arXiv subjects

Jumin Kim

Publications and source records attributed to Jumin Kim.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

PVAC: A RowHammer Mitigation Architecture Exploiting Per-victim-row Counting

As DRAM scaling exacerbates RowHammer, DDR5 introduces per-row activation counting (PRAC) to track aggressor activity. However, PRAC indiscriminately increments counters on every activation -- including benign refreshes -- while relying solely on explicit RFM operations for resets. Consequently, counters saturate even in an idle bank, triggering cascading mitigations and degrading performance. This vulnerability arises from a fundamental mismatch: PRAC tracks the aggressor but aims to protect the victim. We present Per-Victim-row hAmmered Counting (PVAC), a victim-based counting mechanism that aligns the counter semantics with the physical disturbance mechanism of RowHammer. PVAC increments the counters of victim rows, resets the activated row, and naturally bounds counter values under normal refresh. To enable efficient victim-based updates, PVAC employs a dedicated counter subarray (CSA) that performs all counter resets and increments concurrently with normal accesses, without timing overhead. We further devise an energy-efficient CSA layout that minimizes refresh-induced counter accesses. Through victim-based counting, PVAC supports higher hammering tolerance than PRAC while maintaining the same worst-case safety guarantee. Across benign workloads and adversarial attack patterns, PVAC avoids spurious Alerts, eliminates PRAC timing penalties, and achieves higher performance and lower energy consumption than prior PRAC-based defenses.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

RoMe: Row Granularity Access Memory System for Large Language Models

Modern HBM-based memory systems have evolved over generations while retaining cache line granularity accesses. Preserving this fine granularity necessitated the introduction of bank groups and pseudo channels. These structures expand timing parameters and control overhead, significantly increasing memory controller scheduling complexity. Large language models (LLMs) now dominate deep learning workloads, streaming contiguous data blocks ranging from several kilobytes to megabytes per operation. In a conventional HBM-based memory system, these transfers are fragmented into hundreds of 32B cache line transactions. This forces the memory controller to employ unnecessarily intricate scheduling, leading to growing inefficiency. To address this problem, we propose RoMe. RoMe accesses DRAM at row granularity and removes columns, bank groups, and pseudo channels from the memory interface. This design simplifies memory scheduling, thereby requiring fewer pins per channel. The freed pins are aggregated to form additional channels, increasing overall bandwidth by 12.5% with minimal extra pins. RoMe demonstrates how memory scheduling logic can be significantly simplified for representative LLM workloads, and presents an alternative approach for next-generation HBM-based memory systems achieving increased bandwidth with minimal hardware overhead.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2025

SoK: Systematizing a Decade of Architectural RowHammer Defenses Through the Lens of Streaming Algorithms

A decade after its academic introduction, RowHammer (RH) remains a moving target that continues to challenge both the industry and academia. With its potential to serve as a critical attack vector, the ever-decreasing RH threshold now threatens DRAM process technology scaling, with a superlinearly increasing cost of RH protection solutions. Due to their generality and relatively lower performance costs, architectural RH solutions are the first line of defense against RH. However, the field is fragmented with varying views of the problem, terminologies, and even threat models. In this paper, we systematize architectural RH defenses from the last decade through the lens of streaming algorithms. We provide a taxonomy that encompasses 48 different works. We map multiple architectural RH defenses to the classical streaming algorithms, which extends to multiple proposals that did not identify this link. We also provide two practitioner guides. The first guide analyzes which algorithm best fits a given RHTH, location, process technology, storage type, and mitigative action. The second guide encourages future research to consult existing algorithms when architecting RH defenses. We illustrate this by demonstrating how Reservoir-Sampling can improve related RH defenses, and also introduce StickySampling that can provide mathematical security that related studies do not guarantee.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Per-Row Activation Counting on Real Hardware: Demystifying Performance Overheads

Per-Row Activation Counting (PRAC), a DRAM read disturbance mitigation method, modifies key DRAM timing parameters, reportedly causing significant performance overheads in simulator-based studies. However, given known discrepancies between simulators and real hardware, real-machine experiments are vital for accurate PRAC performance estimation. We present the first real-machine performance analysis of PRAC. After verifying timing modifications on the latest CPUs using microbenchmarks, our analysis shows that PRAC's average and maximum overheads are just 1.06% and 3.28% for the SPEC CPU2017 workloads -- up to 9.15x lower than simulator-based reports. Further, we show that the close page policy minimizes this overhead by effectively hiding the elongated DRAM row precharge operations due to PRAC from the critical path.

cs.AR↗