arXiv subjects

Julian Chingoma

Publications and source records attributed to Julian Chingoma.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Proportionality for Constrained Public Decisions

We study situations where a group of voters need to take a collective decision over a number of public issues, with the goal of getting a result that reflects the voters' opinions in a proportional manner. Our focus is on interconnected public decisions, where the outcome on one or more issues has repercussions on the acceptance or rejection of other issues in the agenda. We show that the adaptation of classical justified-representation axioms to this enriched setting are always satisfiable only for restricted classes of public agendas. We adapt well-known proportional decision rules to take the structure of the public agenda into account, and we show that they match justified-representation properties in approximation on a class of expressive constraints. We also identify another path to achieving proportionality on interconnected issues via an adaptation of the notion of priceability.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Apportionment with Weighted Seats

Apportionment is the task of assigning resources to entities with different entitlements in a fair manner, and specifically a manner that is as proportional as possible. The best-known application is the assignment of parliamentary seats to political parties based on their share in the popular vote. Here we enrich the standard model of apportionment by associating each seat with a weight representing the (objective) value of that seat. A seat's weight reflects the fact that different seats might come with different roles, such as chair or treasurer. We define several apportionment methods and natural fairness requirements for this new setting, and we study the extent to which our methods satisfy these requirements. Our findings show that full fairness is harder to achieve than in the standard apportionment setting. Yet, for several natural relaxations of those requirements we can achieve stronger results than in the more expressive model of fair division with entitlements, where the values of objects are subjective.

cs.GT↗