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Julio Trecenti

Publications and source records attributed to Julio Trecenti.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

INACIA: Integrating Large Language Models in Brazilian Audit Courts: Opportunities and Challenges

This paper introduces INACIA (Instru\c{c}\~ao Assistida com Intelig\^encia Artificial), a groundbreaking system designed to integrate Large Language Models (LLMs) into the operational framework of Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts (TCU). The system automates various stages of case analysis, including basic information extraction, admissibility examination, Periculum in mora and Fumus boni iuris analyses, and recommendations generation. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate INACIA's potential in extracting relevant information from case documents, evaluating its legal plausibility, and formulating propositions for judicial decision-making. Utilizing a validation dataset alongside LLMs, our evaluation methodology presents a novel approach to assessing system performance, correlating highly with human judgment. These results underscore INACIA's potential in complex legal task handling while also acknowledging the current limitations. This study discusses possible improvements and the broader implications of applying AI in legal contexts, suggesting that INACIA represents a significant step towards integrating AI in legal systems globally, albeit with cautious optimism grounded in the empirical findings.

cs.CL

Judicial Favoritism of Politicians: Evidence from Small Claims Court

Multiple studies have documented racial, gender, political ideology, or ethnical biases in comparative judicial systems. Supplementing this literature, we investigate whether judges rule cases differently when one of the litigants is a politician. We suggest a theory of power collusion, according to which judges might use rulings to buy cooperation or threaten members of the other branches of government. We test this theory using a sample of small claims cases in the state of São Paulo, Brazil, where no collusion should exist. The results show a negative bias of 3.7 percentage points against litigant politicians, indicating that judges punish, rather than favor, politicians in court. This punishment in low-salience cases serves as a warning sign for politicians not to cross the judiciary when exercising checks and balances, suggesting yet another barrier to judicial independence in development settings.

econ.GN