arXiv subjects

Julian N. Marewski

Publications and source records attributed to Julian N. Marewski.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2019

Heuristics as conceptual lens for understanding and studying the usage of bibliometrics in research evaluation

While bibliometrics are widely used for research evaluation purposes, a common theoretical framework for conceptually understanding, empirically studying, and effectively teaching its usage is lacking. In this paper, we outline such a framework: the fast-and-frugal heuristics research program, proposed originally in the context of the cognitive and decision sciences, lends itself particularly well for understanding and investigating the usage of bibliometrics in research evaluations. Such evaluations represent judgments under uncertainty in which typically not all possible options, their consequences, and those consequences' probabilities of occurring may be known. In these situations of incomplete information, candidate descriptive and prescriptive models of human behavior are heuristics. Heuristics are simple strategies that, by exploiting the structure of environments, can aid people to make smart decisions. Relying on heuristics does not mean trading off accuracy against effort: while reducing complexity, heuristics can yield better decisions than more information-greedy procedures in many decision environments. The prescriptive power of heuristics is documented in a cross-disciplinary literature, cutting across medicine, crime, business, sports, and other domains. We outline the fast-and-frugal heuristics research program, provide examples of past empirical work on heuristics outside the field of bibliometrics, explain why heuristics may be especially suitable for studying the usage of bibliometrics, and propose a corresponding conceptual framework.

cs.DL↗

arXiv2018

Opium in science and society: Numbers

In science and beyond, numbers are omnipresent when it comes to justifying different kinds of judgments. Which scientific author, hiring committee-member, or advisory board panelist has not been confronted with page-long "publication manuals", "assessment reports", "evaluation guidelines", calling for p-values, citation rates, h-indices, or other statistics in order to motivate judgments about the "quality" of findings, applicants, or institutions? Yet, many of those relying on and calling for statistics do not even seem to understand what information those numbers can actually convey, and what not. Focusing on the uninformed usage of bibliometrics as worrysome outgrowth of the increasing quantification of science and society, we place the abuse of numbers into larger historical contexts and trends. These are characterized by a technology-driven bureaucratization of science, obsessions with control and accountability, and mistrust in human intuitive judgment. The ongoing digital revolution increases those trends. We call for bringing sanity back into scientific judgment exercises. Despite all number crunching, many judgments - be it about scientific output, scientists, or research institutions - will neither be unambiguous, uncontroversial, or testable by external standards, nor can they be otherwise validated or objectified. Under uncertainty, good human judgment remains, for the better, indispensable, but it can be aided, so we conclude, by a toolbox of simple judgment tools, called heuristics. In the best position to use those heuristics are research evaluators (1) who have expertise in the to-be-evaluated area of research, (2) who have profound knowledge in bibliometrics, and (3) who are statistically literate.

cs.DL↗