- and hence the result applies even when the second mover is optimizing only within a space of non-responsive pricing distributions which are incapable of encoding threats. In fact, there exists a set of strategies, neither of which explicitly encode threats that form a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous pricing game in algorithm space, and lead to near monopoly prices. This suggests that the definition of ``algorithmic collusion'' may need to be expanded, to include strategies without explicitly encoded threats.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Differential Privacy Overview and Fundamental Techniques

This chapter is meant to be part of the book "Differential Privacy in Artificial Intelligence: From Theory to Practice" and provides an introduction to Differential Privacy. It starts by illustrating various attempts to protect data privacy, emphasizing where and why they failed, and providing the key desiderata of a robust privacy definition. It then defines the key actors, tasks, and scopes that make up the domain of privacy-preserving data analysis. Following that, it formalizes the definition of Differential Privacy and its inherent properties, including composition, post-processing immunity, and group privacy. The chapter also reviews the basic techniques and mechanisms commonly used to implement Differential Privacy in its pure and approximate forms.

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arXiv2024

On Rider Strategic Behavior in Ride-Sharing Platforms

Over the past decade, ride-sharing services have become increasingly important, with U.S. market leaders such as Uber and Lyft expanding to over 900 cities worldwide and facilitating billions of rides annually. This rise reflects their ability to meet users' convenience, efficiency, and affordability needs. However, in busy areas and surge zones, the benefits of these platforms can diminish, prompting riders to relocate to cheaper, more convenient locations or seek alternative transportation. While much research has focused on the strategic behavior of drivers, the strategic actions of riders, especially when it comes to riders walking outside of surge zones, remain under-explored. This paper examines the impact of rider-side strategic behavior on surge dynamics. We investigate how riders' actions influence market dynamics, including supply, demand, and pricing. We show significant impacts, such as spillover effects where demand increases in areas adjacent to surge zones and prices surge in nearby areas. Our theoretical insights and experimental results highlight that rider strategic behavior helps redistribute demand, reduce surge prices, and clear demand in a more balanced way across zones.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Differentially Private Data Release on Graphs: Inefficiencies and Unfairness

Networks are crucial components of many sectors, including telecommunications, healthcare, finance, energy, and transportation.The information carried in such networks often contains sensitive user data, like location data for commuters and packet data for online users. Therefore, when considering data release for networks, one must ensure that data release mechanisms do not leak information about individuals, quantified in a precise mathematical sense. Differential Privacy (DP) is the widely accepted, formal, state-of-the-art technique, which has found use in a variety of real-life settings including the 2020 U.S. Census, Apple users' device data, or Google's location data. Yet, the use of DP comes with new challenges, as the noise added for privacy introduces inaccuracies or biases and further, DP techniques can also distribute these biases disproportionately across different populations, inducing fairness issues. The goal of this paper is to characterize the impact of DP on bias and unfairness in the context of releasing information about networks, taking a departure from previous work which has studied these effects in the context of private population counts release (such as in the U.S. Census). To this end, we consider a network release problem where the network structure is known to all, but the weights on edges must be released privately. We consider the impact of this private release on a simple downstream decision-making task run by a third-party, which is to find the shortest path between any two pairs of nodes and recommend the best route to users. This setting is of highly practical relevance, mirroring scenarios in transportation networks, where preserving privacy while providing accurate routing information is crucial. Our work provides theoretical foundations and empirical evidence into the bias and unfairness arising due to privacy in these networked decision problems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Bayesian Strategic Classification

In strategic classification, agents modify their features, at a cost, to ideally obtain a positive classification from the learner's classifier. The typical response of the learner is to carefully modify their classifier to be robust to such strategic behavior. When reasoning about agent manipulations, most papers that study strategic classification rely on the following strong assumption: agents fully know the exact parameters of the deployed classifier by the learner. This often is an unrealistic assumption when using complex or proprietary machine learning techniques in real-world prediction tasks. We initiate the study of partial information release by the learner in strategic classification. We move away from the traditional assumption that agents have full knowledge of the classifier. Instead, we consider agents that have a common distributional prior on which classifier the learner is using. The learner in our model can reveal truthful, yet not necessarily complete, information about the deployed classifier to the agents. The learner's goal is to release just enough information about the classifier to maximize accuracy. We show how such partial information release can, counter-intuitively, benefit the learner's accuracy, despite increasing agents' abilities to manipulate. We show that while it is intractable to compute the best response of an agent in the general case, there exist oracle-efficient algorithms that can solve the best response of the agents when the learner's hypothesis class is the class of linear classifiers, or when the agents' cost function satisfies a natural notion of submodularity as we define. We then turn our attention to the learner's optimization problem and provide both positive and negative results on the algorithmic problem of how much information the learner should release about the classifier to maximize their expected accuracy.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Equilibria of Data Marketplaces with Privacy-Aware Sellers under Endogenous Privacy Costs

We study a two-sided online data ecosystem comprised of an online platform, users on the platform, and downstream learners or data buyers. The learners can buy user data on the platform (to run a statistic or machine learning task). Potential users decide whether to join by looking at the trade-off between i) their benefit from joining the platform and interacting with other users and ii) the privacy costs they incur from sharing their data. First, we introduce a novel modeling element for two-sided data platforms: the privacy costs of the users are endogenous and depend on how much of their data is purchased by the downstream learners. Then, we characterize marketplace equilibria in certain simple settings. In particular, we provide a full characterization in two variants of our model that correspond to different utility functions for the users: i) when each user gets a constant benefit for participating in the platform and ii) when each user's benefit is linearly increasing in the number of other users that participate. In both variants, equilibria in our setting are significantly different from equilibria when privacy costs are exogenous and fixed, highlighting the importance of taking endogeneity in the privacy costs into account. Finally, we provide simulations and semi-synthetic experiments to extend our results to more general assumptions. We experiment with different distributions of users' privacy costs and different functional forms of the users' utilities for joining the platform.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Personalized Differential Privacy for Ridge Regression

The increased application of machine learning (ML) in sensitive domains requires protecting the training data through privacy frameworks, such as differential privacy (DP). DP requires to specify a uniform privacy level $\varepsilon$ that expresses the maximum privacy loss that each data point in the entire dataset is willing to tolerate. Yet, in practice, different data points often have different privacy requirements. Having to set one uniform privacy level is usually too restrictive, often forcing a learner to guarantee the stringent privacy requirement, at a large cost to accuracy. To overcome this limitation, we introduce our novel Personalized-DP Output Perturbation method (PDP-OP) that enables to train Ridge regression models with individual per data point privacy levels. We provide rigorous privacy proofs for our PDP-OP as well as accuracy guarantees for the resulting model. This work is the first to provide such theoretical accuracy guarantees when it comes to personalized DP in machine learning, whereas previous work only provided empirical evaluations. We empirically evaluate PDP-OP on synthetic and real datasets and with diverse privacy distributions. We show that by enabling each data point to specify their own privacy requirement, we can significantly improve the privacy-accuracy trade-offs in DP. We also show that PDP-OP outperforms the personalized privacy techniques of Jorgensen et al. (2015).

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Oracle Efficient Algorithms for Groupwise Regret

We study the problem of online prediction, in which at each time step $t$, an individual $x_t$ arrives, whose label we must predict. Each individual is associated with various groups, defined based on their features such as age, sex, race etc., which may intersect. Our goal is to make predictions that have regret guarantees not just overall but also simultaneously on each sub-sequence comprised of the members of any single group. Previous work such as [Blum & Lykouris] and [Lee et al] provide attractive regret guarantees for these problems; however, these are computationally intractable on large model classes. We show that a simple modification of the sleeping experts technique of [Blum & Lykouris] yields an efficient reduction to the well-understood problem of obtaining diminishing external regret absent group considerations. Our approach gives similar regret guarantees compared to [Blum & Lykouris]; however, we run in time linear in the number of groups, and are oracle-efficient in the hypothesis class. This in particular implies that our algorithm is efficient whenever the number of groups is polynomially bounded and the external-regret problem can be solved efficiently, an improvement on [Blum & Lykouris]'s stronger condition that the model class must be small. Our approach can handle online linear regression and online combinatorial optimization problems like online shortest paths. Beyond providing theoretical regret bounds, we evaluate this algorithm with an extensive set of experiments on synthetic data and on two real data sets -- Medical costs and the Adult income dataset, both instantiated with intersecting groups defined in terms of race, sex, and other demographic characteristics. We find that uniformly across groups, our algorithm gives substantial error improvements compared to running a standard online linear regression algorithm with no groupwise regret guarantees.

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arXiv2023

Randomized Quantization is All You Need for Differential Privacy in Federated Learning

Federated learning (FL) is a common and practical framework for learning a machine model in a decentralized fashion. A primary motivation behind this decentralized approach is data privacy, ensuring that the learner never sees the data of each local source itself. Federated learning then comes with two majors challenges: one is handling potentially complex model updates between a server and a large number of data sources; the other is that de-centralization may, in fact, be insufficient for privacy, as the local updates themselves can reveal information about the sources' data. To address these issues, we consider an approach to federated learning that combines quantization and differential privacy. Absent privacy, Federated Learning often relies on quantization to reduce communication complexity. We build upon this approach and develop a new algorithm called the \textbf{R}andomized \textbf{Q}uantization \textbf{M}echanism (RQM), which obtains privacy through a two-levels of randomization. More precisely, we randomly sub-sample feasible quantization levels, then employ a randomized rounding procedure using these sub-sampled discrete levels. We are able to establish that our results preserve ``Renyi differential privacy'' (Renyi DP). We empirically study the performance of our algorithm and demonstrate that compared to previous work it yields improved privacy-accuracy trade-offs for DP federated learning. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that solely relies on randomized quantization without incorporating explicit discrete noise to achieve Renyi DP guarantees in Federated Learning systems.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Sequential Strategic Screening

We initiate the study of strategic behavior in screening processes with multiple classifiers. We focus on two contrasting settings: a conjunctive setting in which an individual must satisfy all classifiers simultaneously, and a sequential setting in which an individual to succeed must satisfy classifiers one at a time. In other words, we introduce the combination of strategic classification with screening processes. We show that sequential screening pipelines exhibit new and surprising behavior where individuals can exploit the sequential ordering of the tests to zig-zag between classifiers without having to simultaneously satisfy all of them. We demonstrate an individual can obtain a positive outcome using a limited manipulation budget even when far from the intersection of the positive regions of every classifier. Finally, we consider a learner whose goal is to design a sequential screening process that is robust to such manipulations, and provide a construction for the learner that optimizes a natural objective.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Wealth Dynamics Over Generations: Analysis and Interventions

We present a stylized model with feedback loops for the evolution of a population's wealth over generations. Individuals have both talent and wealth: talent is a random variable distributed identically for everyone, but wealth is a random variable that is dependent on the population one is born into. Individuals then apply to a downstream agent, which we treat as a university throughout the paper (but could also represent an employer) who makes a decision about whether to admit them or not. The university does not directly observe talent or wealth, but rather a signal (representing e.g. a standardized test) that is a convex combination of both. The university knows the distributions from which an individual's type and wealth are drawn, and makes its decisions based on the posterior distribution of the applicant's characteristics conditional on their population and signal. Each population's wealth distribution at the next round then depends on the fraction of that population that was admitted by the university at the previous round. We study wealth dynamics in this model, and give conditions under which the dynamics have a single attracting fixed point (which implies population wealth inequality is transitory), and conditions under which it can have multiple attracting fixed points (which implies that population wealth inequality can be persistent). In the case in which there are multiple attracting fixed points, we study interventions aimed at eliminating or mitigating inequality, including increasing the capacity of the university to admit more people, aligning the signal generated by individuals with the preferences of the university, and making direct monetary transfers to the less wealthy population.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents

We study the problem faced by a data analyst or platform that wishes to collect private data from privacy-aware agents. To incentivize participation, in exchange for this data, the platform provides a service to the agents in the form of a statistic computed using all agents' submitted data. The agents decide whether to join the platform (and truthfully reveal their data) or not participate by considering both the privacy costs of joining and the benefit they get from obtaining the statistic. The platform must ensure the statistic is computed differentially privately and chooses a central level of noise to add to the computation, but can also induce personalized privacy levels (or costs) by giving different weights to different agents in the computation as a function of their heterogeneous privacy preferences (which are known to the platform). We assume the platform aims to optimize the accuracy of the statistic, and must pick the privacy level of each agent to trade-off between i) incentivizing more participation and ii) adding less noise to the estimate. We provide a semi-closed form characterization of the optimal choice of agent weights for the platform in two variants of our model. In both of these models, we identify a common nontrivial structure in the platform's optimal solution: an instance-specific number of agents with the least stringent privacy requirements are pooled together and given the same weight, while the weights of the remaining agents decrease as a function of the strength of their privacy requirement. We also provide algorithmic results on how to find the optimal value of the noise parameter used by the platform and of the weights given to the agents.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Information Discrepancy in Strategic Learning

We initiate the study of the effects of non-transparency in decision rules on individuals' ability to improve in strategic learning settings. Inspired by real-life settings, such as loan approvals and college admissions, we remove the assumption typically made in the strategic learning literature, that the decision rule is fully known to individuals, and focus instead on settings where it is inaccessible. In their lack of knowledge, individuals try to infer this rule by learning from their peers (e.g., friends and acquaintances who previously applied for a loan), naturally forming groups in the population, each with possibly different type and level of information regarding the decision rule. We show that, in equilibrium, the principal's decision rule optimizing welfare across sub-populations may cause a strong negative externality: the true quality of some of the groups can actually deteriorate. On the positive side, we show that, in many natural cases, optimal improvement can be guaranteed simultaneously for all sub-populations. We further introduce a measure we term information overlap proxy, and demonstrate its usefulness in characterizing the disparity in improvements across sub-populations. Finally, we identify a natural condition under which improvement can be guaranteed for all sub-populations while maintaining high predictive accuracy. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments on real-world datasets.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias-Variance Trade-offs in Data Acquisition

While users claim to be concerned about privacy, often they do little to protect their privacy in their online actions. One prominent explanation for this "privacy paradox" is that when an individual shares her data, it is not just her privacy that is compromised; the privacy of other individuals with correlated data is also compromised. This information leakage encourages oversharing of data and significantly impacts the incentives of individuals in online platforms. In this paper, we study the design of mechanisms for data acquisition in settings with information leakage and verifiable data. We design an incentive compatible mechanism that optimizes the worst-case trade-off between bias and variance of the estimation subject to a budget constraint, where the worst-case is over the unknown correlation between costs and data. Additionally, we characterize the structure of the optimal mechanism in closed form and study monotonicity and non-monotonicity properties of the marketplace.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2021

Gaming Helps! Learning from Strategic Interactions in Natural Dynamics

We consider an online regression setting in which individuals adapt to the regression model: arriving individuals are aware of the current model, and invest strategically in modifying their own features so as to improve the predicted score that the current model assigns to them. Such feature manipulation has been observed in various scenarios -- from credit assessment to school admissions -- posing a challenge for the learner. Surprisingly, we find that such strategic manipulations may in fact help the learner recover the meaningful variables -- that is, the features that, when changed, affect the true label (as opposed to non-meaningful features that have no effect). We show that even simple behavior on the learner's part allows her to simultaneously i) accurately recover the meaningful features, and ii) incentivize agents to invest in these meaningful features, providing incentives for improvement.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Pipeline Interventions

We introduce the \emph{pipeline intervention} problem, defined by a layered directed acyclic graph and a set of stochastic matrices governing transitions between successive layers. The graph is a stylized model for how people from different populations are presented opportunities, eventually leading to some reward. In our model, individuals are born into an initial position (i.e. some node in the first layer of the graph) according to a fixed probability distribution, and then stochastically progress through the graph according to the transition matrices, until they reach a node in the final layer of the graph; each node in the final layer has a \emph{reward} associated with it. The pipeline intervention problem asks how to best make costly changes to the transition matrices governing people's stochastic transitions through the graph, subject to a budget constraint. We consider two objectives: social welfare maximization, and a fairness-motivated maximin objective that seeks to maximize the value to the population (starting node) with the \emph{least} expected value. We consider two variants of the maximin objective that turn out to be distinct, depending on whether we demand a deterministic solution or allow randomization. For each objective, we give an efficient approximation algorithm (an additive FPTAS) for constant width networks. We also tightly characterize the "price of fairness" in our setting: the ratio between the highest achievable social welfare and the highest social welfare consistent with a maximin optimal solution. Finally we show that for polynomial width networks, even approximating the maximin objective to any constant factor is NP hard, even for networks with constant depth. This shows that the restriction on the width in our positive results is essential.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Algorithms and Learning for Fair Portfolio Design

We consider a variation on the classical finance problem of optimal portfolio design. In our setting, a large population of consumers is drawn from some distribution over risk tolerances, and each consumer must be assigned to a portfolio of lower risk than her tolerance. The consumers may also belong to underlying groups (for instance, of demographic properties or wealth), and the goal is to design a small number of portfolios that are fair across groups in a particular and natural technical sense. Our main results are algorithms for optimal and near-optimal portfolio design for both social welfare and fairness objectives, both with and without assumptions on the underlying group structure. We describe an efficient algorithm based on an internal two-player zero-sum game that learns near-optimal fair portfolios ex ante and show experimentally that it can be used to obtain a small set of fair portfolios ex post as well. For the special but natural case in which group structure coincides with risk tolerances (which models the reality that wealthy consumers generally tolerate greater risk), we give an efficient and optimal fair algorithm. We also provide generalization guarantees for the underlying risk distribution that has no dependence on the number of portfolios and illustrate the theory with simulation results.

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