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Julian G. Zilly

Publications and source records attributed to Julian G. Zilly.

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Existence as Distinguishability: Quantum Mechanics from Finite Graded Equality

We derive finite-dimensional quantum mechanics from a single ontological principle, that \emph{existence is constituted by distinguishability}, together with two structural commitments: finite capacity $N$ (parametric input) and self-referential consistency (SRC, a closure schema with two equivalent forms, operational and information-theoretic). SRC unpacks into eight derived structural conditions; structural unambiguity (S5) completes the hierarchy, uniquely selecting the Born rule as the geometric/probabilistic closure. The graded distinguishability kernel $K(x,y) \in [0,1]$ realises both axioms, with a state constituted by its $K$-profile against all others. For each $N \geq 3$, the unique distinguishability space is $(\mathbb{C} P^{N-1}, K)$ with $K(ψ,ϕ) = 1 - |\langleψ|ϕ\rangle|^2$, from which complex coefficients, the Born rule $p_k = |c_k|^2$, unitary dynamics, and tensor-product composition all follow. Indeterminism is forced by capacity overflow; alternatives (e.g. Bohmian mechanics) are classified rather than refuted. Standard QM is the $N \to \infty$ limit; finite $N$ is the only free parameter. The algebraic spine is machine-checked in Lean 4 modulo five imported classical theorems and the existence direction of Stone's theorem; the Appendix states the verification scope.

quant-ph

Today Me, Tomorrow Thee: Efficient Resource Allocation in Competitive Settings using Karma Games

We present a new type of coordination mechanism among multiple agents for the allocation of a finite resource, such as the allocation of time slots for passing an intersection. We consider the setting where we associate one counter to each agent, which we call karma value, and where there is an established mechanism to decide resource allocation based on agents exchanging karma. The idea is that agents might be inclined to pass on using resources today, in exchange for karma, which will make it easier for them to claim the resource use in the future. To understand whether such a system might work robustly, we only design the protocol and not the agents' policies. We take a game-theoretic perspective and compute policies corresponding to Nash equilibria for the game. We find, surprisingly, that the Nash equilibria for a society of self-interested agents are very close in social welfare to a centralized cooperative solution. These results suggest that many resource allocation problems can have a simple, elegant, and robust solution, assuming the availability of a karma accounting mechanism.

cs.MA